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Doctrine as Data examines the issues and opportunities
around machine acquisition

and analysis

ol legal doctrine. This

federal appellate case opinion texts,

work sought

clump

constituted.

The

balancing

test,

as well as a logic

is

a nimble

knowledge

structure however,

where parameters and understandings

in case

subject doctrine for this project, compelling interests of the

proved

rights are established.

to

clump of

which could be procured and empirically analyzed with

inlormation processing technology. Doctrine
existing as a

to treat doctrine as data, as a

law are

strict scrutiny

be a logic where notions of legitimate police power and individual

That logic

is flexible,

beyond opinions from a myriad of cases

and responsive, going

politically sensitive,

said manifesting doctrine.

Doctrine as Data examines information systems and their practices of indexing and
accessing appellate case opinions to explore whether these systems are significant to
sustaining, or challenging, conceptualizations of doctrine in cases.

The examination

consists of defining, identifying, and collecting appellate case opinions exhibiting the

compelling interest doctrine using the preeminent hard bound and computer legal
information systems

The

(i.e.

West's digests and reporters and Lexis

project also introduces a

new

tool, the

/

Nexis respectively).

InQuery search engine from the University of

Massachusetts' Center for Intelligent Information Retrieval, to analyze that collection for

conceptual coherency attributed to doctrine,

i.e.

to

probe doctrine's presence

in,

and

reJationship to, case opinions.

It

appears however that doctnne
exists outside of cases, or

rather, is attributed to cases
through traditions oflegal practice,

scholarship moreso than in the
systems created to

V

manage

commentary, and

law's hard data.
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CHAPTER

I

DOCTRINE, DATA, AND MACHINES
A. Introduction

Doctrine as Data explores information
machinesi and praeliees of knowledge

management
knowledge

as they help constitute

meaning

for legal doctrine. Legal

structure, a textual signifier for the
contested meanings,

docuinc

is

a

and contests of

meaning, lor Judicial decision making and
case opinions. Those contests, and

their

authontativc results, are sustained across diverse
practices of law, polities, commentary,

and scholarship. Doctrine however

is

intimately associated with law's hard data,
case

opinions, and by association with the systems and
traditions for managing and providing

access to that data.

To examine how

inlormation machines,

if

it is

doctrine

made meaningful,

upon which inlormation machines and
said to take

its

most

common

is

made meaningful through
this project treats

analytical processes

may

law's

case opinions as data

toil,

and where doctrine

is

from.

Legal inlormation systems for storing, indexing, and providing access

to

case

opinions arc primary tools for legal professionals and scholars. Organization and

mcaninglul manipulation arc the key practices helping shape

how

case opinions arc

encountered and ultimately utilized or interpreted. This project examines several of these
practices and inlormation machines in a constitutive analysis^ of the compelling state

^

A

machine, or information system,

representing iuiy metliod juid/or

is

not a formal designation,

mechanism devised

it

is

a loose signifier,

mid organize access to a collection of daui
objects. Alphabetization of a rokxlex witli index ctirds for individual enaies is a simple example. “An
inlomiation system is an ordering of miy fomi of daUi in a way tliat makes it understandable and retrievable.
Think of every information system as having two pints. The first part is die database of information, tlie
second pint is tlie organizing system. No matter what form of information system one approaclies, these
two principles come into play. The information system model cmi be used to amuige pure data, or to array
objects. It is as complex as an enormous on-line database, or as simple as one's wallet” (Berring, 1994:
to order

50).

2john Brigham (Brighiun, 1996) outlines constitutive examinations of law and legal phenomena
to the scK'ial practices which make tliem meaningful, giving life to the forms luid

by paying attention

interest doctrine in religious
free exercise law.3 Doctrine
us

manner in which, these
in

in the

Uie

practices manifest, incorporate,
sustain, enhance, or aller doctrine

an area of conslituUonal law. Or,

clump),

Data explores wheUicr. and

words of

the text,

is

doctrine less in the bodies of opinions

and more

in the

shared understandings

(i.e.

(,.e.

as a

as a

parameter) of those texts by commentators
and judges operating with the formal
authorities
ot

West

digests and reporters or Lexis/Nexis?

This exploration of doctrine and case
opinions through legal information
systems
part ol a constructed story. That story
originally

was designed

to

is

use the InQueryTseaich

engine to examine the conceptual content^
of a collection of cases delimited by die

compelling interest doctrine

more accurately

in free exercise law.

That doctrine represents a tension, or

the site lor a tension to be legally
manifested, between conceptions of

is

legitimate state action and notions of individual
freedom;

drawn and re-drawn through

it

is the site

where

At such boundaries, legitimacy seems

attributed to the relationship
positive. In the

concepts

in law.

element

is

Brigham suggests

be explored Uirough

-

between

American version

appellate courts, coherency

tlie

Compelling

in a balancing

boundary

state

ol the

critical to the state’s role,

and individual

common

law

(i.e.

in appellate

and coherency

line drawing), is nomiatively

tradition, especially witliin federal

the lileblood of the relationship suggested between doctrine.

tliat

practices which

texts can also

make

be examined

in

nnmner,

tliis

tliat is,

law’s texts can

tliem meaningful.

interests is a standard said residing in individual rights law.

lunchon which weighs an individual’s

rights against

tlie

It

represents one

loosely defined interests of

In tree exercise law,

tlie state.

commonly

held to define

tlie

is

the vagaries of case law, statutes, statutory
interpretation and

implementation, administrative rules and decision making,
and ultimately
courts.

a

tlie doctrinal signifier compelling interests (and its many synonyms)
standards of practice for evaluating cases where a state law or policy, or

conceivably inactivity, was claimed to deny an individual of his/her rights

is

to exercise tlieir religious

beliefs.

^ InQuery search engine

is an probabilistic inference information retrieval tool developed by tlie
Center of Intelligent Information Retrieval at tlie University of Massachusetts. InQuery is tlie backbone of
tlie InfoSeek
search engine, tlie THOMAS Library of Congress legislative database

WWW

Concepts for

tlie

purpose of InQuery, and Information Retrieval generally, are considered

lexically contained in noun-phrases
for

tlie

(i.e.

single nouns or strings of nouns <uid connectors).

examination of occurrence frequencies and associations between noun phrases across a

collection.

2

to

be

InQuery allows
text

prcccden,. and
part or

.siarc decisis,

many views and

as

i,

Hows

ihrough ihc ease disposidon
process. Coherency

precedent are often measured
against coherency.

It is

quite likely

as with notions of rationality in
Judicial rea,soning and product,
rhetoric

and

contexts), as

tradition

it is

is

ideologies about law, about
t.rder, about rule of law;
doctrine ttnd

(i.e.

of the

u,se

is

however
as

much

of powerful language persuasively

that

coherency,

the result of

in particular

universally valid metrics.

Originally, the goal

was

to explore, using

whether doctrines presence, as a clump
text or those cases,

i.e.

ol data objccLs, coiTclated
to

did judges reason and cralt
opinions in such a

pattern of treatment, or at least
consistent
interest doctrine in religious

abstraction, a product

contemporary inlormation machines,

ol'

methods of case

IVccdom? Doctrine however

practices and relationships

dillicult to SLisUiin^ in lormal information

itscll',

any coherency

way

in the

as to imply a

disposition, with the compelling
is

a

knowledge

a

knowledge

structure

structure

ol'

some

which

is

machines without the guiding hand of knowledge

cxperts.7 Thus, Doctrine as Data took
a rencxivc approach, to

examine information

systems as they shape understandings of doctrine
and cases, while simultaneously using
those machines to identity and explore compelling
interest doctrine in a collection of cases.

^ SusUiin

licre in tlic

sense of

its

identity or rneiuiing being elear,

known, and

relatively statie

and

resisUint to rapid change.

Knowledge expert is a kxise categorization or signilier for a class or sub-group of individuals
domains ol social activity who organize, provide access to, luul structure information relevant to their
institutional pursuits. In law knowledge experts are not simply tliose who pos.sess tlie greatest collection
Ironi

or recollection ol data

commenhitors from

(i.e.

facts

and rules

luid prrKes.ses) but are constituted

judicial, political, .social,

and

.scholarly ranks.

3

by opinion

crafters, .select

^ Streams
1.

works are not

sociolcgal investigations, but this
project
textual analysis system to

may

Interests

map

initially

typical places in

is dilTcrent.

which

A large public

the occurrences of phrases

Shakespeare provided the spark of inspiration
for

ol objects,

Back||rnnnH

or doctor's notes on asthma and
a dispute over whether Shakespeare

the author ol recently uncovered

mlormation not

-

Asthma, Shakespeare, and Compelling

A collcclion
was

of Thoini ht

to

ground

health database and a

and words

in the

works of

Each system showed how

this project.

evident while looking at individual
data objects, or even a sequence

be uncovered or constructed by investigating
relationships and patterns

within and between data objects in a large
collection of related

The Center

texts.

for Intelligent Information Retrieval
(CIIR) at the University of

Massachusetts developed a national database of doctors'
notes regarding asthma and
breathing related dilliculties using the InQuery
search engine (Aronow, et
313).

The database was designed

policies lor

to assist health

al.,

1995: 309-

maintenance providers develop coverage

asthma and breathing problems amongst members

in addition to providing a

large collection ol inlormation lor both actuarial and
medical research purposes. InQuery

databases support natural language processing of users' queries and
return
that either contain supplied search terms or contain terms or
phrases

all

documents

which highly co-occur

with supplied search terms.^

As
symptoms

part ol the testing ol this system, and also to define the coverage space of
related to asthma, doctors

were asked

to

query the database with search terms

and phrases they thought indicated the representation of an asthma
return appropriate doctors' notes. Doctors

came up with terms

attack,

like,

and thus would

"shortness of breath,"

"dilliculty breathing after exercise," "cold weather," "wheezing," to supply to the search

^ Natural huiguagc queries tae simply information requests eomposed of everyday huiguage instead
ol structured

query kuiguages grounded

in tilings like Bcxileiui logic.

4

engine

in

hopes of returning doctor's notes
which indicated an asthma

attack.

InQuery

autoniahcally expanded the doctor's
queiy by adding to the supplied
search terms

terms or phrases which occurred
with the supplied terms relatively
oltcn

(i.e.

ilio.se

high co-

occurrence). 'What the doctors did
not know, and what InQuery
was able to expo.se, was
that the phrase "night

asthma

That

attacks.

coughs” also appeared

to

highly coirelatc with doctimeiiLs
indicating

"night coughs" had a high
co-tKcurrcnce with .some ol the d,K-t„r

is,

supplied search terms, therefore InQuery
returned documents with night coughs
large
to the

number

in

them, a

them could be described as asthma
exacerbation or attack reports according

ol

reviewing doctors.

InQuery took a knowledge representation
and request from the users and derived

more inlormation by exploring
the

document

collection,

the textual

environment around the supplied search terms

by assessing relationships

that exist across the corpus,

those relationships to support the information
retrieval task.

in

and using

InQuery uncovered

inlormation, a textual correlation between the
occurrence of "night coughs" and other
indicators of asthma attack. Information

becomes knowledge however when

incorporated in the systems of understanding about asthma
and

becomes an assessment
improvements
In

in

ot the data

which

makes sense

symptoms, when

it

or leads to sensible

understanding and treatment.

another realm of inquiry and investigation the patterns of words across
a related

corpus was significant

in

arguing authorship. During the

over authenticity of some works thought

new document,

to

was doubt and debate

system was employed which derived

was considered

in the scholarly

statistical representations

Shakespeare's works, or at least those largely assumed

those patterns with the contested document to
likely or not

Shakespeare had written

late 1980's there

was

a dispute

be written by Shakespeare (Kolata, 1986:3).

or rather, a newly uncovered document,

Shakespeare's, but there

in

either

its

it is

to

be

community.

5

be

A software

of the patterns of word use
his.

make an assessment

it.

to

A

Researchers compared

as to whether

it

was

These clTons showed

Ihal

il

was

possible lo derive inlormation,
and perhaps

knowledge, not oiheiwise possessed
hy the so-called knowledge
experis, hy using
inlormation systems that idcntily
textual characleristics and
relationships across a large
collection of related text

Doctrine as Data

first

documents

asked whether

(e.g. doctor's

this sort

notes or Shakespearean works).

of approach could be applied in
siKiolegal

sludy, specifically, could a collection
of case law, related doctrinally,
be explored lor
textual relationships, patterns,

and maybe even coherency using

InOuery','

Could more be

learned about the structuring power of
doctrine by looking at a doctrinal
collection ca.scs

with InQucry? In this project compelling
interest doctrine was

asthma, and the .search then becomes for
free exercise law's
a,s,scssmenLs or interpretations of

The compelling

them for a

to

he analogous with

own

night coughs, and

different realm of information cxpcni.se.

interest balancing test in free cxcrci.se
ca.scs at the federal circuit of

appeals and .Supreme Court has been the

.site

of political controversy and activity

l9X0's and I99(l's. In this form compelling
intorcsl doctrine

of understanding and associating meaning to hard
objccLs
provides

Icrtilc

and individual

ground lor the

setting

law either directly or indirectly

part ol that test the

.setting

between legitimate

parameters

As such
state

it

power

interferes with their right to freely exercise

Supreme Court had

is

the strict scrutiny

test.

As

established the compelling interest standard in the

(

Sherhert

v.

asked, amongst other things, whether the policy

and therefore superseded the religious

under some attack

where an individual claims a

contravening the First Amendment,

1960's in this area of constitutional law

interest,

a logic,

cases and law.

like

for deciding free exercise appeals, cases

their religious beliefs thus

test

boundary

politics ol

is

in the

rights.

The standard
state policy or

making

in the 1980's as federal

and

Verner. 374 US. 398, (1963)). The
at issue

served a compelling state

free exercise claim.

slate prisoners

used

That standard had come
it

to file

numerous

claims against prison administrations, criticism tended to focus most on the difficulty

6

in

assessing wiial

which seemed

was compelling, and even wheUier
the

courts ought to be making ihal

to be a policy or logtslativc
determtnation.

The Court changed

doctrinal course in 1990 with
the Smith

.

1

10 S.Ct. 1595,

(1990) decision and iushee Seaha’s
majority opinion regarding religious
Iree exereisl and
prohibition or peyote use. Justice
Scalia criticized the prolTered
existing

standard and spccilically the
compelling interest doctrine supporting

time rc-articulatmg judicial treatment
for
the challenged

law or policy

interests, appellate

at least free exercise cases.

to strict scrutiny

and attempt

to identify

it

strict

while

scrutiny

at the

same

Rather Uian subjecting

and balance

relative

judges should only determine whether
the challenged law or policy

is

discriminatory, lacially or one would
suppose, disparatcly impacts upon an
identifiable

group. Weighing interests and identifying
them as compelling

making bodies

like a legislature writes Justice
Scalia.

conducts policy making with

all

Act

U.S.C.

thus by default,

if

the legislature

2()()()bb to 2(X)()bb-4

to pass the Religious

(Supp.

V

Freedom Restoration

1994)) to re-install the compelling

interest doctrine s balancing standard in appellate
court review of free exercise cases.

RFRA
Elorcs,

has subsequently been overturned by the Supreme Court in
City of Boerne
1

17 S.Ct. 2157, (1997) as an unconstitutional usurpation of
judicial

legislative branch. This political

attention,

in

and has shown

it

to

is

to rise to the level of a constitutional
question.

wake of Mith Congress moved

(RFRA - 42

the realm of policy

considerations of due process, then whether the
interest

compelling or not, does not seem
In the

And

is

and

judicial jockeying

brought

tlie

The

v.

power by

the

doctrine considerable

be a robust and ubiquitous knowledge structure, showing up

balancing acts throughout constitutional decision making. Compelling interest doctrine's

role as a logic or site

lurther solidified

as to

when

exercise?

where a

when

its

particular

lorm

ol political action or tension takes place

ubiquity in constitutional rights law

interests are compelling, generally

How an

interest

and

7

exposed. Questions arise

in specific contexts like religious free

became compelling? And, what

procedures

is

is

sort of balancing test

exist tor assessing the relative
merits of a state interest or
conversely of an individual's free

exercise interest?

Compelling

stale interests

have never been

fully defined, or outlined
as a semi-

lornial institutional practice of
appellate courts. Neither had an
area of law, like religious
tree exercise,

attention to

been empirically investigated with
information machines which pay

word occurrence and co-occurrence

the insight to probe this area of
case law with

Lcxis/Nexis. Judge

Noonan’ was

able to

patterns.

parliculai-

A federal circuit court judge had

what was then cutting edge technology,

show

that in a large

number of cases where

violations of religious free exercise
were claimed, that the purveyors of official
acts
prevailed. »> In a subset of those cases

was lound

interest

to exist,

no standard determination

it

is

rea.sonable to expect that a compelling
stale

and was a factor

in

upholding state policies. There

for the existence of such interests,
this

and compelling

interests,

as of yet

gap has been commented

upon by other appellate judges.” Judge Noonan
made a contribution
tree exercise

is

to our

knowledge of

and he showed the power and potential for computer

assisted legal research into structures like doctrine.

In E^jgal Emplpyrngnt Op portunity C ommis.sion v, Townlev
Engineering .V Maniinu tiirino
859
F.2d
CiLa
610, (1988), di.ssenting Judge Noonan determined tliat in tlie wide area of First Amendment
cases tliat very rarely is a challenge to governmental policy sustained. This
seems at (xlds widi tlie words
of die compelling government interest in tlie First Amendment realm, that is,
“tliat tlie policy is least
restrictive and tliat it serves a compelling government interest.”
Intuitively tliis would appear a high hurdle
to jump, but yet state and federal policies have enjoyed significant success when
challenged, i.e. compelling
interests mid least restrictive means are apparently easily secured.

where

tlie

Specifically, Judge Noonan had his law clerk perform a Lexis search
term “free exercise” was within 10 words of unconstit! or relig!.

^ ^

III

Waters

v.

Churchill.

concern over die doctrine.
is

required by die First

We have

1

a batch of cases

14 S. Ct. 1878 (1994), a free speech case, die Court declared

never set forth a general

Amendment-just

constitutes a compelling state interest.
J.

to find

Michael Waller and Bridget Brooker

test to

its

determine when a procedural safeguard

as we have never set fordi a general test to determine what
This opinion cites Justice O'Connor's opinion in, Michael Boos.
v.

Marion

S. Barry, Jr..

Mayor of D.C..

et. al..

485 U.,S.312,

1988 where she goes dirough die determination of whedier a compelling interest exists in die federal
govenimeiiLs limidng access to foreign embassies for die purpose of polidcal protest; diere is no apparent

model or guideline upon which O'Connor builds her

case.

8

The Robust MoHpI

C.

1.

Doctrine as Data for Information
Machines

This project was designed

cmpincal analysis, attempting

to treat legal doctrine as
data (i.e. as a

that

however showed doctnne

stmcture constructed and deployed

in

to

clump)

be a llcxible knowledge

commentaiy, education, case disposition,
and

opinion production. Yet, doctrine's
relationship to appellate case
opinions
regardless of the particular form doctrine
takes.

The

subjecting a collection of case opinions
tied together by that doctrine
structure) to

computer analysis

in search

attributed to cases by scholars and praciiiioners.i3

is

foundational

original goal of the projeci

explore the conceptual domain of the
compelling state interest doctrine

knowledge

for

(i.e.

(i.e.

as a

was

to

clump) by

the logic or

of coherencyi2 distinct from that

The InQuery search engine

pre,sented

the opportunity to identify concepLs and
their occurrence and co-occurrence
frequencies

across a collection ol related documents.
It

was hoped

that

InQuery could be used

to ascertain

whether doctrine was

manilested structurally in case opinions, to investigate
whether there were patterns

concept occurrences and associations which correlate

to doctrine’s

supposedly

determinative role in two groups ol federal appellate free exercise
cases,
the state's interests prevailed or

1

were

in

in

i.e.

those where

essence compelling, or those where individual

a

The coherency ot doctrine is rigged to a degree. Autlioritative understandings and expert
knowledge of doctrine and cases were used to define and construct tlie corpus (i.e., supreme court and
circuit courts of appeal, focused

around

tlie

First

Amendment and

its

federal

protections of religious free exercise,

operational in particular period

( 1963-present)).
And, tlie language of a balancing test will be present
a wide conceptual net, or rigged coherency, InQuery can identify all concepts, if
are patterns or occurrences of interest beyond tliose used to select tlie collection we may find tliem

tliroughout.
tliere

witli

But

tliat is

InQuery.

Clearly

tlie definition of tlie data set, or collection of cases, relied on expert knowledge, tuid tlie
knowledge in tlie determination of what should be in tlie collection and what should not.
That knowledge is part and parcel of a community of individuals, situated in and around legal institutions

application ol

tliat

tuid tlie research tliereof.

1

1

^ Occurrence frequencies

frequency signifies

tlie

are simple counts of plirase

spatial relationship

between

plirases

9

/

term occurrences

and terms.

in tlie texts; co-(x:currence

righLs claims

trumped

stale interests.

The

project sought to determine whether
collected

cases were tied together primarily
by expert knowledge brought to boar in
legtU information

management, or

instead,

was

there

something

in the cases

themselves which could be

argued suggested a variant of coherency
and bound them together beyond some
basic
textual

common
The

denominators?

projeet originally sought to

doctrine, and the cases

mamlesting

augment

as part of

it,

the study of judicial politics by viewing

what has been considered a

discoursei-‘>

where conceptual contests (Connolly, 1974) and
affirmations of law's coherency
place. Scholars following in the realist
tradition take a skeptical or critical

claiming

it

is

view of doctnne,

indeterminate, used to rationalize and situate those
decisions in traditions of

interpretation (Gordon, 1984;

Kennedy, 1979; Kerruesh, 1991; Barkan, 1987).

Coherency or consistency conferring from doctrine
reasons case decisions arc

Doctrine however

Compelling

take

still

made

(e.g.

is

contrived then, hiding the real

behavioral or political or otherwise sociological).

provides elements of meaning to decisions and case opinions.

state interest,

while

it

may

be superficial rigmarole,

still

appears to matter to

judges, lawyers, advocates, disputants, and observers of cases
by structuring expectations

and relationships and enabling the domains of winners and losers
individual faith and public welfare,

Compelling

interest doctrine in religious

jurisprudence also seems to matter significantly to Congress, as

Summer ol

1999, and

moving

forth

in legal contests

on another attempt

it is

between

freedom

debating, as late as the

to reinvigorate the compelling

^
Discourse has become a term used so often as to almost lose its shape, tlierefore for a brief
survey in socio-legal use see (White, 1990; Smitli, 1994, Davies, 1996; Smitli, 1995)
^

A

Law generally, and legal knowledge structures like dextrine
wide range of social and political contexts. For more discussion See
1996 which significantly for Uiis project suggests a constitutive approach

constitutive assertion:

specifically, take ultimate shape a

Brigham, Const, of Interests

.

understanding taw’s texts is possible, presenting a
practices which provide for understanding tliem.

way

to

examine law’s

autlioritative data

through

tlie

to

interesl standard

Compelling

n expressly jettisoned

interests in the

never will be entirely

movemenks and

static,

by the Supreme Court

domain of religious Ireedom
it

is still

made meaningful,

reflexive relationship between
law's authority and

its

it

is a structure

evolving social

Law's Words and Phrases

in

1990

.

being constituted, and likely

remains a vibrant logic where
policy and

individual righus are

2.

m Smith in

ca,ses

and social

exemplifying the

reality.

Context

Karl Llewellyn's oft cited Bramble
Bush (Llewellyn, 1930) includes a treatise
on
the tlexibility of judges within a

framework of legalism and

legalism's structuring power, doctrine
(e.g.

is

disputes; in disputes, subject to

most pronounced. Llewellyn, and other

Frank, 1935; 1949) refer to practices like
precedent and stare decisis as doctrine, and

used rules to describe more specific practices
lor the distinction to be llattcned
interest, exist

by

in

and around case disposition.

m a subset ot a general class of legal rules.

Compelling

It is

useful

stipulating that doctrine, such as compelling
state

These

notions of practice like precedent or specific
constructs like the
test.

realists

interest's particular class

may

rules

include broad

"strict scrutiny

balancing

of informal rules are developed incrementally

thiough case disposition, building a precedential momentum,
providing either routes of
judicial action or rationalizations for routes of action.

Llewellyn details the act of making sense of the language, and practices behind,
appellate opinions, and assessing the resulting law (Llewellyn, 1930; 25-69).
Llewellyn

claimed that
41).

To do

positive

in

that

order to grasp a case you must read

you must know

the

knowledge; understanding

possible roles given a language's

The Religious Liberty

it

knowledgeably (Llewellyn, 1930:

words contextually
is

grounded

grammar and

Protection Act

-

in addition to

an empirically

in positive definitions

of words, and their

idiosyncrasies, as well as narrower context

Summer

of 1999 (H.R. 1691)

For a more detailed history of compelling interests
of Congress to contravene die Smitli decision, see Chapter 3.

in

Free Exercise, and Uie subsequent efforts

specitic relationships.

The

assoaanons amongst them

latter

that

who

word or phrase use and

amnnaUon

develop and sustain them, "the

m the wide network of their long associations"

The study of law and language
particular legal understandings
is

practices of

develop over ume, and ihe

subsequent knowledge workers
using of them,

depend on

tutd

life

rcphcation by

of words

,s in

(Llewellyn, 19,^0: 41

the

).

focuses on the manner in which
language su-uclures

and contexts, how law

is interpreted,

and ultimately how

it

applied and socially constituted
(Brigham, 1978; Conley and
O'Barr, 199(1; White. 1990

Fish, 1980; Constable. 1998).
Brigham's Consiiiulional

I

;

.anr.,»a. an early efforl to

refocus public law analysis on a
specific legal language and
domain specific concepts,

explored grammars

word use give

in constitutional discourse.

life to that

Perhaps part ol that sense making

m

word

is

when

manifested

they

"make sense" (Brigham,

in relationships

1978).

between concepts as

or phrase, and could be explored with
tools that identify concepts

phrases) and their occurrences and associations

Hanna

asscxhated practices of

language and those concepts hy delimiting
when constitutional

Utterances are reasonable and unreasonable,

constituted

Grammars and

Pitkin also explored the

way

(e.g.

InQuery).

legal language

m her writing on Wittgenstein and Justice (Pitkin,

(i.e.

and words become meaningful

1972). Pitkin, appropriating the

work of

Paul Zitf (Zitf, 1960), argued that words become
meaningful through their repeated and

expected use
static

in context, in "cases."

Rather than being conceptually fixed signifiers for

meanings, many words are ever evolving, always though dependent
upon use,

acceptance, and repetition. Phrase or word, "meaning
distribution in language, the linguistic environment in

Pitkin argued that the

occur

meaning depends on

in its position in those expressions,"

normally" (Pitkin, 1972:

11).

is

determined by the word's

which

the "set of other

and "the

it

occurs" (Pitkin, 1972: 11).

words

that

can also normally

set of expressions in

which

it

occurs

The InQuery

search engine identifies
nounphrascsi’ and their .Kcurrcncc
and cooccurrence frequencies ,n document
collections. Scholarship in
tnformation retrieval has

shown

that nounphrases, espec.ally
those

collection, often
the

for

convey

occumng most

often, ,n a

significant meaningful content
for that collection.^!
Informalion in

form of occumence frequency and
co-occurrence association

knowledge of a coqius of related

mimics or

signifies a

texts.

It

is

statistics ha,s implications

Often that knowledge

key characteristic for the corpus

highly occurring nounphrase).
ol night

doma.n specif.c»text

is

redundant

(e g. in doctors' notes

possible though that the

knowledge

is

in that

it

"asthma"

is

a

novel, like that

coughs hcing a strong indicator of asthma,
hardly redundant, perhaps even

financially and medically significant.
This project hypothesized that occurrence
and co-

occurrence frequency

statistics for

nounphrases across the collection could be

explore compelling interest doctrine.
Specifically,

this project

utilized to

sought to probe for the

correlation ot compelling interests doctrine
with patterns and distinctions between two

groups ot opinions,

i.e.

those religious free exercise cases where
the state's interest

prevailed and those where such interests were
trumped by an individual rights claim.

3.

A

At the dawn of the computer era
processing presented

new

Robust Machine

political scientists

suggested that electronic data

opportunities to study law and the decisions judges

(Lovenger, 1963). This project adopts that Jurimetric suggestion
date.

At

its

most

make

at a significantly later

abstract this project proposed to construct a metaphorical

machine

comprised of a number of individual information management systems, each system would

Nounphrases
complex expression.

are simply strings of nouns and connectors, typically one word, but often

70

The specificity of tlie domain in tliis project is cases representing Free Exercise of religion and
exhibiting a balancing test signified by compelling interest doctrine.
See Information ReUieval scholarship: (Justeson and Katz, 1995; ting and Croft, 1994;
et.

af, 1991).

Croft,

be pun of a process of identifying
and colIecUng da, a ob|oe,s22wi,h
dislinc, a,Cribu,cs23
be analyzed as an aggregate by
InQuery. InQuety is the last
part of that process, and

perfomrs textual examination of
data objects rdenttlted and
collected under the compelhng
interest rubric.

This model was considered robust
because

it

could stand well removed from
the machine, simply
querying

was designed so
,l

to identify

and

meeting a particular characterislic, or
characteristics, and then using InQuery
textual patterns or
that a researcher

coherency

in subsets

of those cases. For instance,

it

that users

collect cases

look for

was designed so

could ask InQuery to produce
occuitence and co-occun ence frequency

stalislics for all lho.se

compelling

intere,st

cases where Justice Scalia wrote
the opinion and

the stale's interest prevailed, in
hopes of finding pattems to iho.se opinions
or other such

subsets.

The ease

eolleetion

was

originally to be defined in purely textual
terms

prolile24 possessing partieular terms
and phrases in defined patterns),
lull text

database

(i.e.

Lexis

/

was planned

and eolleeted from a

some cursory human examination of those

to tag data objects for later data set
subdivision

The process of trying

examination.

using a

Nexis or Westlaw) by executing automated,
hands-off,

searches derived Irom the profile, and then
cases

(i.e.

to

and InQuery

implement the robust model however raised

lundamental questions about the target doctrine, and consequently
about doctrine as a

knowledge

structure in law, and

constitute the

meaning

how systems

for doctrine

for

managing law's information help

and cases. The attempt

at

automated, hands off data

set

22 DaUi

objects are appellate cases for tliese legal intormation systems. The machine meUiphor
corresponds to inlormation management systems like tliat of tlic Lawyers Cooperative,
West digests and
reporters, and otlier autlioritative systems of primary source organization and
access. Systems like Lexis
Nexis and Westlaw arc in fact electronic computational machines to which users connect via computer

/

networks.

Attributes

a semi-specialized term. In information retrieviil an attribute is a characteristic or
a particular data object or objects. See work (Sartori, 1970) which suggests dial
attributes, fact patterns, or oUier observed characteristics, arc autlioritative in segregating data collections.

meaning associated

is

witli

9zl

Compelling state interests balancing tests or sUuidards possess several textutU signifiers,
Uierelore cases had to be screened for die presence of diose terms, phrases, and concepts. As explained later
diis was attempted bodi via automated computer searching and screening, as well as interactively widi a
computer and hardbound digest

dehniuon and acqu.siiion problematizod.
or
notion

made meaningful through

which define things

at least

brought tnto

traditions of legal practice,
education,

like a doctrinal

relevant actors. At one instant
doctrine

times, while

it

is

and professional
ol case

that

that

traditions,

management

can be articulated

clump could
(i.e.

apparent that doctrine
it

is

law or judicial practice

information

is

con.sidered a

clump, describing a panicular area
of

that

in

more

is

is

die .setting

clump of

ca.ses,

judicial practice

like a logic or a arena

doetrme Irom those

in

sy,stems, doctrine as a

or at least delimiting

and law. At other

clump may be a knowledge

representation

an information management system,
cases considered

law

may

the needs of

constructed and contested. This duality
challenges

likely not fixed in

management systems

and

where knowledge about an area

held identification and value assignment).
But, since doctnne
is

a

is

a central product and cuirency
of those intellectual

.simply be tagged with an identifier
by the infomiation

clump, and

and scholarship

space and operate accordingly.
Docuine

chameleon, yet one that takes on
different roles depending
upon

and defining

relief, doctrine’s identity,
a

or

its

meaning

may

in

in that

management system
is

often

more than

ju.st

any one context, the current information

not be able to ineorporate

traditions into indexing structures

all

knowledge of

and practices, and thus may create

tensions between what these systems present and
the intellectual world that most system

users inhabit.

The Reflexive Model

D.

1.

An

Evolution

Challenges of the Robust Machine

-

The robust lormulation was overly ambitious from both
technological) and substantive
trying to

(i.e.

a practical

subject matter) perspective. Early in the process of

implement the robust model

it

was apparent

that an information representation of

compelling interests within a particular area of constitutional law
religion)

(i.e.

and over a defined domain

(i.e.

Supreme Court and

appeals) challenged both automated collection with

full text

(i.e.

free exercise of

federal circuit courts of

search tools and our

under., a„d.ngs
.cu-,eval

o,'

doc.rine^ Scholarsh.p

which

system. (Blair and Mai'cn,
1985) suggested

collect, on of cases

considered relattvely constant

in tree exerci.se

attempt automated collection via
Lexis

as practical

(i.c.

the goal of stepping

hands off data

/

part of

iLs

jurisprudence,

i,

.seemed reasonable

Nexis or Westlaw. Additionally,
the robust

away from knowledge

set acquisition), to .see just

law produced many

experts and audtority as

how

fal.se

/

Nexis. This proved largely

(i.e.

ca.ses

an information rcprc.sentation Lexis

much

of compelling

data ohjecis that

.satisfied

which arc known

and data

.set

definition

and di.scovcry forced

examination of what was being asked of the
machines, and the doctrinal

as

itse

to

be

random sampling or scholarship and commentary.

Dillicullies with lull text tools

the doctrine itscll 1 his dilliculty

much

doctrine inriticnced the ca.se

determinative

positives

query but were not "on point"), and also
mi.sscd

relevant as determined cither from

as

cases between 1963 and the
present, and

full text .searching for ca,scs
rcpre.senting the

interests in tree exerci.se

the .search

.nl„n„a,i«n

that using iuli-tex, tools
to ulontity a

opinions, led to an attempt a, atitomautd
collection via Lexis

impossible, as

ol l,dl

Ye, because contpelling
tnteresus were

dilTicult.

were an expressed and seemingly
tmporlani

model included

cmcacy

fed together by an abstraction
or complex expression
such

compelling interest doctrine could
be

10

Cesied ,he

/

Nexis could

a re-

profile created as

.search on, as well as the very nature of

was only enhanced when held

against the oriorl to control

as passible for the aulhoritalivc understandings of
doctrine. 25

To pursue

a lexical

analysis of a collection of doctrinally related case opinions
with InQuery required relying

on doctrine being a

relatively lixed notion solidly in the

prolc.ssionals and scholars, and

more importantly,

case opinions. Doctrine's presence

is

minds and practices of law

as icxltially prc.scnl and significant in

indeed fixed, but beyond that there

is Ihiidily

and

9S

ConlToIling lor aulhoriUilivc notions ol compelling inicrcsLs in Free Exercise was a hall hearted
endeavor, die reality was diat a searcher had to consult auUiorily, or be educated/ trained in a context wliere
intellectual auUiorily about constitutional law was clearly present, was a delault. At
best what we sought
-

to

do was use audiority

to structure the

cases Irom certain subsUintive

piamneters ol die daUi set
cluaacteristics.

we

panuneters of our seju-ches

<u"eas), alter that

we

between certain dates :uid including
is, once establishing the basic
had some very basic textual

(e.g.

setached blind. That

then looked lor dadi objects within dial

debate, .nUetemtinacy and
pol.t.cs, doctrine

Ute eases, ot at leas,
attnbuted to dtent, bn,

is ,n

parsing doctrtne out easily,
or even identify.ng the
cases which manifest

was

it,

a

d.meuh

proposition.

Attempting
authority
the

to use

Lexis

/

Nexis for data

from knowledge experts)

(i.c.

meaning of case opinions and

is

style to things like doctnne.

interesLs

were applied

in

domain

to

Do

But

editors to notice.'

undermined,

in

in

gather the doctnnal

attribute substance

u.se

and
of

when and how compelling

is that

authority around compelling

objeefs in the various machines of
law’s

Or

And by

is that

doctrine too inconsequential an
abstraction for

association,

is

the

expanding universe of

information systems destabilizing to
abstractions like doctrine?
It

and inlluence

cases exemplified the determinative

be consulted to assess

As

to

that

the highly indexed and editorialized
machines like 'West’s digests and

reporters sustain that authority?

Wests

was impossible

specific decisions.

interests sustained in the ca.ses
as data?

inlormation?

It

knowledge experts who

To know which

compelling interests scholarship had

and acquisition showed

essential to doetnne's
presence

areas oflaw.

collection without significant
reference to

set definition

Do we

legal

need authority, or

an arena where everyone has the tools the
make what they

is

will out of the

product of judges?

2.

Doctrine and the Practices of Law's Machines

The proposed

exploration of doctrine through information machines
assumes that

doctrine could be treated as data in the lorm of appellate
case opinion texts, and as a logic

through which the meaning of those

Data

is

texts, not to

mention

judicial practice, is articulated.

acquired or interpreted from a source phenomena, and

practices ol inlormation

management and

made meaningful through

presentation, be they of neurons, parchment, or

electro-magnetic discs. Data becomes inlomiation, becomes meaningful, in the service of

knowledge workers and

their practices.

structure attributes of law’s data, this

Machines of legal information depend upon and

work explores

that with respect to

compelling

interest

U explores how d.lTcrcm mach.nes

dcK-trine.

»pinion,s lied together
KS at

by doctrine, or

work withm. Machine

practices,

is

are used ,o present, or

at least die

in

available.

expert knowledge which
suggests d.Ktnne

used metaphorically here,
relemng

and knowledge stmetures employed

make

to the technology,

manipulating data objecLs, making
ihem

nteaninglul inlormation. Decisions
aboul laws hard data,

how

cases are organised and
indexed, are specifications
incorporated in machines. Tho.se
decisions directly inniicncc

how

u.sers

expenence

ca.se

i.e.

law becau.se the machines provide
specilic interfaces between

data and user. Interfaces, and the
knowledge representation .schemes
under girding them,

do more than allow unencumbered
access

to law's

hard data, Ihey .shape

how

it is

known

and applied.
Practices develop lor identifying,
collecting, and manipulating cases
relative to

understandings ol them. Traditional case
management tools
reporters

were

built

around

like

West's digests and

editorial practices of data manipulation,
subject area

categorization, synopsis creation, and key
numbering.

Newer

tools use different practices,

for instance the adoption of universal
indices in full-text Lcxis/Ncxis, and the
application of

concept occLin-cncc and co-occurrence frequencies
This project turns

its

to aid in

document

retrieval in InOuciy.

attention to those practices and their inlTicnce
on notions of doctrine

and case opinions.

3.

Constitutive Practices and Doctrine

This work ultimately presents a constitutive analysis of doctrine and
case opinions.

That analysis

is

conducted through an examination of information practices which shape

mcaninglul attributes lor legal doctrine and case opinions through organization,
categorization, access, and case opinion retrieval. Such an agenda calls not only for an

investigation ol machines like Lexis

/

Nexis and InQuery and

but of cpistcmic or scholarly communities

who

their relationship to docuinc,

construct and use doctrinal formulations.

Constitutive socio-lcgal study (Brigham^ 1996; White, 1990) examines

how law and

its

lomis become meaningful through
social practices which
give them palpable suhslance
(
e.g. see Brigham,
1987). Resulting social
contexts, and attendam beliefs,
am, tides, and
actions thus constitute law's
forms and structures. Law's
meaning

is

not inicrpretively

lixed in the proclamations
of judges, legislators, and policy
makers, but rather in ever

evolving institutional and social
contexK and practices giving shape
to Ihose proclamalions

Bngham

suggests that constitutional concepts
and provisions arc conslituicd, made

meaningful, through social and
political interests as they organize
and act relaUve to
authoritative understandings of
Ihose concepts and provisions
(Brigham, 1996).

example,

to

examine

constitutional free speech scholars
should look

As

an

beyond the

aulhomalive formulations and commentary
of law's knowledge experts, and pay
attention
to

how

free speech

is

manifested

in society, especially in those

places where individuals or

groups are altcmplmg contest or reaffirm
authoritative understandings of free speech
for

speed 1 C ends. Brigham indicated

that constitutive analyses of law’s texts
is also possible

by examining the practices which make those

texts

meaningful (Brigham, 1996: 5)

Doctrine as Data extends constitutive analysis
to doctrine and case opinions, doctrine
attributes

meaning

knowledge experts

to cases,

(i.e.

and

is itself

sustained by practices and traditions of legal

Judges, legal scholars and commentators, lawyers). This
project

investigates whether legal inlormation systems

meaning of

managing case opinions

sustain or alter the

doctrine, and thus of case opinions said doctrinal.

E. Doctrine as Data

1.

Cases are

still

Clump and Logic

central data objects in the study of law and politics. Attention to

ideological and political variables in judicial voting and decision making have not displaced
attention to case opinions (Segal and Spaeth, 1993). Formalism^^is a powerful notion in

di.splaced

Formalism as an explanatory model, and epistemological framework, is .said to have been
by Realism. Fomialist approaches to law and legal scholarship asserted tliat tliere was still

praciice ,f nol in theory, and

a,s

.scholars strive to
understand

law and

stgntlicance of opinions and
doctnne must he considered,
to do
practices

which help make them meaningful

to special, /,ed

.so

politics the

attentton need be paid to

communities and

the greater

social contexl.

This project began with the
intention of heating doctrine
as a clump of data,
,.solate

dtKnrinc and expo.se

mtormation

it

to rigorous empirical
analysis u.sing

retrieval .search engines.

At

that point doctrine

computer

to

dataha.ses

and

seemed a reasonable object

to

study in this way. having spent several
years working with legal scholars and
cutting

academic

teeth

on

civil liberties, the

largo part ol lho.se traditions, and
to

doctrine via computers

seemed

Supreme Court, and

make

plausible

judicial politics.

the statement that

if

Doctrine

one was going

to

is

a

study

unusual.

The

doctrines ol the law are built Irom findable
pieces of hard data that traditionally
^
in the form ol published judicial
decisions. The point of the
search is to locate the nugget of authority
that is out there and use it
constnicting
^
one s argument. (Berrmg, 1994: 1
1 )

have been expressed

m

It is

evident however that doctrine

is

never quite as fixed as

it

might seem, and most

certainly cannot be bundled into case opinions
as data without explanation. Simply because

doctrine

is

part ol everyday

law

talk,

and

is

one of the

first

structures

we

cling to

when

organizing cases into indexed collections or merely useful
bundles, does not mean

it

can be

studied like a biological specimen.

As

a logic or parameter doctrine

is

an abstraction for judicial practices and standards

corresponding to categories of case law. For example, doctrine associated with

Amendment

cases underwrites and organizes Court tieatment of clauses within the

Amendment. Establishment
suspect, and

First

how such

clause doctrine might delimit state actions that arc immediately

suspicion might be manifested in Court product

opinions), and even include a three pronged testing

schema

(i.e.

decisions and

for a pseudo-scientific

explanatory and autlioritative power in traditional legal notions such as doctrine juid precedcni; Realist
notions decried such a reliance on structures so inherently interpretive, and proffered instead tliat individual
characteristics

and variables ought

to be explored for tlieir determinative inlluence
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on

tlie

law.

deierm.nat.on of d.acrete results

.n

church and

state cases^

Free exercise ought also have

associated doctnne, one currently
espousing nom.nal neutrality
toward policies wh.ch

impact social practices which
judicial scrutiny rather than

may

be argued are religious in
nature, and lower levels of

accommodation and highest

levels of

scmtiny of those same

polices. Compelling interests
represent a knowledge structure
in free exercise case law,
signifying a standard which
descnbes the balancing of interests
by courts. The challenge
to tie doctrine to the written

judges, to

tie

opinions of Supreme Court justices
and federal circuit court

logic to clump, so that doctrine
might be looked at as data.

Doctrine Within the Words and
Phrases of Case Opinions

2.

Doctnne
determinative
doctrine

is

is in

is

way

said to reside within case opinions,
or be associated with

(Levinson, 1994; 1039). Therefore, the

the texts of optnions.^’

Cases

are ordered to

first

fit

to construct those distinctions.

may

be part of the

There are external forces

Knowledge experts

mtormatton systems through data object

editing, categorization, indexing,

is relative to

some

place chosen to look for

.shaping the terrain ol indexed case law.

Each practice

in

pre-existing categories or

areas ol law in systems like West's
digest and reporter, doctrine

knowledge base used

them

(e.g.

at

work

in

West editors) manage
and use

/

access.

an interpreted or mediated view of the data objects, derived
from

internal characteristics of those objects

no doubt, but also strongly inlluenced by

interpretations of those characteristics.
In this project

Supreme Court and

federal circuit court opinions

were examined

for

the expressed treatment of a particular doctrine, of compelling
interests in constitutional free

exercise law.

and

/

The goal was

to see

whether the doctrinal

or presence, or whether that presence

97
togetlier

by

on whetlier

In

tlie

was

consistent in form

consistent figuratively only, a presence that

context, ascertaining tlie use of tlie phrase doctrine in a collection of cases tliat are tied
doctrine of compelling state interests in free exercise of religion law might shed some light
Court considered compelling interests a doctrine, or whetlier they considered dcKUinc at all.

tills

tlie

is

signifier

wa.s largely rnterprelive
or edilorial rather than tn
the texts themselves.

The most obvious

placed* to explore this

project, authoritattvely
placed within a

rel.gious liberty

in the

batch of cases collected tor

known

management

tool

this

dtgest categoty of cases
under the rttbrtc

and freedom of conscience and
containing a standard, balancing

doctrine otherwise

database

West

was

test,

or

as compelling interests.^’
After collecting the cases, using
a
(i.e.

Folto-Views) the collection was
searched for the occurrence

01 the phrase "doctrine,"
the text

window30surrounding encountered occurrences
was

•scanned. In the collection of
186 case opinions the

word doctrine appeared roughly

201)

limes, 2/3 of those occurrences
though represented discussions of
so-called "religious
doctrine," not legal doctrine. This

collection

is

makes sense

since the es,sential subject area of
this

religious freedom, and very often
claimants argue that state proscribed
actions

Stem from religious doctrine.^

The remaining occurrences though
abstraction.
fairness.

The following

is

a partial

list

referred to legal doctrine in various levels
of

of types of doctrinal formulations: "standing,"

Free Exercise," "intra-military immunity,"
"sovereign immunity,"

"least

restrictive alternative," "separate but
equal," "dangerous," "mootness," "collateral

consequences,
vagueness.

substantial compliance," "equal footing,"
"overbreadth," "void for

First

"official restraint,"

28 Obvious

Amendment," "disallowing

a defense of ignorance or mistake of law,"

"misplaced confidence," "invited informer," "plain view." Nowhere

in tfie

in

sense

tfiat the collection was in possession, and that if
tliese cases were in fact
might well express diat openly. Please note tliat Uiis was not really expected
was expected tliat little overt doctrini recognition in tliese cases would occur.

tied togetlier doctrinally, they

however,

in fact

it

90

A full accounting of tlie process of definition and collection, and tlie snafus along
included in subsequent chapters on West digest and reporters and Lexis / Nexis.
A
words

text

ot a given

window

word or

is

simply

phrase. In

paragraphs before and after

tlie

all tliose

tliis

case

words and

tlie

plirases

window around

tlie

way,

is

which are wiUiin a certain number of
phrases like doctrine was several

occurrence of doctrine.

9

Subsequently reports of occurrence frequencies for nounphrases in tlie collection were
examined. The plirase doctrine did not occur in great frequency, neither did it appear to change distribution
witli particular subsets of tlie total collection (i.e. state policy upheld, individual right claim upheld)
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ihe collection

was compelling

interests refen-ed to as
doctrine,

were labeled or associated
w.ih doctrine. For example,
"the

compelbng

interests sister

however

least rcstnctive alternative"
is

under Conn stnct sctuuny
practtces of poltcy evaluat.on

Challenged pol.cies under Free
Exercise claims must have
met both
muster.32

m the cases for this project collection the "least

called doctrine, compelling
interest

synonym

however

is

to pass constitutional

restrictive

only referred to as a

means"
test,

test ,s also

standard, or

thereof.

3.

In scholarship
to

related structures

Ml. compelling

Doctrine

From

on Free Exercise, and

the Outside

specifically the doctrinal sea

interest is shorthand for a balancing
test

which

is

change attributed

a part of free

exercise law (e.g. see Smith, 1994:
529). Considerable conceptual variability
exists as

compelling interests
standard.

however

The

is

also called a balancing formulation,
balancing component, and a

existence and characteristics of the signified
practices and expressions

are largely agreed upon,

even

if their

normative quality or nomenclature

is not.

Despite the lack of doctrinal language for compelling
interests in the cases themselves there
is

scholarship which speaks of compelling interests
doctrinally.

Sanford Levinson
project's treatment of

s

response (Levinson, 1994) to Smith provides a model
for

this

compelling interests as doctrine. Professor Levinson specifically

discusses Justice Scalia s Smith majority opinion and his attention
to compelling state
interests.

While the Smith decision not only repudiated

the use of that phrase and any

associated practices in claims where a state action was said to incidentally
inhibit religious
free exercise,

Levinson suggested

that if the

compelling interests

test

had been applied, a

compelling interest lor Oregon's prohibition of peyote use could have been found.

Levinson argued
in

that the doctrine of

examining social and

Of course

compelling interests need not have been exorcised,

political data

Uiis is prior to

such as newspaper

editorials, polls,

Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990).
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and

legislative

that

debate and dtscusston.
judges eould have reasonably
diseovered any existing
contpclhng
.nterest. Nevertheless,
Justtce Scalia

jetttsoned contpelling
interest doetrtne, decbntng
to

look lor interests, instead
restructuring expressed
judicial treatment
exercise cases.
doctrine,

it

sense of

it.

What

is

ol religious free

significant here is Levin,son's
use of compelling interests
as

appears unproblematic and
as though his interpretive
community would make

Other scholars
to explain legal

change

in that

in the

political scientists Epstein

community

bolster this use of dcKtrine

Supreme Court through a doctnnal

m work which sought

lens.

To measure change

and Koblyka (Epstein and
Koblyka, 1992) operationalised

factors con,sidered independent
variables in doctnnal shifts

(i.e.

dependent variables)

in the

realm of abortion and the death
penalty. Epstein and Koblyka
used doctrine as an
abstraction for the particular
practices and traditions in evaluating
and deciding cases in
the,se

lirsl,

two realms. There are three things
of note

in this

work which

pertains to this project:

they unproblematically use
doctrine to identify an area of case
law, and the cases

in

those areas arc then data in the
analysis of said doctrine; second,
they position their work

between lormal and sociological
lorms of law, and

third, they

/

behavioral efforts and their respective
treatments of

suggest a socio-political significance for
constitutional

doctrine beyond Judicial activity.

^ emphasizes the importance of processes and
constitutional doctrine ii
QPi fntffhr
setting
the parameters ol subsequent political
and policy choices.
Our approach
does not deny the utility of other, more sociological
frameworks; tliey tell us much
about important linkages between law and society.
Rather, for purposes of
^alytical clanty and depth, and because we think that
law as articulated by the
supreme Court sets the general legal and political context for
the resolution of any
given contentious issue, we coniine our study to an
assessment of three factors that
work to promote or retard doctrinal shifts in the decisions of
the Supreme Court:
1 he Court itsell, the
political environment, and the organized
.

lobbying the Court. (Epstein and Kobylka, 1992;
5)

.

pressure groups

Doctrine as Data strives to reler to doctrine similarly, to signify the
expressed practices of
the Court otherwise

known

as the compelling interest balancing test or standard.

From

loundation, cases are collected which contain references to the practice
as being at least

that

partially determinative.

It is

exist at all outside of
the

these case opinions which
must manilcsl doctrine

The robust model provides

process

now

-

to

MefhoH

the basic parameters of the

for the definition, discovery,
acquisition,

by the compelling

to study the

is

meUtod

for this exploration

around information machines
helping constitute doctrine and
cases. The robust

model called
related

it

knowledge experts of law.

E. Process

ol practices

it

interest doctrine in free exercise
law.

ways doctrine
is

is

it

These steps are

ca,ses

dte vehicle

shaped through practices of information
management. The

more than an instrumental

analysis of law's texLs,

and analysis of a collection of

became

application of infonnation machines
in an

a rellexive study of doctrine and
the machines and

information practices which sustain
law's knowledge base and are primary
tools of law's

knowledge

experts.

Doetrme
users,

more

It

may

typically

comes

be incorporated

to these

in the

machines

ways cases

likely doctrine remains an intersubjectivc

parcel of other

knowledge bases

in

in the

minds of system designers and

are organized

phenomena

and made retrievable, but

attributed to cases, part and

and around law. Traditional case management tools

like

West's digest and reporters were built around
editorial practices of data object
normalization, subject area categorization, synopsis
creation, and key numbering.
tools

employ

New

diltcrent practices, for instance the universal full text
indexing and Boolean

querying ol Lexis

/

Nexis, and concept occurrence Irequency and co-occurrence mapping

in the association thesaurus-'^^

examined

tor the

collection

and

way

they

inQuery. Each system and their associated practices are

make

doctrine and cases meaningful for a specific task, the

textual analysis of a doctrinal

clump of case

opinions.

- InQuery utilizes an assoeiation Uie.saurus, or a table of co-occurring terms
enhance document retrieval effectiveness (Jing mid Croft, 1994).

tuid phrases, to

D,K,nrinc

is

known

>n a vaiicty

narrow domain for examinaunn.

of ways and comcxus,
Docuinc as Data chooses a

How

,s

compcilmg .morose doonrno

man.lcs.od in the two preominent
machines

(i.o.

used by legal profcss.onals
and scholars? And,

shed light on doclrino's coherency

and Lex,s

/

Nexis are queried

in cases

to, "identity

U-x,s

/

Noxis,

how docs

a

Wes,

,n froo

oxcciso law

digos. and ropo.-,o,s)

now machine

(.,e,

InQuery)

provided by those mainstay machmes?
West

and provide access

to those federal appellate

cases where the compelling slate
interest doctrine in free exercise
law

was pan of the

expressed decisional mix since 1963."
The cases ultimately collected are divided
into two
categories, corresponding to the
supposed inlliiencc of compelling interest
doctrine, Ihoso

where

The

state interests prevailed

ca,scs arc

provided

to

and those where individual

InQuery

to further

righLs

trumped those

interc,sus.

explore doctrine's presence and inlluencc
on

ihc rclricvcd cases relative to that
basie breakdown.

Delinition represents the creation of search
profiles to execute on

Lexis

/

Nexis) and hard bound

(i.e.

West

full text (i.e.

digest and reporter) systems. Profiles were

designed as mlomiation representations whieh,

it

was hoped, manifested

the determinative

application of the compelling interest doctrine in
free exercise cases. Compelling interests

show up

m many areas of constitutional rights law,

thus definition

gather only those data objects Irom the desired area of law,

be argued that

which use

it

il

should be included. However,

coherency were
in a

compelling interest doctrine

to

be exposed

is

it

religious freedom.

the subject of investigation then

seemed

that

in this fashion, that they

narrower subject area domain, with

i.e.

would be challenged

il

all

It

to

could

cases

meaningful patterns or

were more

less textual chatter to

likely to be observable

confuse examination and

analysis.

Discovery

is

the execution of those searches and preliminary examination of results

to

determine

is

an expert knowledge laden step, notions of "on point" cases with respect to doctrine and

il

in lact the returned data objects represent the doctrine as desired.

Discovei7

subject area depend heavily on interpretations and traditions of understanding cases and
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law. Acquisition represents
the collection of cases and the
creation of a tagged data set lor

ultimate InQuety text analysis.

produce

statistics

which

And InQuery

identify the

analysis

this

work

and

(i.e.

the

new manner

in

most highly

which

those steps

analysis). Prefacing these data set

(i.e.

examine,

definition, discovery,

and machine specific endeavors,

first

investigates doctrine as a construct in law, and
specifically as a vehicle for the

compelling interest standard in religious free exercise
law. The work ought

whole however, each chapter
is

to

data.

The following chapters roughly follow
acquisition,

the processing of the data set to

most important concepts

occurring) and their inteirelationships,
thus opening a

and ultimately manage, law’s hard

is

made meaning! ul through

telling a tale

to

be taken as a

about the ways doctrine as knowledge structure

law's informational gates and gatekeepers.
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CHAPTER

II

doctrine as logic
A. Introdiicfion

This project explores

how

legal information

machines which organize and provide

access to appellate case opinions partially
constitute legal doctrine in those opinions.

Doctrine

is

knowledge

a

practices in law,

it

structure coiTesponding to understandings
and parameters of

functions as a logic through which legal events
and objects take shape

and meaning. This chapter presents a survey of
doctrine's place
examining

its

relatively unproblematic existence in the western
legal tradition.

brielly addresses the foundations of doctrine

European

by looking

legal scientists' resurrection of that law.

maxims and

in jurisprudence

their codifying

Roman law and

at

commentaries provide a bridge

on doctrine,

at

once revered and

to the

modern

America

are

facilitated

by

It is

done so as

part of an analytical perspective

distinct

While undoubtedly

between settings and

for legal

period. Finally,

examined

to

show

civil

and

which reduces

common

doctrine,

many

institutional settings

and legal

the substantive understandings of unique doctrine are

traditions (e.g. civil

and common), the thing doctrine, the

lunctional abstraction, has a clarity of identity over the boundaries of law's traditions.

B.

The Power of Principles

Language presents

the

authority of these worlds have

power

-

Social

Legacy of

to create worlds.

marked

Political

Language

Debates about the contours and

linguistic history.
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it

the early

particular practices (e.g. judicial, scholarly, and editorial) and associated

understandings, to a knowledge structure present in
traditions.

so

reviled.

This survey crosses traditional lines of inquiry drawn between

law systems.

To do

Bacon and Blackstone's search

theories ol lormalism and realism ol 19th and 20th century
distinct positions

by

Within western

institutions of

polmcs, war, religion, and law
the power of language

knowledge

experts.

Docinne

ts

is expre,s,sed

a knowledge simeture
specilie

to

ihrough

praciiee,s ol

sueh .nstituttons,

providing coherence to the meaning
of their ntteranees. The elevation
ot words and
phrases to dixitrine

is

an act of power, words and
phrases take on greater significance
when

as,sociated with official policy,
reciprocally, policies arc often
altributcd with rationality or

when

at least authority,

In

American

become

they

doctrinal.

politics, presidents

have stamped domestic and foreign
policies with

doctnne. President Monroe set the stage
for a century of indigenous
cultural and physical

displacement Irom central and western
North America, while President Nixon
committed
our national resources to eliminate foreign
interference in South Vietnam and Laos.
To
those ends doctrines ol

Knee and Mylai,

war and

politics

rightly or wrongly,

were created and employed, events

come

to

be associated with them.

It is

like

Wounded

a difficult

proposition to suggest that these tragic events
were caused by doctrines of war and politics,
but certainly the association between them in
public and political consciousness after the
lact has socially constitutive power.

words used

Doctrine

is

but a sign, a string of words, however

politically to justify or contest authoritative actions
are potent tools for

structuring perceptions and perhaps subsequent events.

knowledge structures and

It is

in

law, where the edifice of

traditions of understanding are highly defined

this characteristic ot doctrine is

most pronounced.

In

and valued,

that

law doctrine exhibits a regular

palpable presence.

Doctrine
belief.

is

detined as a principle or body of principles presented for acceptance or

In legal discourse,

established by precedent.

it

is

Its

described as

archaic use

a, rule

was

or principle of law, especially

when

as something taught: a teaching in middle

English, Irom the old French and Latin "doctrina," a progeny of doctor, or teacher, and

docere, to teach.

agency.

It is

The

root "Dek," to take or accept

a term of authority, docti'ines

is

causative, the construct facilitates

come from on
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high, are designed to

fill

listeners

with understanding, and serve
to drive behavior, or al
the very
particular behavior or authoritative
action

makes

least,

explain

how

a

sense.

In law, precedent’s relationship
to doctrine is reflexive.
Precedent is itself a

doctnne, simultaneously

it is

specialized legal term closely
arising

a practice central to

mimics

its

all

other effective legal doctnne.

more general meaning,

from long practice" (American Heritage,
1992). Black's

"a convention or

Law

The
custom

Dictionary condenses

precedent to a key phrase, "as furnishing
an example or authority for an identical or
similar
case atterwards arising or a similar question
of law." All doctrine rely on precedent to
stretch

them across time and space,

unollicial actions,

and

expand

to

to get into the

their influence

over a range of

official

consciousness of practitioners and subjecLs

and

The

alike.

two are products of complex and interdependent
practices within law.i
Rules, principles, and
In

maxims

are other constructs closely associated with
doctrine.

junsprudence they are used repeatedly and often interchangeably.
Early European

science lor example, treating Justinian legal texts^ as data,
sought to

Roman

law,

analysis.

maxims

its

lundamental principles which

Those

principles

ol both nature

unproblematically

if

may have

fall

distill

legal

the essence of

out with the application of scholastic

represented a hybrid of natural and positive law,

and man. Jurisprudence has dealt with doctrine somewhat

tangentially,

by focusing on sources, forms, and the

scholars have explored whether rules or principles reign, whether there
positive forms and politics, and what,

if

is

politics of

law

anything beyond

any, the normative quality of law

is.

Throughout,

doctrine plays an important role as a knowledge structure for making sense of law.

"It

means

tliat

a principle of law actually presented to a court of autliority for consideration and

determination has, after due consideration

,

been declared

iuialogous cases, but matters which merely lurk in

tlie

decided are not precedents." (Empire Square Reality Co.

N.Y.S. 2d 470, 483)
2

6tli

to serve as

a rule for future guidance

in tlie

same or

record and are not directly advanced or expressly

Century A.D. codification of Romtui law.

v.

Chase National Bank of City of New York 43
.

Maxims and

CL.

Rome
roles,

Prin c iples of

presenus an early recording

and pracliccs providing impcius Ibr

codilication

was

institutions

was

m

i>

an ordered syslem of law,

later

will, iLs m.sliiuiions,

European models.^ The Justinian

Roman law and

make

orderly the codes, rulings,

order ideology, attributed to Ihe

a powerful contributor to the
development of western social and poliiical

and practices (Ullman.

examination of

egal Sri<

the first notable effort to
cneap.sulate and

opinions of the then waning Empire.
codification,

,,l

l

tho.se ideological

European

IbV.-i: .53).

legal science

was

concepLs within the mintilia of the Justinian

The Roman law in Ihe shape it received in Justinian's
codification
gicat many governmental ideas and
principles as they came
republican and especially
intrinsic quality ol

fueled by an

to be

in imperial limes.

.

.

what matters

is

.

.

texts.

.

embodied a

evolved

not so

in late

much

the

law, which certainly was very high, but the
inlltieiice which
exercised on the cvolulion ol govcrnnicntal
praelicc and ihcory. (Ullman, 1975;

11

Ihi.s

IcalLiics missionaries, Gaul, superiority to
local, lalin - Biblc| logclhcr with
the high degree ol lurisilc expertise, clan and
elegance that charactcri/cd Roman law
I

make understandable why it exercised an irresistible innucncc in
early medieval
hurope. At least in ideological respccLs a great deal
of Europe was shaped by the
Roman law in its Justinian codilication. (Ullman, 1975: 54)
Govcinmcnt and

legal institutions in western

particularities ol

Roman codes and

"jurisprudential

were derived

language

authority.

less

dependent on the

legal customs, but rather relied

axioms and principles enshrined

principles

ol'

Europe were

in it"

on interpretations

(Ullman, 1975; 53). Axioms and

I'rom legal texts written in Latin, the language

In

some ways

ol'

the Church, the

this early specialization inslituted the elite

exclusive nature ol knowledge experts

in law.

ol the

and

Experts were ideological, and their axioms

Ronuui law is the model lor later European eontinenial or civil law. It is Roman civil law
where most energy was applied by jurists and commenUitors ol the day, with common law being just that,
-

law ol die everyday, the mundane interactions between individuals of lower political and SfK'ial status.
positive enactment's ol Roman political institutions however attracted signilicjuit intellectual attention,
while the common did not. However, in their modern imuiirestations axioms and principle.s, originally
tlie

The

Roman Civil Law, would tran.scend the divisions between civil and common
law traditions. See Blackstone's iirgument (Black.stone, 1809: 19) with the premise that sustained the
.secondary status of common law to tJie learned men of his lime.
products ol .scholarship around

conveyed law and order ideology
above

all

others.

Concerns

lor justice

and about the relationships amongst
citizens and between citizen
and

and

fatr

procedure,

were also

slate,

operative within that general ideological
framework.^

The treatment of doctrine
purpose

to

as data

is

traced to early European legal
science and

its

"give structure and coherence to the
accumulating mass oflegal norms, thus

helping to carve

new

legal systems out of the older
legal orders

almost wholly dillused

in social

custom and

in political

which previously had been

and religious

institutions"

(Berman,

1983; 120). Early European jurists,
studying at universities in Bologna and
Paris in the
1

1th Century, scholastically

examined the Justinian

Novels, Institutes, and Digests. They did

texts, i.e. the

this despite the fact that

books of Roman Codes,

most law

existed in social and religious practices
quite distinct from the edicts of

at that

time

some long dead

Romans.

The law

that

was

taught and studied systematically in the West was
not the
the law contained in an ancient manuscript which
had come to
IDliiin library toward the end ol the eleventh
century. (Berman, 1983:

prevailing law;

it

first

was

122)

The Digest stands out
The

as the

most important manilestation of the axioms of Roman law.

Digest, "was a collection

made up

of fragments, snippets and excerpts of varying

length from the statements of the jurists" (Ullman, 1975;
55). While

was

much

of this material

quite specific, dealing with questions of private law, the day to day interactions
and

transactions between individuals, there were portions concerning criminal law,
constitutional law, and "other branches of law governing the

1983: 128).
the Digest.

its

What was most

important

to the legal scientists

These sections covered, "general

Of course

tliis is

(Berman,

were the general portions of

power of public organs

.

The Romans were detail oriented, and
low levels of abstraetion.

a simplified model.
to reach fairly

citizen"

principles, such as the definition of the law,

divisions and sub-divisions, the law creative

mid attendant ideologies tended

Roman

.

tlie

general axioms

and the cnlorccmenl of the law,
procedural max.m,,, responsibihty,
and so on" (Ullman,
1975: 56).
Inlcre,stingly the

Romans

spent considerable effort on
spceilics.

"problem solvers;” articulating an
organized
left to the

treatise of legal principles

Bermtm

called them

and practice seemed

end of empire. Yet they were concerned
with consistent law practice and record

keeping, "they worked case by
case, with patience and acumen and
profound respect for
inherited tradition.

The Digest

and principles was attempted

(Berman,

198,f: 129).

in that sen.se

was an anomaly, where

after centuries of imperial

The knowledge

.synthesis of

and republican

stractures of principles and

maxims

legal practices

axioms

.set

the

parameters tor these traditions, establishing
a role which doctrine would soon partake
filling.

European
determine the

legal science

truth, the

had

its

data,

and rigorous scholarship was applied

"embodiment of reason"

to

within, "they took Justinians law not

primarily as the law applicable in Byzantium in
534 A.D., but as the law applicable

times and in

an

1

places" (Berman, 1983: 122).

Roman

voice to the
in

all

It

was

the legal scientist

at all

however who gave

principles, perlorming the scholastic interpretation
constrained by life

1th century university

was they (European Juristsl who

first drew the conceptual implications - who
a theory ol contract law out of particular types of Roman contracts, who
delined the right of possession, who elaborated doctrines of justification for the
use
ot torce, and who, in general, systematized the older texts on the
basis of broad
principles and concepts. (Berman, 1983: 129)
.

..

It

made

Their ellorts to uncover
ol

European

went on

to

institutions

law's ideological edifice had profound effects on the shape

and thought

to tollow, as

occupy places of importance

Legal science

coming out

Roman

for

at

Bologna and

in

many

of these Jurists and their students

developing western law and government.

Paris,

and

in

other European universities, marked a

law and legal study. The influences of interpreted

Roman law would

throughout western Europe as legal scholars and practitioners were socially and

be

fell

politically

ascendant. Maitland labeled Ihe
twelfth century as "the most
legal, and that, in no other
age, since the classical days of
Roman law, has so large a part of the sum
total of
intellectual

Through

endeavor been devoted

to jurisprudence" (Pollock

and Maitland, 1899:

the proce,ss of dialectical analysis
the medieval lawyers

were able

legal thinking, to slate the basic
ideas with clarity, to develop the
logical

111).

.systemati/.e

consequences of

legal principles, to reconcile
apparent contradictions, to define, classify,
distinguish, to

make mierconnecuons manifest and

to eliminate irrelevancies

thinking to perhaps the most intensive
logical analysis

it

-

in short, to subject legal

has ever

known"

(Cairns, 1949:

164).

Doctrine, in this analysis,
it

is

Ihe product of the early legal scienli.sts,
they considered

a di.scovcry, cither interprelively gleaned
from the specific aspecLs of the Justinian texts or

Ironi the cxpre.sscd principles

and axioms. Given

their proclivity for sticking to individual

cases, spccilic statutes or codes, and singular
issues, the
lexical structuring to those that followed.
Perhaps

scholarship ol Bolgna and Paris legal science
itsell,

given

title

scholars and

may

and name, given

jurists, likely

due

made

Romans

to the

left

need

the theorizing and

to persuade in the

doctrine an authoritative thing unto

status in the politics of interpretation.

The Roman

convinced ol the ideological concepts undergirding

their world,

not have needed doctrine to be so sell consciously prollered. Nevertheless,
whether

axiom or

doctrine, they are

knowledge

structures for conceptualizing law and shaping

its

practices.

D. Bacon and Blackstone

The

eltorts in

development
bet ore this

^

European

universities

were the beginning of a resurgence and

ol scientific inquiry in the West.^

work would

The Moors

take on

its

Yet

it

would be several hundred years

modern manifestation,

arc widely held to have continued

degree, witli respect to Matli, Geometry, Algebra, and

tlie

tlieir

34

further

in the

tradition of

tlie

work of rational

Greeks, iuid

legal

Romans

applied pursuits such as Architecture.

to

a

scholars, ^perhaps most notably
Bacon.
in this

scholarship, llowing out the
Enlightenment's propositions that by applying

struclLired empirical analysis

Iree

ol'

Reason, rationality and logic arc central
elements

and induction

Man

could conceive of the world accurately,

superstition of the preceding era,
yet tied together by totalizing notions
of scientific

method and

inquiry. Doctrinal legal science

is

an extension of the Enlightenment project.

Rational inquiry and scholarly practices
were foremost in legal science of the 17th,
IXth,

and 19th centuries, "and no fundamental
distinction was drawn between

the

exposition of basic principles of positive law,
and the study of natural reason and justice"

(Simmonds, 1984:

19).

Maxims and

doctrine lunctioned as both a

principles were the

synonym

for

backbone of law

in this

model,

them as well as a subset of them. Maxims and

principles roughly correspond to the normative
or ideological foundations upon which the
specitics ol

common

and statutory law systems^

relied.

considered a key principle, as a doctrine embodied

would be very

in the

mass of case law however

dillicult to find a specific referent or textual source.

a normative abstraction.

practice loi lawyers

A

For example, justice was

contemporary

ol

In its other role, doctrine

was

also

more

In this sense doctrine is

specifically rules of

and judges which help structure particular actions and

Bacon organized these two

it

interpretations.

levels of doctrine under the rubric of

piimary and secondary principles, perhaps loreshadowing contemporai*y discussions of

primaiy and secondary rules

in

jurisprudence (Hart, 1961; Dworkin, 1985). John

Dodderidge, another legal scholar and commentator, "distinguished between 'primary
principles'

which he

identified with

maxims, and 'secondary

identilied with rules" (Coquillette, 1992). Primary rules

principles,'

embody

which he

the ideology of a legal

system, whether that be fairness or justice or equity, secondary rules manifest those

primary principles

in specific dictates, or so the theory suggests.

Sec di.scussion and

Llic

works

cited in

by Simmonds (Simmonds, 1984) as prototypical of

rational legal science.

^
tJie

The

knowledge

twe)

systems and

tJieir

histories is a project unto itself, for purpo.ses here

it

is

suggested that

structure doctrine plays a simihir role in each, Uiough to different degrees undoubtedly.

Thus

doclrinal legal science reduced
law to a dual system. In the
background, bul

certainly not insigniricam,

were the rundaracntal principles
and/or maxims

growing out of social norms and
customs,

Chri,stian morality,

and

Roman

t.l'

western law,

law and order

ideology. In the foreground
existed the accumulated mass
of cases and codes, and the
rules and/or doctrines that help

the legal .scientists, join the

make them

two

meaningful. Doctrine, essentially codified
by

parks deductively.

the 19th century this propo.sition

became more

and maxims became predicated on

With the advent of

difficult, since the

legal po.sitivism in

existence of principles

their objeettve expression (i.e.
positing), not their logical

deduction. However, doctrine did not
.seem to wither along with legal .science,
as a stgnilier lor a

.set

ol practices that judges

and lawyers applied

organizing ol cases, whether inspired by
eonstilulional,

Nearly two centuries

later Blackstone's

have a prolound impact on the then developing

common

jurists.

Commentaries (Blackstone, 1809) would
legal consciousness

and practices

American

attempted

to

common

"reduce to short and rational form the complex legal

institutions of an entire society" (Boorstin, 1941

make

in

legal

Blackstone's Commentaries the "codification" of English

in the 18th century,

and

law, or statutory lorces.

,

law

remained

in the disposition

colonial America, serving the role of the Justinian
texts for the early

scholars and

it

:

3).

Such an

effort

needed constructs

to

sense ol the multitude ol practices and lorms comprising the English
legal system.

Arising out of the development of rational science and

its

adherence

reason, Blackstone attached considerable importance to the

common

law he was attempting

modern lorm

as a specific

in the disposition

Blackstone, but
essentially

to sort out.

knowledge

to notions

maxims and

In Blackstone's

of right

principles of the

work doctrine took on

its

structure corresponding to an implicit rule or practice

of legal cases. Principles were of greater abstraction and significance

maxims provided

maxims

a connection between principles and

more

to

specific rules,

linked reason and doctrine.

Since he was interested in the "elements and first principles" which were the
components of a general map of the law, he could provide merely a general
discussion of the nicety of creating a contingent remainder; then the student "will

in

It

appears that Blackstone was
objectively staying away from
speetfie rules and/or docmnes

and

their applications in lieu
of the greater project of theorizing
about the

Its "first

principles."

However

discuss maxims, operating at a
the day to

somewhat lower

maxim

Maxims, "summed up

the luture" (Boorstin, 1941;

principles,

the need to connect principles
with practice forced
level of abstraction, yet generally

law and

htm

to

above

day acts of judges and lawyers.

Blackstone’s use of
principles.

common

though

at

times

1

14).

is distinct

from, yet dependent on, higher level

the proverbial

wisdom

Maxims were

maxims were

of the past, and

first

commended

it

to

generally bridges between rules and

conflated with rules, symbolizing the "broad

guidelines which could be considered to
underlie and direct loosely individual
decisions"
(Cotterrell, 1989: 24). Doctrine

have expressly dealt with

it

comes

into play here, while Blackstone does
not appear to

analytically, he uses

similar to contemporary uses of doctrine, as

maxims and

rules in a

word phrases describing

manner

that is very

rules or practices.

This conflation was not problematic for Blackstone,
"the identification of maxim and law
did not prevent Blackstone form giving a

maxim

as the reason for a legal rule" (Boorstin,

1941: 115). Rules were given Latin names, e.g. "autrefoiLs
acquit (formal acquittal)," and

were associated with universal maxims,

e.g. "that

no man

is to

be brought into jeopardy of

his life

more than once

known

as the double jeopardy doctrine, covering both rule and the

knowledge

for the

same offence"

structure for legal practice

(Boorstin, 1941:

by exposing a

and legal concepts. Boorstin essentially posited

as

used maxims as a restatement ol a rule of law, but

remembered or which endowed
transition ol rule to

maxim was

it

1

15).

This might today be

maxim, functioning

as a

history of corresponding decisions

much, suggesting
"in a

that

Blackstone often

form which made

with a solemn Latinity" (Boorstin:

1

17).

it

more

easily

However,

not a mere translation from one form to another,

it

was

this

a

I'-ansniog, illcali.,,,
implyiat; grealer .sigailicancc
r„r ihe asMiciau- d pracliccs,
iiioic (iiillioriialivc,

more

signilicani.

D^Ctrin^

1.

lie

I

and

Icderal

common

practice

concepts of

common

in

Modern

Coiiiiiioii

l^aw

law iradilion dominales the
American

state conslilnlions

much or (he

made

still is,

law. Cairrespondingly,

American experiment was

private,

legal syslem.«

speeifie provisions lor law

law was, and

ol'

making ihcm

i.c.

While boih

making and

jndieiaries,

defined by the long standing practices
and

much

legal activity in ihe first ceninry
of the

pertaining to individuals and their
interactions and

iransaciions, while public law, that
concerning the structure of state, and the
relationship

between

state

attention to

it,

and individual, was of smaller scope. This
orientation, and scholarly

would change considerably

in

Americas second century,

the following

discussion will attempt to survey jurisprudential
thought around doctrine during
ol

I

lux.

Specilically,

will be a treatment of legal philosophy's

it

this

period

major focus, the

clarilication or analysis of, the "ideas or
structures of reasoning implicated in, presupposed

by

Ol

developed thiough

beliel in

teims

ol

which

legal doctrine, or

which constitute

the legal processes are justified

the

environment of thought and

and explained"

(C'otterrell, 19X9;

2 ).

I

listorical

positivism shook

jurisprudence

common

is

the study of

law's grip

common

law systems. Liberalism and

somewhat with notions such

as the separation of

public and piivate, with the neutral state and attendant legal apparati overseeing an

otherwise unencumbered marketplace, and

through the application
1977:7-12).

I

die

tirsi

ol rules

In contrast, the

that judicial

and reason should be

common

determination of legal realities

rational

it

was

interest free

(I

lorowit/,

law implied a direct connection between the

hat system is a conglomeration of state and federal systems,

American century,

and

not until alter the Civil

War

llie

prior

was most

signifieani in

that federal roles increased considerably.

community

(i.e.

ihc Volk)

and the law, and judges' application
of

be true to the established legal
principles, maxims, and rules
1X31). Positivism in

many

areas of sciemilic and

dominant epistemology. Positivism
required
authonty distinct from scKial or moral

.social

that all

interests,

and

rea,son

ol that

inquiry

was an

cITott lo

community (Savigny,

was becoming

the

law be posited Irom some legitimate
that there

were no abstract principles

laying beyond, or behind, these
positive eonstnietions.

Where
statutory

Blaekstone's exposition of the

common

law as complimentary, yet peripheral,

law treated the

to the centrally

prolil'cration of

important

common

law,

Savigny, the Prussian jurist of the 19th
century, integrated the two. As positivism
might

have dismissed Blackstone for
saved

common

complemented

law from the

.

transitional phases

positivist ax.

which resides

that

[legislative] task.

his search for first principles of law,

.is

where new

in

a sense

For Savigny, statutory or legislative law

in the doctrines

that ol putting settled

Savigny

law

and practices of common law,

into systematic

"its

form and clarifying law

legal principles rcHecting the developing

in

common

consciousness arc emerging but not yet crystallized" (Savigny,
1831:1 52-3). Savigny's
incorporation ol legislation into a model ol the
ol codification in

common

law corresponded with the

efforts

America.

Savigny's writings had considerable influence on legal scholarship

in Britain

and

America in the nineteenth century, especially since the specter of codification - the
symbol ol rational legislative lawmaking dominating over judicial law finding arose to challenge

common

law thought in both countries. Because he offers a more
development than did the common lawyers, he supplies a
development largely lacking in common law thought. (Cottcrrell,

explicit theory ol cultural

conception of legal

Early in the 19th century most authoritative texts of law were relatively small and
unstructured collections ol cases and opinions, and handbooks explaining very specific

common

law lorms of action (Horowitz, 1977: 12-13). The generally ambitious and

overarching treatises modeled by Blackstone would have

by formalisms' conceptual categorizations and

to

wait until these were replaced

digests. Doctrine in this tradition tied

together these conceptualizations
by shaping

how

cases were presented, interpreted
and

perhaps ultimately decided.
Criticisms of the

common

law method focused on the
un-principled manner

which material was organized, and

that there

was "no

scientific basis" in the collection
or

organization then offered in treatises
(Horowitz, 1977: 12). Formalism was the
to

provide a scientific basis, and

could logically deduce virtually

its

all

in

movement

conceptualizations were constructions "from
which one
legal rules

and doctrines" (Horowitz, 1977;

129).

Positivism in legal thought runs concurrently
with the development of formalism. Flowing

Irom the work Bentham and Austin law
was considered exclusively the domain of
sovereign, or his agent judges, and to

know law one need

proclamations ol sovereign institutions

the

only observe the posited

executive, legislature, and courts).

(i.e.

Formalist conceptualizations were inherently tied
to judges and a positivist law
society dichotomy, positing an

lawyer and

jurist,

autonomous realm of phenomena and behavior

/

for the

separate from social forces such as politics.^ Fomialism
in the late 19lh

century brought about comprehensive treatises and
textbooks, as well as sowing the seeds
for the intellectual tradition of

modem

professional law schools (Dane, 1823-29; Hilliard,

1859; Story, 1805). Formalism has also been referred to as the doctrinal
study of law, "or
in

cognate terms, black

letter law," or as legal positivism taking, "legal

cases as the universe" (Fitzpatrick, 1992:

3).

mles and reports of

Legal professionals were assigned the task of

applying doctrine and mles in a dance of practices around unique fact sequences, producing
a coherent, well reasoned law.

Doctrine played a similar role throughout, defining, or

and rules

in particular areas of law, regardless

described, in a

common

or civil law tradition.

whether those areas originated, or were

Two nineteenth century English

^ Late 19Ui century legal formalism represented

emerged

at least signifying, practices

tlie

legal

crystallization of a legalistic mindset

tliat

had

and 18th century English constitutional tliought and was furdier elaborated in liberal
political tlieory and post revolutionary American legal tliought. It was marked by a series of basic
dichotomies: between means and ends, procedure and substance, processes and consequences. In a world of
conflicting ends, it aspired to create a system of processes and principles tliat could be shared even in tlie
ab.sencc of agreed upon ends. (Horowitz, 1977: 16)
in the 17tli

40

schoiars place doccrine ,n bolh
the

common and tbrmalist camps, signilying

doctrine's

versatility:

A glance at the statute book is sufficient to show
1

that, from the days of Edw-ird I
«'n«nuous, and thrvety '~Td,ese
permanent eltects on the development of
legal dtrclrine. (Broom,

™

Sefhlvo
875^ 60

The

doctrines ol our law arc enunciated in
decided cases
au hen 1 C form - and in the treatises of
learned writers
judicially recognized and thus have
become precedents,
.

-

.

,

now

published

an

in

Caserwhlcrhave been

must be confomied

to

ad"u1ged""’(Sd1worih',*9S^^^^^

Doctrines most significant presence
statutes are indeterminate,!^^

and

ol course, in the

where

common

contemporary legal practice

constitutional provisions

is in

those areas where

and clauses arc being

tested,

law.

Formalism and Positivism

2.

Formalism, holding

in

to liberal

notions ol a neutral state and autonomous law,

suggested that law was distinct trom social whims and lancies, and
was better served by
the lunctional lormalization of doctrine and practice. Reasoning

proposition,

it

was

the

means by which

rules

was

a major pillar in this

and facts were combined and perhaps

produced. Judges' reasoning was not open ended nor decontextualized, but rather their

domain of actions was constrained within

a range of acceptability or legitimacy;

The late-nineteenth-century etlort to integrate legal doctrine was accompanied by an
equally important attempt to create a self-contained system of legal reasoning that
would be immune to the charge that it was simply political.
It aspired to import
into the processes of legal reasoning the qualities of certainty and logical
inexorability. Deduction from general principles and analogies among cases and
doctrines were often undertaken with a self confidence that later generations.
could only mistakenly regard as willful and duplicitous. (Horowitz, 1977: 16)
.

.

.

Inierpretation.s of statute.s
tlicre

may

be a completely indeterminate

are contexts and traditions of interpretation

legitimate

domain of

interpretation

,

tliat

beyond which

constrain

tliat

act, but con.sensu.s

suggests

tliat

indeterminacy, perhaps constructing a

jurists risk irrelevtuicy.

D(Ktrine in ihc lomialisl case
method was produced and reinforced
by the

between the

legal

practit, oners

academy and

know and

profession, and wtis used to
structure

express law.

formalist edifice, "the Formalist
hero

It

is

was perhaps

the

how

relalio.isltips

legal

preeminent structure for the

the judge or treatise-wnter

who

best clarifies

doctrinal categories" (Gordon,
1984: 67). These categories and
subsequent procedures and
rules

made up

legislation,

the formal legal world, a world
changing

and the belief

that

law and society, or

due

to the increasing role of

at least policy

n were more

closely

intertwined than formalism held.

The lormahst /
century,

would

positivist project, while reaching

its

nadir in the late nineteenth

lind a prominent twentieth century
proponent in H.L.A. Hart and his

theory of analytical Jurisprudence. Generally
following Austin's path. Hart suggested a

more sociologically

sensitive version of positivism,

where law’s creation was not merely

by a singular sovereign, albeit with numerous
agents,

distinct

from

social inlfucnces. For

Hart,

law

state,

but that social forces acted through those institutions
to enact contextually sensitive

law.

However, with the ascendance of realism,

still

came Irom

authoritative sources associated with the sovereign
institutions of

positivists of this school

outnumbered. Paradoxically positive lormalism has continued
education, especially in the sense ol knowing what law
prolessionals. Juxtaposed with this belief
that law,

is

however dependent on lormalism,

is

by

would be

to survive in

legal students

far

American

legal

and

a realist understanding that the application of
is

a realist endeavor, highly dependent on

sociological and behavioral factors.

Early Progressives, in law iuid otlier realms, began to view policy as tlie sovereign arm which
needs into account and tirUculated tliem officitUly, if trtmsmogrified. This was at odds with
lormiil distinctions between law - state- society, <uid tlic till powerful rule / value dichotomy so powerful in
l(X)k social

liberalism.

Realism

3.

Realist or progressive scholars
and jurists began to question

underg.rding the formalist

effort,

lunctions, not

ifs

ol the

concepts

notably the proposition that law
and society were distinct,

and that doctrine was the epitome
of
Realists suggested that to

some

rea,son

know what law

and

really

rationality within the traditions of law.

was one needed

to

proffered conceptualizations, rules, or
doctrines.

constructs that obfu,scatcd a clear view
of laws

.social identify

and

observe and
In fact

it

c|tialitios.

map

was

its real

these very

Specifically,

the roles of legal profc.ssionals, and
the politics and ideologies which
shape their

dcvclopnient and subsequent behavior, was
decidedly non neutral,

and

denying neat and clean dichtilomies. O.W.
Holmes, writing before the

forces,

coming

may

out, suggested their future, "for the
rational study of the

be the

man

of the

prc,sent, but the

man

of the future

is

master of economics” (Holmes, 1897: 187). For
Holmes
the wares ol law's investigators, no longer
In

want

to

tied to .social interests

Holmes P ath

know

law,

wht) attempt to
utilizing the

we

ol

Law

his

the

realist

law Ihc black-letter man

man

of statistics and the

.social .scientific tools

would be

would rhetoricians and logicians hold sway.

lamous "had man" passage suggested

that if

we

should not he looking to the rarefied words of elite practitioners

sum up

the principles

and maxims

methods of .social science

ol legal life.

Rather,

we

should ob.scrvc,

then proliferating, the actions of our bad

man,

determine what connection exists between his actions and his conception of law, for
the had

man who

tests the

edges ot legitimacy and law. The bad man

world, exhibifs real behavior, and makes real determinations as to his

Only by observing

know

that

man, a man tempted

the law, principles and doctrine matter

played out

in

laws

.social

formalisms and looked

really

to

to

it

is

lives in the real

cotir.se

of action.

breach the law, can .scholars and jurists

little

to the

bad man, only expected results

world. Realism denied the very existence of such tran.sccndental

to

mere men

to

understand law.

01 the

Fchx Cohen’s Ir ansccndcntal Nonsense
(Cohen, 1935) has been suggested
most signilicant early statements
of

as one

the realist project, though
he refened to the anti-

lormahst ellort as functionalism.
Cohen used the term functionalism

literally, rather

than

exploring law’s alleged, or proposed,
or expected, phenomena and
characteristics, he

suggested that scholars reduce that
which they study into terms of actual
experience, into
the lunctions ol individuals

and

institutions.

"functionalism represents an assault
upon
into terms of actual experience”

all

At

its

most basic Cohen posited

dogmas and devices

(Coleman, 1994: 822).

concepts that cannot be delined

in

m a death knell

is full

cannot be translated

of such devices,

terms of experience, and from which

empirical decisions arc supposed to How.”
Doctrine
concepts. Cohen,

Law

that

is

likely

for formalism, speaks

that,

all

sorts of

preeminent amongst those

more of

’’legal

concepts” and

"principles” than doctrine, but considering
doctrine’s obvious presence and importance in
the lormahst

model

it is

unlikely he intended to leave

it

out.

In fact, the

more he wrote of

what lunctionalism was replacing, the more obvious
doctrine becomes.

The age of classical

jurists is over, I think.
There will of course be imitators and
lollowcrs ol the classical jurists.
But I think that the really creative legal thinkers
(H the luturc will not devote themselves.
to the taxonomy of legal concepts and to
the systematic explication ol principles ol justice
and reason, buttressed by correct
cases. (Coleman, 1994: 221)
.

.

..

.

Doctrine

is

.

implicated lully, the taxonomy ol concepts and principles can

without doctrine,

it

is

mean

little

the primary structuring device, providing for the application of

reason and the production of correct cases.

Realism, cognizant of doctrine’s place within the formalist model, claimed

one component

ol a general,

il

(Gordon, 1984: 67). Horowitz

it

to

be

not always well coordinated, policymaking enterprise”

summed

the realist take:

From the beginning of the twentieth century. Classical Legal Thought found itself
confronted by an increasingly powerful critique of its basic premises. In one legal
field after another. Progressive thinkers challenged both the political and moral
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Doctnne was

still

clearly signilicam, but could no
longer be the scienlilic and objeciively

reasoned product of formalism,

it

became

fluid,

shaped by judges subject

to .social

and

individual forces. Legal behavior, and
the structures used to de.scribe or
authorize that

behavior,

was no longer considered

reasoning. Doctrine

and "precept"
is

in

that of objective professional
practices like doctrinal

is u.sed in realist

case disposition,

scholarship that explores terms like "rule,"
"dispute,"

it is

within these discussions that doctrine's fluid
identity

exposed.
Karl Llewellyn's Br amble Bush

that IS possible

well.

ot doctrine in Llewellyn's

as a referent for something else that he
itself.

The most open

is

work must be

most notably

the,

largely interpreted since he uses

it

interested in, not as an object of his analytical

discussion of doctrine uncovered

response to Pounds criticisms ot realism. In
positions,

texts, if

m a pursuit that denied the very notion of sacredness, and perhaps texts as

The place

attention

recognized as one of realism’s sacred

is

it

was

in Llewellyn's

Llewellyn suggested some essential

distrust ot traditional legal rules

realist

and concepts insofar as they

purport to describe what either courts or people are actually doing," and
distrust of the idea
that rules as

expressed

in the

form

ot legal doctrine, "are the heavily operative factors in

producing court decisions" (Llewellyn, 1931: 55-7). This
the realists

a

little

on doctrine, especially as

it

like "rule"

be the ultimate position of

was construed by formalism, however we must dig

deeper as Llewellyn, and the other

Terms

may

realists,

tended not to address doctrine so openly.

and "dispute" coexist with "doctrine"

in

Llewellyn's discussion

the art ot understanding cases. This begins with Llewellyn's exposition

behind the case," and specifically the place of doctrine
appellate system. For Llewellyn the opinion

one judge whose name

it

is

in the constitution

the case,

bears, and concurred in

by the

"it is

on "What
of a case

e)f

lies

in the

the Justification, prepared by

court, for the courts deciding the

case as they have done" (Llewellyn, 1930: 37). Opinions and the decisions they support

arc abstraclcd, in the formalisl
tradition especially, to a set of
applicable rules and relevant
laets

which Iramc

the dispute before the court.

have two related meanings,

and .second, the

lirst

Bramble Bush dispute seems

In the

representing the basic disagreement
between

legal ea.se presenting a profile
of facts, rules,

to

.social actors,

and doctrine;

Everything, everything, everything, big or
small, a judge may say in an opinion,
be read with primary rel'erenee to the
particular dispute, the partieular question
before him. (Llewellyn, 1930: 43)
to

Delming disputes

is

a eentral praetiee for appellate Judges, rules
and faels

eonsume

is

that

process. Setting laets aside, admitting they
are clearly dependent on doctrines of inclusion
01

exclusion,

I

suggest that rules are the

site

of law's most significant doctrinal activity.

Rules, according to Llewellyn include black letter
law, as well as the

dependent rules

ol practice to categorize

and process cases,

to

more

interpretively

frame disputes so they can

be decided against the backdrop ol established or developing
rules and doctrines.
indicate the

meaning

situate the case

lor cases,

and enable

its

though muses Llewellyn?
disposition.

and ultimately rules brought

what dillerence these
True

ol a case

to the

rules

developing

to

In realist

models

bear therein,

and these decisions made

realist

ideology

if

In formalist

you wanted

is

models

rules

yes, they

this is short sighted,

determined "only as

Do

meaning

we

observed

to

people" (Llewellyn, 1930: 39).

to

understand cases, and by

association law, one needed to go out into the real world and measure impact, chart

behavior, and ascertain beliefs toward the legal system and

For other scholars of

this

evolving effort

crucial for understanding the distinction

(e.g.

its

phenomena.

Frank 1949; Levi 1949) rules were

between formalism's

legal

orthodoxy and the

effort

they embodied. Rules encompassed a wide range of constructs for Frank, he considered
rules to be the product of both legislation

and judging, the prior objectively created by

willful action, the latter either already present in our

Anglo-American

common

law

tradition

or produced by the transformation of an already existing rule. Formalism might have

suggested that heretofore unenunciated rules merely needed discovery by rational judges.
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real, SIS like

Frank were quae skepiical „r
such a p,„p„sinon, and we.e
me.es, ed
,

new

were developed and applied

rules

in the

edge or rule developnicm where
Frank's

day

crilieal

to

day ope,a.,o„s

ol courLs .2

of legal practice. Rules are
quite adaptable lor Levi,

rca.son,ng he suggested that rules
arc

molded and changed

socal contexts. While the nomenclature
of rules

by ihc same words

is

movement"

Rank

in his

suggested

work on

legal

to suit variable I'acl paltcrns

may remain

in

and

constant, the actions signified

sociological Jurisprudencei^ perhaps
tackled doctrine most

lorthnghtly. In Pound's "broad view,"
law
in

is a, this

subjccl to fairly constant rc-articulation.i3

Dean Roscoc Pound's

system

h„w

eneigy persisls today.

For Lev., rules and lacts are more
inutrlwined than Uewellyn or
the.r a,s,sessntenLs

„

in

is

(Cotterrell,19K9: 153).

more than

a system of rules, "but a doctrinal

Pound used

the term precepts to

expand on

the idea ol positive rules, "precepts
attaching a definite detailed legal consequence
to a

dclimtc detailed state of facts or situation of
fact" (Pound, 1941: 256). Precepts
were
inclusive ol principles, "the authoritative
starting points for legal reasoning," as well
as

conceptions, "authoritatively defined categories,"
and standards, "defined measures of

conduct, to be applied according

to the

circumstances of each case" (Pound, 1941: 256-7).

Contrasting his work most notably with that ol Hart's
analytical jurisprudence (Cotterrell,
1989: 156)

Pound put

forth an organicist, or sociological,

view of law:

law contains within itself the doctrinal resources for its own development
lorm ol values and principles capable ol giving content and shape to evolving
law; (ii) law has a natural momentum lor change, an inbuilt tendency
to develop;
(

1

)

that

in

the

1

criticiU

It should be noted the Frank is known as
a fact skeptie. Tliis is Uiken to mean tlial lie is
of doctrines mid practices which are used to eonstruct, extract, situate the relevant facts for
a legal

dispute.

1 'X
-

vSee Levi's discussion of the so-called inherently dangerous rule in product liability law. In it
he shows Uie development ol a rule which begins quite closely <digned with tlie Latin expression caveat
emptor, or the buyer beware, witli netirly toUil absolving of a retailers liability. Gradually tliis has changed
to increase a reUdlers responsibility tor

ckmiages incurred after die purchase of a particukir pnxiuct

Pound claimed not to be a realist, largely I think because of he still felt that dcKtrine mid otJier
authoriuitive lorms were of vjilue to the legal enterprise, and not necessarily bmikrupt by their association
witli social and political forces under the guise of objectivity mid neutrality. Nonetlieless, legal scholarship
has included Demi Pound timongst

tliat

catch

all

called realism.

'ho legal system ,o

of the jurist

is to keep these orderly
otesses ol
processes
^ ^
onesaTl^k-tn'**"
legal development
(Colterrell, 1989: 156)

This view also suggested that the
reason doctrine has come under
such
espectally, is that,

the essence ol the

(Cotterrell, 1989: 158).

The

common

working

lire,

by

freely.

realists

law method has not been I'ollowed"

fomtal.st tradition, also associated
w.th the term mechan.cal

jurisprudence, required that legal
concepts like doctrine stand alone, on
their merits and
logical structures to

and context
,se

manage

in the pursuit

court practices. Doctrine

was cut adrift from

of mechanical application. Interestingly,

that .sociological jurisprudence

was

it

social interests

was not

doctrine per

railing against, but rather the
context free nature of

doctrine's use.

Rules of practice, categorization, and ultimately
reasoning then are the working
tools of Judges, calling

do. Llewellyn

and used rules
tlattened

by

some of these

rules doctrines

and Frank used doctrine

is

not a great stretch, and in fact they

to refer to practices like precedent

to describe specific doctrines as this
project suggests.

The

and

distinction can be

stipulating that doctrines like compelling
state interest exist as a subset of a

general class of legal rules and practices. These
rules

precedent or specific constructs like the

may

"strict scrutiny

include broad notions like

balancing

test."

In this project,

claims ol religious tree exercise violations represent the
dispute, some might
doctrinal space,

it is

it

Compelling

state interest is

one of those

represents an accumulated knowledge from previous cases and their facts,

related constitutional clauses and realms, and suggests actions

help them

call this a

constituted by rules and doctrines which further shape judges', and

other relevant legal actors, range of motion.
doctrines,

stare decisis,

make

Rules

which judges may take

to

sense, and ultimately decide disputes before them.

make

tlie

game

space, define

how

the

iuid resolution.
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game

is to

be played, and provide for completion

4.

While realism

may have more

to

,s

Life After Realism

generally considered a rclired

do w.ih

ihe tact lha,

its

movement

prognosticators are

lar

m

legal scholarship, ihal

gely gone, ihan ,he

obliteration of their ideas.
Realist inspired efforts have
been incorporated in a range of

scholarly pursuils.

all

with the

common theme of investigating

between law and society, denying the

posilivi,si

the interface and relatronsh.p

or formal dichotomy between them.
In

addition to neo realist work, there
has been scholarship which
incorporates the realist
critique ol rule

bound jurisprudence, but

rather than attempting to understand
law only

through a sociological or behavioral
lens, reariiculates

communal
there

is

principles

renewed

constitutive

beyond

positive rules.

attention to the instilulions

work suggesting

palpable, through

that

.social practice.

And,
and

to

common

fill

law-like concerns for

the space between ihe.se pursuits,

their practices

shaping law, and hybrid

forms of law become meaningful, become

The

social reality of

law

real or

iisclf is related to Ihe

behavior of

judges, lawyers, and citizens as well as the
legal forms and structures most a.ssocialed
wiih
tradilional

orthodox approaches

to law, like constitutional texts,

and perhaps even appellate

court doctrine.

The following does not purport
to build a

to

exhaustively track

all

of these, rather

it

attempts

bridge between the realist attack on doctrine and formalism
and contemporary

examinations ol doctrine as

it

structures judicial actions. In this vein,

it

explores the

work

of Ronald Dworkin (Dworkin, 1977; 1982), and specifically his
theory of principles,
especially as

it

contrasts with lormalism and positivism ol the

H.L.A. Hart. Dworkin's work represents an

effort to

come

to

modem

variety described

terms with what he

considers their major tailing, specitically that judges exercising discretion
legislators in the creation ol positive law.

Dworkin counters with

discretion as part ol law, not legislating, and

Irom the essential principles

it

is

that undergird legal

ai'e

acting as

his exposition of

a valid notion in law because

it

mles and procedures. This

followed

is

stems

by

Wilh a concluding discussion
of che post
activity brings doctrine front

Fom^ahsm

whether

tound lacking, that

discretion

and center.

rested on the idea that law

political authonty,

court, then Judges

realist critical effort in
legal scholarship, its basic

is,

is

a collection of rules posited
by legitimate

that be the executive,
legislature, or courts.

an appropriate rule could not
be made

would solve these

was considered

Where

rules

were

to fit the dispute before a

'hard cases" by exercising
discretion. Their

a legitimate positing of law,
derived from whatever sovereign

sources that judge or court found
appropriate. Dworkin disagrees, but
his position differs

Irom the dominant
making,

is

realist inspired

the result of

non

view

that discretion, as well as literally
all decision

legal 1 6 forces, such as political
ideology

and

interests.

Both

agree however that decision making
was not exclusively a mle bound activity as
the

orthodox positivists
decision making.
railed against,

said, but

Much

Dworkin parted with

like the

Dworkin argued

common

that

principles of law that structured

law

beyond

the Realists

tradition

on

just

and scholarship

what was driving
that

fomialism

the specific practices and rules of law

how and when

rules

were

were invoked, and more importantly,

provided a normative backbone within law.

Dworkin s strategy is, therefore, to show that principles, which
cannot be reduced
to legal rules, are treated in practice by courts
as legal authorities which cannot be
Ignored, that they are essential (not optional or discretionary)

element in reaching
decisions in hard cases. Indeed, Dworkin seeks to argue
that in all cases a structure
ol legal principles stands behind and informs the
applicable rules. (Cotterrell, 1989;

Rules and principles are distinct

in

Dworkin's model. Rules are specific codes of conduct,

both procedural 1'^ and substantive, which satisfy some theory of recognition
that positivism put forth to define the

domain of rules.

(e.g. Hart's)

Principles are not so tight, and

I

suggest despite Dworkin's use of the term doctrine to refer to broad practices such as the

Meaning

extra legal, Irom outside Uie realm of a legal apparatus, deriving from interests luid/or

psychological factors.

PrcK'edural rules

which

structure court function, for processing <uid resolving disputes.
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doctrine or "judicial discretion"
(Coleman, 1994: 4(K)), or the

docume of "poliltcal

responsibility" (Coleman, 1994:
42(1) that pnnciples and
doctnne have .some

Perhaps dtattrine could

knowledge

between rules and

fit

structure to transform principles

principles, providing

cro,s.st,ver.

Dworkin with

a

mto operative frameworks w.thin
which

rules

can be created, applied, and eventually
altered or discarded.
Principles are standards to be
observed, "not because

economic,

political, or social situation

justice or laimess or

Dworkin

some

deemed

it

will

advance or secure an

desirable, but because

it

is

a requirement of

other dimension of morality"
(Dworkin in Coleman, 1989: 389).

writes that pnnciples have a
dimension that rules do not, namely that
of weight or

importance. Whereas rules are fixed

in their applicability

and accountability, principles

have sliding valuations depending upon
the proposed application. Rules by
cannot conOict,
this

lest

definition

one rule be proven unusable or plain wrong,
but pnnciples, because of

weighting and sliding characteristic, can
overlap and conOict (Coleman, 1989:
393).

Doctrine has characteristics ol both conditions,
in free exercise cases selected for
project, principles

and doctrines abound. Principles of religious

toward conceptions

ol the

"good

life" are the

judicial processing ol such cases.
exist to facilitate that processing.

the test as to

While

liberty

this

and neutrality

conceptually abstract propositions behind

doctrines, or tests, or perhaps even implicit rules,

The compelling

interests doctrine is one, others include

whether a legitimate religious practice even

exists,

whether

it

was

interfered

with, and whether the allegedly interfering state policy
represents the least reshictive
lor achieving

its

means

necessarily legitimate end.i^ While these tests are not codified in any

statute enabling judicial behavior, they are

employed by judges as

legitimate practices in

deciding free exercise cases.
Principles are simply less "positive" for Dworkin, they "emerge, flourish and

decline gradually through their recognition, elaboration and perhaps eventual discarding

18
eliapter.

The jurisprudence and

practices of religious free exercise cases to be explored in succeeding

over time

in the

ongoing history of the legal
system" (Coucrrell, 1989:

1

7(1).

They

undergird the legal system, whether
that be private or Constitutional,
and ground the rules
that positivism recognizes,
or those

that realism either ignores
as archaic refercnis for legal

action or criticizes for their
in.stnimental qualities.

pnnciple (and doctrine?)
the principle/ rule

is

dichotomy one finds
all

in

Dworkin's earlier work

law

Dworkin, and by association doctrine,
have

While Dworkin may be instrumental

still

I

their

connection

dominant. For

conclude

this

interrelationship

powerful (Dworkin, 1982}, and perhaps

Rules). Resting on the assertion
that

and

The

is

survey with a

and the

critical

(i.e.

rule

has undermined

The Model of

to be present for rules to
to the

make

sense.

study of law's forms and phenomena

backdrop

in

scholarship

fact that neo-realist attention to
doctrine

approaches

its

lo doctrine.

indeterminacy and interpretive

association, attacking the liberal edifice housing
rule skepticism

and attention

to the

it

fluidity,

and therefore by

(Barkan, 1987). Inspired by realism's

(i.e.

CLS

in

important ways. While the underlying critique of liberalism and

and realism indelibly,

CLS moves

to

another level of

relativity.

its

CLS

legal

deontological views of law and society. Society and

its

and practices was not

"right"

from

forms

ties

which

rest

on

institutions are contingent, not

Realism stopped well short of this, claiming instead

social institutions

itself

appropriated the

intellectually popular notions ot post-structural or post-modern social
theory,

natural.

legal

legal ideologies), critical scholars continued to

explode the legal orthodoxy of liberalism. Critical scholarship
though separated

each

most

law and society nexus, and Marxism's claims of

instrumentality and lalse consciousness

is

obvious,

is

Critical legal scholarship, or Critical
Legal Studies (CLS), tackles doctrine
forthrightly, problemitizing

and

a matter of interpretation, principles
for

to constitutive social contexLs,
the Realist

this reason,

this

between

and needed

that a particular version of

to

be improved through

progressive law. This of course conflicted significantly with the judicial conservatism of
the early 2()th century.

CLS

differs

from Marxism similarly, but appropriates from neo-

Marxism

the idea oflaw’s relative

autonomy i9 which moved

CLS

further

still

from

traditional realism.

Lesi becoming too confusing.
liberalism and legal orthodoxy,

its

CLS

essemtal characterist.c

opposition stance to

denial of the separation of law and
society, and later

suspicion of the idea of law's complete
instrumentality
legal ideology

is its

at the

ius

hands of the purveyors of

and power:

—

.vvwo,

uii,.

uucu

Lw uiiucKsuuiu

me

msioncity and ideology of the
is extremely important.

thinking about and acting in the world
(Hutchinson, 1989: 3)

m
CLS

addresses doctrine through

liberalism s

key

to

thought captures

applying law

its

importance

its

associated attack on reason and reasoning. Reason

fairly,

and Roberto Unger's

to the critical effort.

"technique of rule application" that

is

supposed

to

on

treatise

is

liberal political

In Liberalism reason provides a

guarantee that "laws are applied

uniformly" (Unger in Hutchinson, 1989: 20). Unger suggests that the
technique of reason
is in

tact a

machine, one which provides tor the analysis and categorization of specific

data and contexts. Reason represents "the capacity to deduce conclusions from
premises

and the
21).

I

ability to

choose efficient means

suggest that doctrine

reasoning,

it

structures

is

to accepted

ends" (Unger

in

Hutchinson, 1989:

data, constructed data to be sure, in the technical process of

what reason can conceive

of,

and provides practices

conclude the disposition of cases. The distinction between law and society

See work (Hay, 1975; Thompson, 1975,
insUumentality.

Colliirs,

/

is

options to

maintained

1982) which explores law defying

strict

by asserting that reason

ts

an .ntellectual proeess, a
professional process, a techn.cal

process, one disconnected from
the surrounding maelstrom
of politics and interests.

CLS
neutrality

attacks reason, and therefore
doctrine, by going after the
separation and

metaphors of liberalism.

It

was untenable

could be so neatly apolitical.
Therefore they sought

elements within the practices and
constructs
the

most important of

those. Ultimately

that

CLS

set

to critical scholars that reason
in
to

expose the

law

political or ideological

support the technique, docu ine

is

one of

about to show:

Benrath the patina of legalistic jargon, law
and
rit nor separable from
disputes about the

sp

judicial decision

making

are neither

wanuXem

kind of world we
Legal
^
casomng consists ot an endless and contradictory
process of making refininc
reworking, collapsing, and rejecting
doctrinal categories and distinctums
Doctrinal
patterns can never be objectively
justified and consist of a haphazard
cluster of ad
hoc and fragile compromises. (Hutchinson,
1989: 4)

Critical scholars started to

level

where the most

Reason
ot

some

is

unpack reason

law, especially in those cases at the appellate

signilicant questions of

law are addressed.

an abstraction, doctrine however

internal logic,

some

was how

is

the

body being taken apart

transcendental order to structure reason.

no preordained method of reasoning
All that mattered

in

CLS

said there

was

that could be replicated as in a physical experiment.

various doctrinal applications and interpretations were strung

together in the present case, such that the reasoned product
listen. 20

CLS

for signs

made enough

pursued not merely the different interpretations,

i.e.

sense to those that

through so-called thick

doctrinal analysis (e.g. Klare in Hutchinson, 1989) of doctrine, but
sought explanation in
the political contexts

which gave

rise to

competing interpretations

This has not rendered doctrinal study obsolete in the same
certainly later judicial behavioral

analysis and critique

is

models

way

in political science,

(Cotterrell, 1989: 211).

that perhaps Realism,

and

might suggest. Doctrinal

significant not only for uncovering reason's indeterminacy but as a

on
^

This raises tlie issue of legitimacy of judicial reasoning and case opinions embodying it.
Certainly judges are concerned about what otlier judges, especially at lower courts, will do in light of
pre.scnt decision. But, tliere is anotlier level of legitimacy tliat scholars of more sociological studies of law
are concerned witli, (e.g. Scheppele, 1988), namely tlie constitutive tuid resonative power of doctrine in
individuals and groups outside of jurists.
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structure that has

some wider social

significance, that perhaps
constitutes social

relationships and actions around
law.

==;SB=iH3

motives that the judges themselves would
treat as
it 'requires the analysis
of the coherence of
judicial explanations ol outcomes.
But the goal is neither an
outcome.’ Instead it is to show how
a judge’s formal rationale
of he decision (which presents itself
as mere legal reasoning) (£'^1110
rSl
political significance of what is
being decided. (Cotterrel, 1989; 212)

illeSimate

if for'^vd
torced to

confront them
,

;

aUemad“^^

.

fV

F.

Conclusion

Doctrine has served a remarkably similar
role through nearly a thousand years
of

western law, as a logic, as a
judicial practices

can

rest

site

reasoning and argument

though, whether aligned with
realist

heap by

and say, and

maxim

critical scholars

in the

where contests of meaning can take

ways law

is

need

be.

It is

and where

a nimble structure

or principle, or seemingly discarded at the
base of the

and jurists,

made

if

place,

it

continues to breath

life into

what judges do

socially real. This chapter has tried to

show

that

regardless the context and period, that the basic shape of
that logic has been consistent,
despite the vagaries of

its

output or product.

CHAPTER

III

COMPELLING INTERESTS AND RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY
A. Introdiirfinn

The lollowing surveys

religious free exercise jurisprudenee
to explore the

development, presence, and application
of compelling
constitutional doctrinal scholarship,
the focus here
religious tree exercise claims.

The

legal

and

interest doctrine.

In the tradition of

on the Supreme Court's treatment of

is

political

thought which gave

our

rise to

particular variant ol a liberal treatment
of religion provides theoretical context
for the

Court's subsequent constitutional discussion.

manilcstcd

of compelling state interest

m a judicial test balancing between the constitutional rights of

state interests

city, state,

The concept

m

the performance of

its activities (c.g.

is

individuals and

public welfare, police powers).

A

or Icdcral law claimed to interfere, either
directly or incidentally, with certain

lundamcntal rights

may

be judicially tested

to

determine whether

its

compelling

interest

prevails over those rights.
In the post

C arolcnc judicial

procreative behavior, where a state
a range ol options

Akron

(*^73);

world,’ compelling state interests extend to

may

and actions available

intervene in
to those

women's

women

(e.g.

to prohibit trade in,

protecting victims (e.g.

lundamcntal rights

^

Sec U.S.

v.

Wade 410
.

.

.

in

Roc

U.S.

Center, for Reproductive. Health 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Webster

v.

Reproductive Health Services 492 U.S. 490} Federal and

compelled

prenatal choices, and define

V.

development judicijil

and production

New York

to liberty

v.

of, child

Ferher.

state

1

13

v.

governments have been

pornography, asserting

458 U.S. 747 (1982)).

its

interests

When

and cquality^arc abridged by government actions courts have

Carolcnc Products

Co 304
..

U.S. 144

activity in areas of civil liberties

and

(

1938) as

tlic

watershed opinion

in die

later in individual rights.

^ In die post Cttfolene world
of double standards (Brighiun, 1984) appellate courts have paid
special adenlion to rights considered fundtuiienuU to constitutional democratic America. Of course, diis

held policies up to Sirict scrutiny,
cstabl.sh.ng whether the action's
rcstricuve of the rights and

Compelling
S chuster.

interests

Inc,

v

NY State Crime

residency requirement

/

in tree pre.ss

Viciinw

reverse discrimination cases

/

state, or social,

have subsetiuently shown up

Members of

reapportionment
in

ends represented a

its

(e.g.

equal protection ca,ses

compelling

cases (e.g.

least

intere,sl.

Simon and

5,(2 u.s. 105 (1991)), in

Shaw

(e.g.

means were

v

Reno 509 U.S.

Shapiro

v.

-

(

199 .5 )),

Thompson s.n a

y Rodrigue/ 394 U.S. 618 (1969)) and most importantly
speech

a,

.

.

Virginia

Board of

rights casos3(c.g.

West

v Rarnelle 319 U.S. 624
(1943)). Finally, compelling mterests

F,l

,

have an important role
bcliclsS

and

in free exorcise

law, displacing earlier formalist distinctions
between

actionsS.

This chapter

prCsScnUs a hkstorical

tradition ol religious liberty,

and specifically the evolution of the compelling

doctrine therein. That history
the Carolene era
lact constructs,

m

,shilt

survey of free exercisSe law within the American

became more

judicial focus.^

interests

active in the middle of the 2()th century, after

Maybe bowing

to realist criticisms

of formal rule

judges began to interpret and incorporate interests
more aggressively

keeping with then dominant balancing

/

in

This heightened explicit political

tests.

considerations by judges as they constructed and weighed
those interests over ever shifting
doctrinal grounds. Reciprocally this
altering legal consciousness in

may

be anoUicr

The

•

contlicLs,

d(X.'lrinal

adopted lor

tlie

and out

area which ebbs iuid

preferred position of 1st

where notions

may have enhanced

ot the legal prolession.^

Hows

1st

concern with judges,

Compelling

interest

widi die contingencies of Uie era.

Amendment rights

ot strict scrutiny judicial mailysis

treatment of otlier

political

Amendment areas

begtui willi free speech mid poliUcal .speech
were employed. Such doctrines were gradually

like free exerci.se.

A

An era is a label attached alter tlic fact, it is used in practices of scholarship mid story telling as
a knowledge structure tliat helps tlie reader or recipient make sense of tliat story. Undoubtedly eras are
simplilications and details are

Supreme Court, mid

lost, traditionally tlie

otlier ledenil appellate courts,

era that begmi around

were considered

Cmolene

to

have elevated

(both

Supreme and

labels a period
tlieir

where

involvement

tlie

witli

cases of civil and individual rights.

more

The claim being made is tliat federal appellate courts
of Americmi society since Carolene

in the politictil lens

.

Circuit) have been

much

doclrine in

modem

iLs

fom, emerged from

chis period,*.

Ii

Court's effort to remove ttself
from one realm of poHtics.

economy and
civil

property,

and individual

seems thwarted by

ils

is

mteresling u, nole ihai ihe
Icgtslative

i.c.

embrace of another

involvement with

political realm, that

of

rights.

Coincident with the enhanced status
of civil and individual rights

in

American

jurisprudence was the rise of interest
group and social issue politics.^ Religion
played a
significant role in both, giving authority
to rights assertions in the face of
majoritanan

policy and shaping the mobilization
of a broad spectrum of interests around
those soils of
assertions.8 Religion has been elevated
to

means

levels of influence in politics, whether
that

the President embraces a conservative
Christian-styled opposition to abortion or the

local school

The

new

committee requires the judicially permitted equal time

for theories of Creation.

law and religion bring more attention and energy

on courts and

politics ol

to bear

judges, despite their nominal neutrality and
institutionally constrained relationships with

Notwithstanding such attention and

politics.

religion

may

be undergoing another

moment

political significance, the jurisprudence of

of change, moving from the era of rights

accomodationist) to one of deference (supposed value

Perhaps re-emergence
legal history,

is

more

separation of law and religion and

tlie

Compelling

interests

accurate. Compelling interests have existed tliroughout American

particular variant discussed witliin

tlie

neutrality).*^

(i.e.

however can be traced

weighing of competing

to

Lockean ideas about

tlie

interests in eitlier realm.

n

See work (Karst, 1993) which examines

how

interests

become

articulated

and expressed

politically.

O

The supporting interests of tlie Religious Freedom Restoration Act were quite diverse, all
coming togetlier in tlie wake of tlie Supreme Courts treatment of compelling interests and religious practice
in Smith .110 S.Ct. 1595, (1990).
^

As

ol

tills

Originally, in

tlie

establi,shed in

(

writing

peyote case

Sherbert

v.

tlie

compelling interest standard had been suspended by tlie Supreme Court
Smith) the Supreme Court struck down tlie test as it has been

(i.e.

Venier ,374 US. 398 (1963)). The succeeding Religious Freedom Restoration

Act, Congress accomodationist effort to restore

of

Boeme

v.

Florcs .117 S.Ct. 2157, (1997).

tlie

compelling interest

test,

was struck down 1997

in City

have been an obvious target

in that

move,

it

is

an endangered notion representing
political

values and judicial practice

B. Free

Hi<;fnry

Locke and Rousseau

1.

The European

E xercise

invasion of what

is

now

the

Americas was spurred by the dynamic

tensions of religion, politics, and
economics in I7lh, 18th, and 19th century
Europe.

North American colonization was
first

in part the result

of the European religious conllicus
of the

half of that period, with English
Protestants of one sect or another

contribution.

They

lied direct persecution as well
as the

more

making

the largest

indirect dimensions of

prejudice and di,scriminalion, they
sought to not only freely practice their
religions but to
establish

them as newly dominant. Colonial charters
and

later .state constitutions facilitated

these desires, representing a patchwork
of religious toleration in colonial America.

Such a
ellons

diversity of legal treatment of religion
pre.sented a challenge to federalist

10 establish a national identity

writers such as

Locke and Rous.seau,

tolerant neutral slate .separated

and charter." Taking

their iheoreiical leads

from

the federalists expressed an institutional
de.sirc for a

from the factionalism of religion, yet dependent on

the social

organizing and interest channeling powers of religious
institutions.

Locke s ^cond Treatise and Rousseau's The
Madison and Jeflerson with models
state

was

to

for the relationship

between

state

and

religion.

The

be tolerant of religion by separating religion from the public
sphere. Locke

may have been more
religion

Social Contract presented Founders

insistent

on

this separation,

perhaps most fearful of the influence

had during the English Revolution. Privatization of religion was the

See (Aleinikoff, 1987)

for a di.scussion of

tlie

political

and

judicial contexts in

solution, a

which

tlie

practice of balancing interests developed.

^ ^

Prominent Founders Madison and Jefferson represent those

treatment of religion

in Uie

Constitutions Bill of Rights.

witli

most influence over

die

nominal removal of n entirely

front the realm of
state instuut.ons

rehgtous freedom became the
vehicle for

this,

and publtc

life.

Rights to

encapsulating the privately held
.stock

in

religious practices, distinct
from state dictates, but only
to a degree. Practice has
proven
that

and

dichotomies ot public and private
have been

difficult to sustain, just as
those of neutral

political.

Rous.seu's civic republicanism
seems to seek a less separate place for
religion, or
least not being so confident
about separation.
it

should have access

to the

Religion's social signtficance

hence creating a substitute

Rousseau recognized however
limited, cither

cllort to

made

.set

A

at the

direct connections

in

interests in safety

(

Both Locke and

must be

and property.'S

Locke, 1955: 17-23) was an explicit

support of the tolerant liberal slate and religion.
Scholars have

between the Founding and these

Jefferson's Bill for Religious

the creation of a civil

that personal liberties like that
of religious exercise

Letter Concerning Toleration

out principles

same time as

for religion in the public sphere.

by social contract or others

Lddke's

that

processes of state as other interests
or groups. Rou,s,seau

sought the "de institutionali/,atton".2of
religion
religion,

was such

at

principles, specifically

between

Freedom, and Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance
as

well as his later efforts on the Constitution.

The overlap has been summarized

in the

following principles:

1) True belief is inspired by reason, not force;
2) Civil magistrates are not
competent to judge matters of religious truth; 3) The domains of church
and state are
separate, and, therefore, a citizen's (religious) opinions should
have no effect on his
civd capacities; 4) Civil governments may punish sedition and other
similar
activities which represent the movement from opinion to overt
activity against peace
and good order. (Sandler, 1960: 1 10-116)

1

An

early form of non-establishment,

tlie

removal of

official political roles for religious

organizations.

1

For Rousseau tlie scx'ial contract implied a sacrifice of liberty for tlie security of tlie group and
protection from an anarchical domestic and international world. For Locke liberty is only legitimately
constrained when tiie well being of otliers, or society generally, are damaged sufficiently. Of course tlie.se
its

boundaries imply politics

in tlie tests

of balancing

interests.

60

The tmal pnnc.ple may
later to

be a doctrine

represent an early articulation
oi the compclltng rntcrest
pnncple,

m free exercise cases.

It

certainly

is

consistent will, both

Uxtkc and

Rousseau's notions of legitimate
restrictions, or abdicairons,
of personal religious

The

liberty.

hheral stale requires such
concessions in the maintenance of
law ruid order. In the

subsequent American experience

much would be made of the

action, the prior utterly
unassailed

measured as

all

by

the

distinction

whims of Lockean Magistrates

between

belief and

but ihe latter

other social or political actions.
Maintaining the distinction though proved

difficult.

Locke speaks most

directly to this issue. Specifically,

where does

the liberal stale? Michael Malbin’s
Religion and Politir^ iM-Aihin

examination of the First

show

Amendment and

that the state brokered

i.e.

letter to

beyond man and
magistrate’s

is

up

to the

state,

Given

law because of religious motivations must face

to

that

opinion or

this,

those

state

Creator to meet ultimate judgment. There are matters that

and mistakes

supremacy

mean

(e.g. either

action) might have this kind of an adverse
effect" (Malbin, 1978: 32).

it

historical

"had an adverse effect on the proper concerns
of

Magistrates, or the state, "must have discretion in
determining what

discipline, but

in

Locke’s Letter Concemi up TnlPr.H.n
purports to

(Malbin, 1978: 32). Malbin summarized Locke’s

that transgress civil society’s

end

no exceptions for opinion or behavior which
are contrary

legitimate interests ot civil society,
civil society"

1973 )

toleration

may

be made, but neither of these assertions

lie

alter the

in earthly matters of public policy.

2.

Jefferson and Madison

The experiences of American

states

between the Articles of Confederation and

the

Constitution were formative of the federal apparati for religious freedom and toleration.
Jetterson and Madison’s efforts in the Virginia legislature and in the drafting of the federal
Bill ot

Rights are examined here. This examination

is

against a backdrop of diverse legal

conditions for religious exercise and establishment. There were states which guaranteed

iree exercise, (e.g.

New York

Consliiulion, 1776, Article
r

yet

nsiitulion of 1780, Part

some of those

(e.g.

Conscitution of 1777. Article

XXXVIll; North Carolina

XIX; Virginia Coixsiiiulion
of 1776, Section
I,

Article

New Jersey Constitution

II;

16; Mas,sachusetus

of 1776, Article XVIII)

Massachusetts') provided for
the aid of an establi.shed
church. In

other states free exercise

was

limited to those

who

believed in God.

Some

stales

had

religious oaths of office and
religious tests for office
holders (Schultz, 1994; 24(1).

Virginia

however

considered the state producing
the seeds for

is

clauses on the relationship
between church and

The

Virginia constitution of 1776

Madison's words. Mason proposed the
duty which

we owe

individual's reason
that

all

men

to our Creator,

was

state.

the product of

"fullest toleration"

George Mason and James

of religious expression, or "the

and the manner discharging

and opinion, not the dictates of state
(Hunt

should enjoy ihe

later federiU constitutional

it,"

in

was driven by an

Malbin, 1978; 21). And,

fullest toleration in the exercise
of religion.

.

.unpunished

and unrestrained by the magistrate, unless
under the color of religion any man disturb
the
peace, happiness, or safety of society"

Mason's language of
he proposed instead

Madison

in

toleration

to

Malbin, 1978: 21). Madison apparently

(

and exceptions

ensure the

to religious free exercise unacceptable,

religions and beliefs.

to free exercise preexisted the

extend toleration, and the associated task of identifying
legitimate

And

secondly, and most important to the future of compelling

interest doctrine, that protection for religious
belief be

may

and

and free exercise of religion" (Hunt quoting

"full

Malbin, 1978: 21). Madison proposed that rights

State s prerogative to

fell

disturb legitimate social interests.

extended

to related actions

which

Only those actions which "manifestly endangered"

society presented exceptions to free exercise and could then
be precluded said Madison.

Malbin suggests

that this

was an

seen in political speech cases,
interests, certainly setting

I

early

example of the

suggest

up the

belief

/

it

clear and present danger test later

also provided a foundation for compelling

action debate to follow. Nevertheless, the Virginia

cc,nvcn,.„n ad, pled a
,
c„mp,„„„,sc pesiuon, ind.cadng
then- unca.sc will,
Madison's level o,
Ircc exercise.

Between

the raUneation of the
Virginia constitution and
the addition of the Bill of

Rights to the Federal Constitution

in

1791 there were two other
sigmlicani legislative

actions that lurther relined
the status ol church

Assessment
establishing

Bill wtus prolTered to

it

/

state relations.

In

1784 the General

provide lor state support of the
Episcopal church,

as Virginias olTicial church.
Madison's opposition to that

bill,

Memorial and Remonstrance of 1785,15
espoused the unalienable nature of
rights vis-a-vis the state.

his

lamous

free exercise

Perhaps cognizant of the Virginia
legislature’s lack of comfort

with his high standard for exceptions
to free exercise rights Madison
sought to put forth a
less aggressive standard.

Madison formulated a

distinction

between opinions and

actions,

hencelorth the belief / action distinction,
and the right to hold opinions or beliefs
freely was
a natural right

beyond

the positive law of state. Actions

however were protected only

degree that they were associated with
religious worship. There were
dilliculties with this standard, but

which

states

had

it

was an obvious attempt

to allord latitude to actions

claimed

to

still

to the

interpretive

to lessen the stringency

with

be religious (Malbin, 1978: 26).

Jellerson stepped to the lore in this debate
as well, providing an alternative to the

General Assessment

Bill

when Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance

Jellerson s Bill lor the Establishment of Religious

Freedom was passed

culminating the discussion opened by the General
Assessment

Bill the

carried the day.
in

1785

year before.

Reiterating the notions ol Ireedom of religious opinion
present in previous documenUs

Jellerson weighed in on the exception to free exercise troubling
the Virginia legislature to be sure. Distinct Irom Madison,

who

Mason and Madison, and
explicitly sought protection

Tliat religion, or the duly we owe to our Creator, and tlie manner
of di.seharging it, ean be
direeled only by reason and eonvielion, not by loree or violenee, and tlierelore
all men are equally entitled to
the Iree exerei.se ol religion, aeeording to the dielates of eon.scienee;
and dial it is the mutual duty of all to
praeliee Christiiui forbeiu-imce, love, and charity toward each oUier Hunt.
1784:
(

R'’

For

text

of

tlie

address

.sec

James Madison, Writings

As.se.ssmenls For Support of Religioun, vol. 2 (Nov. 1784).

.

167).

Hunt, ed., Notes of Speech Against

lor actions construed
as worship, in addition
to Uic absolute protection
lor opinions

Jefferson concluded that

all

police powers of Che state

actions,

even those of religious
symbolism, were subject

(Malbm, 1978:

28).

The

result

was

to the

a sharp division between the

protections for opinions and actions,
a distinction present in tree
exercise jurisprudence
until the 1960's,

speech

where

perhaps bowed

to the elevation

of protections for symbolic

actions) and the lack of confidence
in dichotomies in law.

(i.e.

Reynolds

3.

it

The

First

to Braunfield:

Amendment's

Beliefs, Actions,

and

Human

Sacrifice

religion clauses are generally
considered to be the product

of events and actors in Virginia between
1776 and 1791, as well as the philosophy and
writings of

Locke and Rousseau. The

opinion nor action, and
there

if

religious clause included the term "exercise,"
not

one had sought the intent of Mason, Madison,
and Jefferson,

seems no unified answer would

result.

This indeterminacy would propel judicial

treatment ol beliefs and actions into the late
20th century.

Amendment

It

should be noted that the First

originally extended protection only from federal
actions, this fact

responsible for the relative inactivity in free exercise
law until Reynolds

is

largely

v. U.S..

98 U.S.

145 (1878). Most states though adopted constitutional and/or
legislative provisions

with the
that

1st

Amendment

was

still

many

is

die circuits

civil

the Civil

to

day

life of

War to

The case

is

the citizenry, that

alter significantly.

much

attention in

noted for establishing the Jeffersonian model of belief /

The decision upheld

a federal law prohibiting polygamy, the discussion

See scholarship (i.e. McCloskey, 1960) for general analysis and argument tliat tlie Court and
were more concerned wiUi tlie formation of tlie nation and its institutions and tlie federal / state

relationship for
tliat

would take

day

law and policy makers were

the first of the religious free exercise cases paid

doctrinal scholarship.

action distinction.

that federal

statutes or regulations governing

largely the states' domain, and

Reynolds

lor

of the Constitution. Scholarship on the Supreme Court^^
suggests

Court business was focused elsewhere, and

unlikely to pass

in line

tlie first

moment)

100 years of

issues regarding

and individual

rights

tlie

tlie

American experience. After

tliose issues

had been

settled (at least

place of industrialism in American society and politics and

would be addressed

64

tlie

role of

01 Ihc exceptions to
the free exere.se right is
significant. Chief Justice
First

Amendment removed

to reach actions

which were

lEmiflds. 878:
1

ol ten-ihles that

all

1

64).

would

opinion from Congressional
reach, but that

in violation

Waite

trotted out the

human

.secular policy

had

was

means toward

social cohesion

a valid

pa.s.sage that is especially

and

beeome

safely.

one

a law unto himself"

religious,

of religion.

Chief Justice Waite included a

(

i.c.

would be

law of the land, and

Reynolds 1878: 166-7).
.

essential quality about this study as
well as this area of law.

doctrines,

name

enlightening to this project. Waite
writes that "to permit this

proles.scd doctrines of religious belief
superior to the
to

left free

supersede minority religious claims
where that

religious based exceptions for valid
.secular prohibitions of actions)

every eitizen

"was

sacrifice cxamplc.i’ first in
a piuade

result if free exercise really
reached actions in the
to

it

of social duties or subversive
of good order"

This could not be,
policy

Waite contended the

Mormon polygamy,

Waite

the other civil,

is

i.c.

It

to

conduct and a playing

field

the

in effect to permit

captures an

describing a war of

public welfare through

personal practice regulation. Compelling state
interest doctrine, paradoxically,
that war, providing rules of

make

(i.c.

where the attendant

is

the site of

politics

may

be

expreSsSed.

This doctrinal analysis depends on scholarly authorities
political science to

shape

its

basic lorni. Before heading

uselul to question the nature ot that torm.

throughout

this scholarship,

however

distinguishing between belief

moreso than

17

doctrine,

Human

Iree exercise.

It

is

/

there

is

belief

work

action, or opinion

most determinative or

.sacrilice is Uie classic

shows up

The

/

/

down

in legal scholarship

this path further

action distinction

is

it

and

may

centrally present

that displaces the formalist doctrine of

practice.

In that work,i^ politics,

significant in understanding the free exercise

example of

in future tree exercise

tlie most terrible coirsequence of an absolute right to
cases as a rationale for limiting Uie exercise of behavior

de.scribed otlierwi.se as religious..

See Epstien and Walker (1992: 79) quoting Brigham (1984: 77) who suggests Uiat it was
or moral, considerations moreso tlian doctrine which explains tlie Courts decision. This
project incorporates tliis, and posits tliat while indeed politics is determinative, tliat doctrinal forms in
politictil, <uid

opinions play a role

is in tliose politics.

First

be

we

try to

determine what

is tliere in tlie

forms.

luany. For example.
Epst.en and Walker chose
lo mclude a discussion
of Pierce v

268 U.S. 510 (1925)

WHS.

Pierge

was

in their civ.l liherty
case

hook

directly following that of

also a free exercise case,
where dte Court struck

down

a mandatory

public education standard in
Oregon, one which effectively
outlawed parochial or other

non secular schools. Not

that this case is uninteresting
or unimportant, but its profile in

free exercise doctrinal scholarship
is subdued, perhaps because

SsmiMs belief / action distinction; instead,
i.e.

as

opposed

to the

Mormons, engaged

it

rested

its

in a 'useful

niling

it

"virtually ignored the

on the view

that the society,

and meritorious' undertaking"

(Epstien and Walker, 1992: 80). So.
as this project embraces doctrine in
the explanation of
judicial events in a particular manner,

I

cases, as well as likely within doctrine

am

ever cognizant that politics are behind

itself.

The period between Re ynolds and Sherbert

in

1963 has several cases which are

doctnnally signilicant.19 Constitutional law
scholarship also claims that a major

occurred in
activity

this period, reorienting the

Supreme Court and

domains. The Carolene footnote

is

economy and

shift

federal circuit courts and their

considered the nexus,2o with Justice Stone

articulating the terms of that shitt. Specifically,
the Court

directives with respect to

the.se

was going

property, while at the

those cases where civil or political rights were at risk

.

21

to defer to political

same time

This period

is

closely scrutinize

the subject of

much

scholarly attention, and an exhaustive overview ol the fight
over unenumerated liberties,
like that of contract in

Lochner.

v.

New

York. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) and

its

After the preceding paragraph

way

tlie

cases unfolded and

how

tliat is

doctrinal

tliis has several meanings. Doctrinally instructive
portrayed in scholarship and opinions.

90

in botli Uie

That nexis is merely tlie swing point, witli considerable attention paid to llie first 35 years of
2 OU1 century's law and politics. Likewise there is much attention to tlie 35 years, or more, after
Carolene and its so-called active judiciary. See scholarship which discusses tliis in light of a perceived
tlie

double standard
9

‘

The

in

Supreme Court practices. See Brigham (1984) and Abraliam

(1982).

so-called double standard, see sources above, specifically Brigham.

66

companions,22is not proffered here.23

it is

important to reeognize that
a climate of

deterence to state interests was
ascendant, despite Caroleno'>;
r,
reonentation of the potential
lor judicial activism on
civil rights.

Given the new condition espoused
regulatory

/

administrative

nghts law, and the

later

after Carolene, deference to
state interests in the

scheme became

the defeult condition, the

development of privacy

(the classic

growing area of civil

modern unenumerated

notwithstanding. Civil nghts of speech, assembly,
and voting were the
the post Carolene judicial paradigm

raised political interests to
judicial opinions

compelling

new

which paid

heights.

The

The

deterential default

attention to textually fortified rights and

to doctrines like strict scrutiny

however seemed

to

those doctrinal decision matrices. So, while compelling
interest
political

speech cases

influenced by

protections afforded civil rights took form in

and practices corresponding

interests.

first

liberty)

to tree exercise cases, the likelihood

and

weigh against them

in

was transformed from

of superseding state interests

remained low.

Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 298 U.S. 238, 297 (1936) (invalidating
Conservation Act of 1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Com, v. United
,

tlie

Bituminou.s Coal

Stau^ 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (su-iking die National Industrial Recovery Act); Hammer v. Dagenhart
247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (striking federal child labor laws); Chicago. Milwaukee & St. Paul Rv. Co v
Minnesota 134 U.S.418, 456-57 (1890) (requiring judicial inquiry
,

regulation).

AUgever

v.

into reasonableness of state railroad

Louisiana. 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (striking statute

agreements as violation of right

tliat

to contract).

For a more detailed di,scussion

see:

(Horowitz, 1977; Sunstein, 1987).
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regulated insurance

.

iMwcl
.nvolv,,,,

y

l

r„.OTin

however

,n a

helie, /

iwo concepls, reedon,
I

I

.

3 10 U.S,

irsi is

2%,

,

.MO,. ,he

I

acion d.shnchon

undueha,

,o believe

.4

Jn.siice

a ,sc„.,s ol cases

can,,,,,

„ee exeai.. Cause

Jushce Rohe.J.s openc,
,he dochina, doo, a
d,a,

Rohens

and heedon,

absolnie yel Ihe second

l„,s,

W„ncs,se,s, i„co, „o,a,e,l
,he

Madisonian dueciion by snggesiing

Ihe p,o,ecive free
exe.ci,se

say Ihe

i

„ce cxccsc dain.s h, Jehovah

-ul eeamnuc, ,hc
l>h

,

siales ,ha,

,o aci."

be

hee excxi.se "e.nluaces

rhongh Jnshce Robeds goes on

hen

in

eonduc, was no, emnely
Ivyond

ol ,he proieclion ol
s,H.iely.

,o

The

Ireedon, lo acl nmsi have
app,-op,iale deliniiion n, p,ese,
ve ihe enloicemeni ol ihal

piolecion, ihns leaving ,he inlerpielive
door open a

having

will,

moved

Tree exercise

LiMllwsdl was lollowed

away

hi,.

Iron, a so-called sirong
beliel

well as Ihjn ce

v. Ma,s.saclnis.-( ls

appi-opi iale slandards

Inslice ITanklniier
exerci.se claim

by

loi-

w„„e

a.s.sei

/

acion

is

cediled

dislinciion,

closely by Mineisville .School
Pisnici v (h.hhh xio u.S.

a:esl VireiniiiBoaidorihhic-aiio,,',

‘

Neveilheless, Rolx-ris

321 U.S. 2

l,ee exeici.se

lor Ihe

Conn

1

%

ighLs.

as

,<

(104,1), all

In (iliMlii,

upheld a Hag

il

3
ol'

^

,

jj

,,34

^

which Iniiher dcrined

Ihe

anolher Jehovah’s Wiinc.ss case,

.saline

ling Ihal Ihe slale inlcresls in Ihe
|)olicy

law, di.scharging die Iree

weie oh such

palriolic

ami

pohlical signilicance Ihal Ihey were
clearly valid and liininphed. Jnslice
l•|allk^nrlher
ex|,hcilly ado|,led die language of
inlercsl balancing lalher an beliel

/

acion. liann-iic

overlui iied (johdi.s Ihongh Jnslice Jackson's
opinion resled on ireedom orex|,ie.s.sion
.

lalher Ilian Iree exeici.se in Bjirnelle.
olliei

clauses ol die birsl

Amendmeni.

Neveilheless Jackson's winds aic insirnedve

Jack.son wroie dial Ihrsl Aincndinenl righis "aie

siisceplible ol reslriclion only lo prevenl grave
and

Slale

may

lawlully protecl."

inn .simply opinion, die C'onrI

And

loi die

immediale danger

lo iiileresls

which

die

since abslaining Irom a Hag saline was cleaily an acion,

was moving

rnriher slid I'rom Ihe beliel

/

acion

di.slincdon.

CiUUwUl is inKlilionally conceived ol evaluating the nature ol the |K)liey at issue, and whether
a valid .secular fX)liey, notwithstanding whether it pnxiueed an
indirect burden on lice exercise.
he
ea.se is understtuxl to have turned on C'onneetieut's
attempt to identily religion lor licensing, thus while Ihe
ends ol Ihe fxdiey may have a legitimate public wellare rationale, Ihe means
lo achieve them were
unacceptable in its potentially di.sec|nilous IreaUnenl ol religions beliel.
it

was

I

6H

.ncorporaung boU, balancing
and a slid.ng scale of
proiecuons for acdons claimed
rcl.giou,
Fmally Pnncfi aniculaied ihe
d.fficulty the Court was
hav.ng tn th.s area^ Wh.le
uphold.ng
the prohibition of distributtng
Jehovah rehgious materials by
minors, Jusi.ee Rutledge's
opinion indicated that free
exercise claims were not
beyond consideration, and perhaps
had

some

merit.

mterests,

Such consideration notwithstanding

whereby those of

the public regarding child
welfare superseded that of
Prince's

free exercise (Frankel, 1994:
71). Justice

come, he said
actions

the opinion described a
balancing of

that "convincing proof'

Murphy's dissent

was necessary

to

is instructive for

show

in

to

that the child's religious

were harmful, and necessarily concerned
a public welfare

convincing proof may be compelling
interests

what was

rationale.

Such

another discussion; that discussion
was

about to begin.

B raunlcld, 366
scholarship,

it is

U.S. 599 (1961) has an interesting
position in doctrinal

one of those cases

that has

added significance because

one betore" an important lineage began.
Such cases may be credited

it

represents the

as providing a

doctnnal spnngboard, or moving doctrine
within one step of re-articulation. Braunfeld

unique however
that

is

m that the professed reasoning and operative doctrinal logic is essentially

which presently comprises

free exercise jurisprudence. Rather than
focusing

on

beliefs

distinguished Irom actions as the Court had been
doing, Chief Justice Warren declared that

an otherwise secular public policy could not be
superseded by religious rights

if that

policy

exacted only an indirect burden on religious practice.
Essentially Braunfeld represented
the proposition that free exercise

disparate impact had

little

semtinized

The

strictly.

Orthodox Jewish

antidiscrimination clause, therefore de facto

bearing in an arena where only de jure discrimination was

dissent of Justice Brennan gives voice to the doctrinal era about to

open, relying on the free speech
criticized, the nature

was an

strict

of the compelling

interest in

scrutiny

model he pondered,

state interest

if

not downright

which overwhelmed,

if incidentally, the

working on Sunday instead of the Saturday Sabbath.
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Modern Free

4.

In the period

Exercise: Compelling Interests

between S herben

Di vision. Deparlmcm

ol'

Human

Vernei, 374 U.S. 398

v.

e^as

Resources of nr,-,.„n „

(

Weigh Heavily

1963) and Emnlovnn-n,
4^,4 pj

^ 872 (1990)

compelling mutres, dtx-trine was
copied Iront tree speech
junsprudenee
.

itlmg the strict scrutiny
standard. Whtle

targeting religion through policy
cxerci.se ca.scs largely locti.sed

Standard

ol

burdened by a

was severely

ol'

state policy, as

was claimed

justified

free

in

II

Sherben then

IVcc exercise
a

was

tougher

by the Court.

^herbert opinion inquired as to whether the interests of state or

soeiety were "compelling," and
whether the
the "least restrictive" of religious
exercise.

unemployment

constrained, 25 ,he post Sherben

one's religion could be prohibited.

review of that burden was

Justiee Brennan's

had always been accepted law that
explicniy

,t

on when, and whether, a policy
who.se incidental ellecLs

interlcred with the free exercise
signil icantly

tree exerctse,

bcnclits law

upon

means employed

In Sherbert the incidental

the decision of a

Satuiday work was not sustained by the

to satisfy that interest

impact of a

Seventh Day Adventist

state's interests in a

functioning

were

state

to refuse

unemployment

bcnclits system. Free exercise appeared
as a pseudo-entitlement in Sherbert and this
.

seems sensible when viewed against
activities.

would

No

the backdrop of developing welfare state judicial

longer would a policy's claimed secular validity be
enough to sustain

the bclicl

/

nor

action distinction be determinative, instead interests would
have to be

explicitly idcntilicd

and balanced against claimed

rights.

Much

balancing would be

accomplished bclorc ^niith and the Court's subsequent abandonment of compelling
doctiinc, but very

it,

little

interest

detailed or analytical idcntilication ol those interests accompanied

that balancing. 26

2 ^ Explicit
Uirgciing ol a practice which
secuhtr purpo.ses, but the hurdle

See Gottlieb (1988)

is

may

be coirstitutivc of a religion can be .sustained for

raised very high, at least in tlieory.

lor a deUiiled examination of

tlie compelling interest doctrine as a foil for
Gotlieb argues that the major critici.sms of finding fundamenuil rights
Irom constitutional inlerences should also apply to compelling interests, essentially they are each sides of
the siUTie coin and should both be subject to simihir amdysis and tirgument. Gotlieb finds that this is not

claims ol lundtunenUil

rights.

In

it

70

has been noied
(McConnel, 1992: 127; Sullivan,
1992: 2I.S) ,ha, the Suptente
Court wa,s eonsorvauve^’
in its application ol'
the compelling interest
doctrine, or
II

at least in

ttccepttng its application,
in free exercise
cases.
in tree exerci.se
cases, the

outstde of

unemployment

lamous ffis consin

v,

Court found

In the

27 years of the doeu ine's pre.sence

that free exercise claims

benefius law, the area

Yoder 406 U.S.

tnumphed

in hut

opened by Sherbea. That

2(tt (1972), with its protection
of

ca.se is the

an Amish

tndividual from criminal
prosecution for pulling his children
from .schooling at a
age.

The court

interests

were

rejected other types of free
exercise claims

pre,sent or

interest doctrine

by rea,sontng

le.ss

young

stating that compelling

that the levels of scrutiny
represented

should be supplanted by a

The second condition has two

215).

by

one case

by compelling

stringent rational basis test (Sullivan,
1992:

manifestations,

first

where

state administrative

interests in .secure institutions
(e.g, military, pri.sons) effectively
lower the required

standard tor accommodating alleged
religious practices. Second, culmtnaitng

otherwise valtd .secular policy need not
be examined under
not on

its

face dtscriminatory, and that any
burden

on

strict .scrutiny

reitgious practices

in

Smith, that

so long as

was

it

was

incidental and

did not cocrcc actions contradictory
to religious belief.

Compelling

interest doctrine

remained determinative

cases in the period between Sherbert and
Smith.

oLthc

Indiana

Appeals Commission 480 U.S. 136

which were lound
interests.

relused

Thomas

to

Thomas

v

benefits

Rovipw

Rtv.„-fi

(1981), and Hohhie v
(

1987), the Court struck state laws

burden religious free exercise without the necessary
compelling

atlirmed an entitlement

work because

state's interests in

unemployment

Specifically in

Emnloymeni Divisinn 450 U.S. 707,

U nemployment

in

to

unemployment

ol religious objections,

i.c.

benefits

when an

individual

the production of tank turrets.

providing unemployment compensation effectively and

fairly,

The
and only

tlic case, lliat in fact die deterential
posture of tiie judiciary to state interests is quite out of line witli tiie
olten articulated critique of its activi.sm in tlie area of civil
and individual rights. See al.so Levinson (1994)
lor a search lor compelling interests in tlie politics and
state institutions of Oregon prior to Smith.

97

tliey

This is meant to imply tliat tlie Supreme Court chose not to be expansive,
some might say
were apologetically backpedaling in giving life to compelling interests in free
exercise.

who

U. .h..,se

lost their

jobs "Icgitintately." did no,
outweigh the Inct that Ihe nteans

ends not only burdened Thontas's

Hobijk extended

this reasoning,

and docti ines perltaps,

Seventh Day Adventist .sought
nnentploymem bcnefiLs pursuan,
io

work on Saturday. Aga.n

,o du.sc

religion, but coerced hint
to violate a tenet titereoi
to a Florida case.
to tern, ina, ion

A

over relusal

the state's tnterests bui dened
IVee exe, ci.se by iorci.tg a
choice

between a parttcular livelihood and
Hobbie's rehgious

tenets.

The

controlli.tg con, polling

.merest doctrine had a distinctive
doniain where tho.se interests
scented insuHicicnt,

uncntploymcnt benefits

ca.scs

where

the policy

would force a choice between job and

religion.

1 he exemptions Irom policy as
in Herbert were closed olT
to other areas, yet the

compelling interest doctrine would be
incorporated

in that process,

hence maintaining

doctrinal authority in other areas of
free exercise law. In Gillette v

11

.^

(1971) the Court weighed the interests of the
U.S. military against those

401 u.S. 437
ol'

both

prospective servicemen and active servicemen.28
For both however, while their religious
exercise

was

certainly burdened by

membership

in the

armed

Ibices, or

by being subject

to

conscription, the interests ol the military and
state were signilicant and brokered no

exemption as

in

unemployment

beneliLs policy. Perhaps

we can view

Sherheri and Gillette

as poles on a spectrum of interests, the Court
had staked out the ends, the task then

becomes finding

the boundaries

What about

between them.

state interests in social security

provide the boundary sought? The case of U.S.

boundary

closei to Shei bert

by upholding

would have required Amish employers
taxes.

Similarly, in

Hernande/

v.

state interests in a lunctioning tax

to

v.

and internal revenue? Would they
Lee. 4.55 U.S. 252 (1982)

state interests in the social security

deduct and then submit

to the

IRS

moved

system

that

that

social security

Commissioner. IRS. 490 U.S. 680 (1989) compelling
system ovei^whelmed Church of Scientology members

28 This was a
consolidation of cases.
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aUcmpLs

10

deduct from

"audit, ng."29

teed

its

Ihc.r taxes

The Coun, while

payments made

to that

skeptical of ihe religious
nature ol andiling in this
conlext

decision of Ihe compelling
mieresl docirine, choosing
nol to investigate Ihe nalure

or essence of Scientology's
claim to religious slams.
So
recently as 1989 in

Hgmandez,

was superseded by an
bcnclits,

ol

individual's free exerci.se claim

compelling

was

active, though

where „

was stuck on unemploymeni

.

inlerest doctrine in free
exercise

dormant area of explicitly

the year bolore.

m each of these inslances, as

the compelling mteresi
docirine

and Ihc ever lonely Yoder

The end
in Ihe

church lor (he practice ol

law with Snihh, other than

di.scriminatory policy, .seems sudden
in light ol Hernandev

Using Karl Llywelyn's

ideas,

one could say

dial juslices,

and indges

generally, could easily argue that
significanl fact pallcrn differences
distinguished Smith's
dixilrinal irealmenl.

why

But, as

is

evident, Jusiice Scalia

Ihc compelling intcrcsi docirine
did not belong.

end of a counlcr-currcnl

doctrinal conslitulional law .scholarship
Ihcrc

is

these watershed cases to determine where
ihcy

following build up shows

.shift

how

Smith went out of his way

The

Court's Smith decision

of cases within Ihc Sherbert

liiany

possibility that a doctrinal

m

to

show

is at

is,

Ihc

in

an established practice of looking hack from

come

from, scholars basically deny ihc

can occur suddenly, without

a dcfercniial judicial posture

distinguishing the legilimate inslitulional spaces for

determination, and second, by eliminating the

Smith penod. Thai

to

lest

making

hiiild

was

up of some son. The

crafted by

first

a compelling interests

altogether along with strict scrutiny of

olhcl-wisc valid non-discriminatory secular policies.

Auditing

is tui

initiation rite,

consummated with payment by

aspirant

members

to die

Church.

The old de jure / de lacto distinction of equal protection lore. So long as tlie policy did not
facially discriminate against religion, or as it would later determine in
Church of the Lukumi Rahalu Ave v
C ity qI Mont Hialctili, 1 13 S.Ct. 2217 (1993), did nol in etlect target a specific insular
religion or iLs
practices, tuid it served a legitimate end, tlien it need not be tested against free exercise claims.
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The Beginning of

5.

The

(

End

for

Compelling Interest Doctrine

definition of icgilimale
mstituuonal spaces for the
application of

interest doctrine

U.S. 506

the

seemed

settled, or at least accepted,
until

1986) and fflL one

compclhng

Gol.lman v

475

Shaha// ,482 U.S. 342 (1987).
The doctrine had been

v.

determinative in areas as diverse as
miliuiry conscription and internal
revenue
administration.

became
flLonc
fact:

With these two

cases, the institutional spaces of
the military and prisons

significant as to whether the
doctrine could be invoked or not.
In

the dtxnrine

was

Goldman and

objectively jettisoned due to the
controlling effect of a particular

the state institution proffering
interests. Free exercise claims in
the military and

prison

would henceforth be held up

to a less than strict scrutiny
"legitimacy" standard, the

challenged policy need only be a legitimate
means

to

an administrative end, one viewed

dcrcrcntially by the judiciary.

The Imal phase
like

valid secular

in the pre

Smith period

is

written by the Court's attention to notions

policies and "incidental burdens."

Bowen

v Rf^y 475 U.S. 693

(1988) tested the ettorts of parents to deny acquisition
of a social security number.^i The
lorccd enumeration ol citizens was a valid
policy representing a legitimate government
interest, as if

it

mattered anymore, and that the manifestation of those
interests occasionally

incidentally burdened the free exercise of religion.

The case of Lvng

Cemetery Protective Association 485 U.S. 439 (1988) completed
,

the

v.

Northwe.si lndi:m

sweep by upholding

the construction ol a Forest Service road through
public land considered sacred to Native

Americans. Moving beyond the balancing of

interests, the

was

the road policy neutral in that

that

any "incidental burdens" were subsumed by the

established that unlike in

it

targeted

no

Court maintained that not only

particular religion or religious practices, but
validity of that neutrality.

Lvng

unemployment cases, where a policy forced a choice between

01
-

ol"

The

social security

stigmatization.

number was considered a

soul robbing practice, going well

beyond

tlie

claim

religious exercise and penalty

(i.c,

denial of

unemployment

hcnel'iLs), the policy

here had

no such implications, the
burdens were incidental and lorced
no such dilemma,

Smnh
seem

to

have

presented the Court with another
unemployment hcnclit case, and would
fit

under compelling interest doctrine
as practiced through Hobbic.
Members

of the Native American church

in

Oregon were tem, mated from

counselors at a private drug and
alcohol abuse

clinic, for

their jobs, paradoxically, as

using peyote. Oregon law

at the

time prohibited the use and
possession of peyote, and more
importantly, stale

unemployment
In

Oregon, one

benefits
lired for

were contingent on

the cause, or context, of one's

unemployment.

misconduct could not receive unemployment
compensation, and

certainly actions contravening stale
felony statutes could be construed as
such. Smith, and

co-pctitioner Black, claimed that their
free exercise rights were unconstitutionally

constrained by the coerced choice between
their jobs (and by association their

unemployment

and

benefiLs)

their religious practice of ingesting
peyote.

case profile, an image, suggesting

this ca.se

was

and HtiblM, where individuals were compelled

Compelling

interest doctrine

been rca.sonably expected

to

was

little

different

They

pul forth a

from Sherhen Thomas

to either contravene religion or state law.

a central element of that profile, and the Court
could have

continue

its tradition.

Justice Scalia, cognizant of the "valid

secular" and "incidental burden” infiuences in
cases like Lvni; and Rtiy, and consi.slently

pining for deference to state legislatures, look

strict

scrutiny and

its

compelling

interest

doctrine on.
Justice Scalia's opinion denied the application of the compelling
interesSt doctrine as

the Sherbert tradition intimated. Smith established that free exercise
challenges to generally

applicable, religion neutral laws should not be evaluated with strict scrutiny, but rather
a

variant ol a rational basis

There was
tliat

a deliberative

/

religious neutrality

little

test.

Simply,

if

the law banning peyote

was

discussion of what constituted rationality, perhaps

repre.sentative
test, little

body passed

die law. Probably

attention to policy

means

is

all tliat is

more accurately

required

rationab'^^and of

needed

tlie test

is tlie

fact

for rationality is a

course noc on

irs

race ..serin,, „aro„,
,„e„ .Here

be ra.sed. „ exemp.ions

u,

othcwise

was no cause

rai.onal nennal laws

for a cons.i.nuona,
,ssue ,o

we.e

,o

be developed „ shonU,

be done legislatively. ^3

Jusdee Sealia made ,wo
signilicam points about con.pell.ng
Ihc

Sherben standard or

practice

subsequent unemployment

comm.ttmg a crime and

was invoked whc,e

ent, dements,

or narrowing the relevant

lact

domain

a choice between a job,
and

and rel.gious

rel.gious exercise as
,so

Smith

exerci.se existed, not

did.

In

noting a "parade ol

terriblc,s" thal

between

keeping with Llewelyn's notion

as to .shape precedential choices,
Just.ce .Scaha

claimed Smiih wa.s really about
somelhing quite diircrem.
itscir,

inceresi doeirine. I.ns,,

would have

Second, he took on the doctrine

resulted

it

it

had not been

Court's selective, and pro state,
application ot compelling interest
doctrine.

Ii

Ibr die

Ihc

is

selective nature ol the application
thal .seems to trouble Justice
Sealia, such .selection

problematic, and should be

left to political

bodies to

is

decide.-''^
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A.s a nialtcr ol lad iJiis occurred
in Oregon, passing a law in tJie
wiikc ol Snnili dial esUiblishcd
an cxunpiion Irom the pcyoic prolnbiiion
laws lor religious praclices, ouLside ol
prisons ot course.
-

•mnii

h die compelling

d

.

t^s^ really
n'' inetins what
mnccrest

i

i-

it

says (and watering

it

interests test is to be applied at

all,

then,

it

must be

commanded. Moreover, il compelling
down here would subvert its rigor in the other fields^

"‘>rchy, but that diuiger increases m direct
proportion to die society’s diversity ot religious
beliels
determination to coerce or suppress none of them.
Precisely because we are a cosmopidrnin nation
<ide up ol people ol almost every conceivable
religious prelerence, Braunleld v. Brown and
precisely
because we vtdue mid protect that religious divergence,
we cminot allord tlie luxury of deeming
presumptively invalid, as applied to tlic religious objector,
every regulation ol conduct that docs not protect
<tn interest ol the highest order. The
rule respondents favor would open the prospect of
constitutionally
required religious exemptions Irom civic obligations
ol almost every conceivable kind - ranging from
compufsory miliUiry .service, see, c.g., Gil lette v. U.,S. 401 U.S.
437 (1971), to the payment of Uixes, .see,
c.g.., LLS. V. Lee; to health and .safety
regulation such as manslaughter and
‘

ml

’

Its

;

,

child neglect laws,

Runkhoq.ser

.see, c.g.,

763 P.2d 695 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988), compulsory vaccination law.s,
see, e.g..,
mJc V. Shite. 237 Ark. 927, 377 S. W. 2d 816 (1964), drug law.s, see, c.g.,
Olsen v. PEA. 279 U.S.
App. D.C. I, 878 F.2d 1458 (1989), and traffic laws, .see Cox v. New Hampshin'
312 U.S. 569 (1941); to
social welbu'c legislation such as minimum wage law.s, .see
Tony and Susan Ahuno Foiindaljon v. Secretary
ol Labor, 47
U.S. 290 (1985), child labor laws. See Prince v. Mas.sachnseiis 321 U.S. 158
(1944),
animal cruelty laws, see, e.g.. Church of Uie Lukumi Bablv Ave Inc, v, Ciiv of HialtMih
723 F.Supp. 1467
(
.189).
environmenUil protection laws, see U.,S. v. Little 638 F.Supp. 337 ( 1986), and laws providing
v. .State

.

L

1

.

1

.

.

.

for equality of opportunity for the races, e.g.

Boh

.lones University v.

U

S

.

461 U.S. 574

(

1983)

.

A.S a l.nal note

on Snolh Justice O'Connor's
concunencc of iudgmen, should
bo

ntcnuoncd. iffor no oUrer
rca.son than

,s

mtelleclual inspiraUon lor
the Religious

2(K)0bb-4 (Supp.
u.

V

1994)). Justice

generally considered ,o be
Ihe iextual and

Freedom Restoration Act
(42 U.S.C 20(K)bb

O'Connor suggested

apply compelling interests
doctrine, and one where

its

th.s

was

pr,.hihit.on of drugs.

real,

and

would have been
state interests in the

She. the author of
Lyog, d.stingu.shed this case on the
nature of the

religious interest burdened,
and the

burden, while

good a place as any

as

application

relatively unproblemaltc,
as there certainly are
compelling soc.al

to

was

manner

tn

which

it

was burdened.

In

Lyng. the

incidental to a legitimate state
function, and importantly did
not

lorce the wholesale abdication
of a centrally important
religious practice as in Simih.

6.

The Aftermalh: Religious Freedom
Restoration Act and Beyond

The

reaction to Smilh

Act, proposed in 1990,

endpoint to

was

this chapter's survey.

and then resurrected by

common

politically active.

finally passed in

compelling interest doctrine.

Smuh

was

It is

RFRA

The

Religious Freedom Restoration

November of

was an

199.4,

providing a doctrinal

explicit attempt to legislatively
salvage

unusuai for a doctrine to be so obviously
discarded as

direct congrc.ssional

and presidential action.

It

is

much more

for a ca.se like Smith to inspire
legislative bodies to create individual
exceptions to

laws which had been conslittilionally contestable.
case a constilulional, standard was nothing
the Spring ol 1997, the Court struck

if

RFRA

To

re-articulate a judicial,

(1997) as an unconstitutional expansion

ol

and

in this

not a controversial congressional action. In

in

City of Roerne

v. Flon\*s

1
,

Congress' 14th

Amendment

17 S.Ct.

2157

enl'orcement

powers.

RFRA

was "an

ellort to enact the theoiy that the free exercise of religion

is

a

substantive civil liberty ... an attempt to create a statutory right
to the tree exercise of
religion

in

(Laycock, 1994: 896). Congress actions are an extension

powers under Section 5 of

the Fourteenth

Amendment, much

77

the

ol its

same

enlorcement

as applied in the

Voung

Rights Act. Poluical inlercsLs,
often of very divergent
natnre, were allied

suppttrl

RFR A,

exercise law.

ACLU,

A

I

«).

and parlteularly

Groups

its

reinstatement of the eompelling
interests ditctrine to free

like the National Association

and People for the American

well as Irom prison administrators,

and the

pri.son i.ssuc

RFRA's subsequent

lined

to

exempt

hecame

the

up

of Evangelicals, the Mormons,
the
in

hehind

to the potential

RFRA

2()()()bb (a)(1))

9104 loui
RFR A

ahorhon tmpl, cations, as

Several senators stalled the

pri.son administrators.

most

rhetorically,

and

That amendment ultimately
judicially, contentious

of

Speeilically,

right to religious Tree exercise.

where "governments.

t

a loreign hmguage where

.

.substantially burdened

discussion of prisoner challenges: See Merritl-Bev
v. Delo. No
(determining iliat the court need not reach the elTeci of
direshold showing Uiat Uieir exercise of religion
was subsUiniiallv

hnrH
n by the correctional center); Smith v, Elkins. No.
burdened
93-15185, 1994
1994) (remanding for determination of RFRA’s effect on
a pri.son
in

hill's pa.s,sagc unlil

addressed the intent of the Constitutional
IVamers, attributing

'V

g-;

ISteinfels, 1W.1:

feared overaggressive interference
with piison

them the expressed desire of proteeting the
unalienable

(42 U.S.C.

RFRA

appliealion.35

Provisions of
to

who

RFRA's enactment.

an amendment was propo.scd
lulled,

Way

Opposition from Catholic Bishops,
due

administration slowed

to

'

U

S

App

(9ih Cir

rule prohibiting inmates to

plaintill

had alleged

dial prison discipline for

praying aloud

in

Mar

2

communicate

Arabic violated

his constitulional rights to Iree exerci.se of religion);
Ctuiedv v. Boardman 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1994)
(noting dial had prisoner’s assertion in his brief, that
a saip .search by female officers particularly burdened
him because he was a Muslim, been mnended to the complaint, diough
likely doomed under Smith, such a
claim may succeed under RFRA); Prins v, Coughlin. No. 94
Civ. 2053, 1994 U.S. Dist. S.D.N.Y.

Aug.

1994) (denying injunctive relief to prevent a prison transfer where
plaintiff failed to show diat u-ansfer
imposed a subsUintial burden on die exerci.se of his religion as required under RFRA);
3,

Boone

v.

C ommis.sioner

of Prisons, No. 93-5074, 1994 U.S. Dist. (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1994) (finding
that plaintiff
prisoner laded to make die direshold showing under RFRA diat confiscation
of certain religious dcKunients
xUid a lilteen-day cell restriction was a subsUuitial burden diat eidier
pressured him to commit an act
lorbidden by his religion or prevented him Irom having a religious experience which his
faidi mandates);
Mesbintt V, Mil//, CP, 854 F Supp. 16 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting diat RFRA rai.sed the government’s burden
to demonstrate a compelling, rather tliiui legidmate, interest, but furdier determining
that government need
not nuike such showing where plaintiff prisoner failed to esUiblish diat he was denied the right
to practice
.

his religion);

directive

Campos

v,

Coughlin. 854

which prevented
F.

F.

Stuiterian inmate

even the government’s legitimate
Mgaci, 844

1

interest,

Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (determining

diat

from wearing religious beads did not have a

it

was unneces.sary

Supp. 1056 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (concluding

diat

to

because prison

rational relation to

apply RFRA’s higher sUuidard); Allah

RFRA

provides die .suuidard of review

controversies involving pri.son rules that subshintially burden prisoner’s religious practices); Lawson

X44

F.

Supp. 1538 (S.D.

Fla. 1994) (determining dial

Corrections to use the least restrictive means

to furdier its

RFRA’s standard

compelling

interest,

v.

in
v,

required the DeparUiient of

which

it

failed to do);

religious exercise wiihout
compelling juslilicalion,"

recourse.

(H.R. Rep. No. 88.

RFR A was

Cong.(l993) and

11)3

cite

intended to provide

42 U.S.C.

2(l(K)bb (b)(1))

RFRA provided:
(a)

Findings

The Congress
(5) the

(b)

finds lhal

-

eompelling interest

test as set forth in prior

Purposes

The purposes of this Chapter

are

-

compelling interest
(
(

I
1

Federal eourt mlinp<;

>>63)

and Wiseonsin v

test as set forth in Sherbcri v

406 U.S. 205 972) andm
guarantee its applieation in all eases
where free exereise of relieion
^
substantially burdened.
42 U.S.C. 2000bb

Vorru^r

u

f t

c

( 1

Explicitly taking on Smith,

burden a person's exorcise

ol'

RFRA

religion

provides that "government shall not
substantially

even

if

the burden results Irom a rule

applicability, except as provided in
stib.section (b) of this section,"

compelling governmental

RFRA

applies to

including every

iniere.st

all

and

is

least re.strictive

means

i.o.

ol'

general

except where the

tests arc met.

governmental burdens on religious conduct,

branch, department, agency, instrumentality,
and official (or

other person acting under color of law) of the
United States, a State, or a

subdivision ol a State." Reacting to
doctrine Congress perhaps pushed

Smith's perceived dismantling of compelling interest

its

Section 5 powers under the 14th

constitutional provision has been interpreted as a remedial

power

Amendment. That

to take national legislative

action against laws and policies that restricted or interfered
with due process rights (e.g.
voting). Challenges to

RFRA

waged on RFRA's use by

focused on

prisoners to

collapse due to the prior but would

cam

Flores represents the death of

.

file

this

RFRA

to the

the rhetorical

so-called frivolous challenges.

dubious distinction from the

RFRA,

Congress' enlorcemcnt powers under Section

Kennedy, comparing

power push, while

falling

5.

upon

its

RFRA would

latter.

explicit expansion of

The opinion of

Voting Rights Act, showed

the Court

how

by Justice

Congress' power was

remedial, not pro-active; and most importantly, not pro-active in the sense that
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war was

it

sought

to

alter

a Con.slicuuonal right, something
the Court eon.siders fixed

Court

e.stabli,shc.s

authoritative intcrpreiat,on.s
ofcon.stiiutional nghus, Congrc.s,s

law,s to protect tho.se nghus,
but trad.tionally only after
a

those rights. Congre,ss heard
what the Court had to
pa,s,sed legi,slat,on

in the Con.stitut.on,

may

The
enact

law or policy negat.vely i„lluence,s

,say in

Smith, d.d not agree, and

overtly contradicting the result
of Smilk and explicitly articulated
what

the appropriate dixnrinal
standards ofcon.stiiutional free
exercise rights were. Justice

Kennedy's opinion found

this unacceptable.

For

that

moment, and

compelling interest doctrine was effectively
eliminated from free

C.

The preceding
to

Compelling

analysis ol'eompclling intcrcsl doctrine

interest doctrine

Court and American
incorporation,
tolerance

when

were ideological

law with Flores.

in the tradition

was

a

sell'

conscious allcmpi

of scholarship around such

can be seen as a part of a larger history cngulling
the

politics generally.

facts

exerci.se

Conclusion

explore an area ot constitutional rights law

rights.

likely for .some time,

In

time of formalist old, before the age of

and law were thought clearly

distinct,

and where neutrality and

pillars ol doctrines like belief / action dichotomies,
interests

ol political significance only, they

had no standing yet

in law.

were

With the watershed events

ol early 2()th century constitutional law, destroying
protections for

economic

liberty

and

substantive rights of economic liberty, and replacing them with
a deference to legislative

policy

making and heightened

role ol interests

doctrine

scrutiny of policies

became enhanced. The

accommodates both

strict

ultimately individual, rights. At the

ready

way

made

same

interfere with political rights, the

scrutiny appropriation of compelling interest

ol these tendencies.

judiciary's self proclaimed intention of being

which

more

Strict scrutiny is

symbolic of the federal

active in the area of political, and

time, compelling interest doctrine provided a

construct for incorporating the state into discussions of those rights. In such a

that they

could quite effectively trump those same

exercise examined here that

was more than

rights,

often the case.
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and

in the area

of free

('IIAPTKR IV

M^(JAL INFORMATION MA('IIINFS
A.

lools do MOI
bill

make

a cral'lsman's finished prodiiet,
his labor

dial piodiiel is inlimalely

Tools allow the individual
without them.

would

Some

liUrodiirHon

and

skill

are his

connected with the devices and methods employed

to create in a particular fashion
that

m

own,

his erart.

which may not be possible

lools are instrumental to a trade or craft,
such that the objeels created

not exist without the advent ol those tools,
or at a

minimum,

they

would

not be as

linely finished or useful. 'Pools help create
parameters of the possible, they provide spaces
01 potential lor creativity to

take hold and

make something,

human endeavor. Those parameters however
which

cie.ilive eneigies

limits that individuals

new

ones, to

may

push

move beyond

at

be applied.

It is

add meaning and value

at

the point of frustration

and recognition of

those parameters, either adapting existing lools or building

the status

quo

ol a

productive domain that

consumers of

managing information present many of

the

the

is

no longer

goods produced.

same

issues, except that in

social arenas like law, the product ol legal actors and their lools of information

have impact upon the
tool users.

lives ol a multitude of social actors

'Pools of law's information

Doctrine as Data attempts to explore

management

how some

beyond

the

immediate

presentation

is

It

management
circle of

are both enabling and constraining.

of these lools, and practices associated with

them, help shape the meaning of doctrine, an abstraction of law manifested
a|)pellate case opinions.

to the

are limiting as well, they free/,e the range in

salislying to the users ol those lools, or to the
'Pools for

to

in federal

has been suggested that the manner of law's information

nearly as significant as the information

S

I

itself,

certainly

it

is

central to the

meaningful content of that
information, and thus the actions
and bclicls that

How

from

conceptualizations ot that information.!

The need
traditions

for

managing

legal

informauon

linked to the development of
legal

and institutions dependent upon
specific knowledge bases and
experts

and act on

that

knowledge. Record keeping

literate cultures

had law, or

at least

project though is
(i.e.

grounded

in

in

a tangible

medium

is

to interpret

not required, pre-

a stock of behavioral norms and
attendant traditions of

observation and enforcement, organized

writing

is

in the

minds of experts and subjects

Anglo-American law. a

tradition

now

alike.

This

fully

dependent on

the ability to record data
meaningfully on a portable durable

medium) and

Structured sensemaking around law's
written hard data.
In

Anglo-American law information management
has been

meaningful access

to the texts of case opinions.

As

the

body of

Two hundred years ago

stressed,

to provide

texts has increased,

become more complex, information systems’

and organization practices have been
challenging.

upon

Information systems, or machines, are

created to record, index, and catalogue
case texts.
the needs ol legal professionals

called

and

categorization

and meaningful access become more

a lawyer might need to keep track of relatively
few

cases2 ol precedential value to his substantive
and jurisdictional area of practice. Today, in
the

wake of over one hundred
West

likes ol

years of comprehensive and universal case reporting
by the

Publishing, and the adherence, at least in practice

stare decisis, precedent,

if

not theory, to notions of

and analogical reasoning, the scope and complexity of a practicing

lawyer's information needs has increased significantly.

1

See discu.ssion of West s structuring power

for the

knowledge base of indexed case law

(Berring,

1987 25 )
;

There are a variety ol information systems employed in and around law, certain systems more
Those which allow for access to appellate cases of the federal courts are most
usetul to professionals and scholars probing such notions as precedent. Rather tlian paying
attention to
systems which allow local police to monitor sex offenders or tlie local district court to record and make
significant for diis project.

available case and
in die

-

lit

trial

reports,

Supreme Court or

tlie

project pays attention to appellate cases of

Adlierence to practices like stare decisis require

ptirticular

tlie

federal variety, tliose hetird

Circuit Courts of Appeal.

meanings. Witli

tlie

incredible increases in

82

tiiat

tlie

data objects be categorized tuid normalized to

rate of case opinion publication

it

becomes

Yearbooks. N()miniiHv«> Reporte
rs, and ihv vvihi

ii.

The

c.minK,,, law look l„rni in

rclali,,,,

iccl,nic|uc.s l„r

i'>l<.nna(i„n, ,cchnic|ue.s ol
|nc,senlali„n, reasoning

ami argnmeni, rule applicalion
and

uhi.nalely decision rendering and
reporling. Wriling and prim

play

Ihe slory ol law's inlormalion
machines.

,n

Hnghsh

royal

linked Ihe

I

conns and

nlnre ok

I'-arly l•;tlglish

ektorts ttnd taletiLs.

m

common

and early
core

2l)lh

was

olThccommoti law

ccniury Ihe power ok

in

ol ihc

pica rolls

tinderstanding them.-i

individtial

he

lirsi

Irottghly bclwecti Ihc I2lh atid ifiih

atid ititcrpretatioits ol

conn

intellect atid traditiotis

ol law's inherent (or contrived'.')

I

titid

hy ihose conns

expansion

law inlormalion systems were
dependent npon

were wrilten records

supplementary.

texts

as had an nnporiani role to

Ixgal pntetilioners were the repositories
ok legal knowledge, hnl even

Ihc lotig lormalivc period

cetilnry) ihcrc

hiw with

I,

In ihe i2lh ccniury, ihe

Ihe heginning ok record
keeping

common

managing anllmnialive

acliotis.

Utilil

the late IhIh

ok interpretation was

coherency, as recorded anihorily was

still

Ihe

still

recorded, and .so-called aiilhorilalivc, legal
inlormalion .system

Ihc Yearbook.-''

I

he Yearbooks were recorded

cleniciits oreoiirl

notes ol the signilicance or implications

powei

ol Ihe

(lilliajll lor

Yearbook

it

ol'

proceedings as well as

aiilhors’

those proceedings/’ Despite the anthoritalive

was an inlormal system

ol'

record keeping. Yearbooks were

prcccdcnlial

(rails to be maiiUaiiicd, simply, a studious aud
rigorous researcher can potentially
cases to back up a variety ofarguineut positions. Such variability
defies the old structures
ol stare decisis and analogical rea.soning as exhibited in
traditional legal education and practice models.
Inlormation systems which attempt to continue (he structuring of tho.se
models while simultaneously
pubh.shmg copious numbers of cases are inherently stressed, or are .stre.ssing
upon things like stare decisis.

Imd

all

lorm

ol

A

See work which surveys

legal information

systems (Gro.ssman, 1994),

For a more thorough di.scussion of (he Yearbooks see Hicks (1923: 94-102),
Eletnents ol court proceedings and authors' notes might be a dillieult distinction to sustain upon
examination, generally (hough the prior refers to points of law and decision.s, perhtips factual p;it(erns
as well, tho.se things considered relatively iinproblenmlic in ca.se reporting. The hitter might tlien be
undersUuKl as an extension ol the 'elemeiiLs of court proceedings,' or interpretations of (hose proceedings by
clo.se

(lie

author.

volumanlycealoO

lo,

a c„n,n„,ni,y

,,l

lawyer,s and ,„d,c.s.

Imccsnngly um.i il,e l„l.
cenlury anihnnsh.p was
anonymous, perhaps sipnily.ng
a des.re lor percepiions
o, legal
oi-|cc„v,ly. or nrore hkely
ihe laci iha, n,any
nulivldnals were
re.sponsihle K,r ihen ere.

Lm:

«‘'<-nan,

Yearhooh coverage was rpnie

were lorinnale enough

Nomlnauve

lo

which

be recorded by nidividnal
elTorls.

reporls succeeded Ihe
Yearbooks.^and represenled a
nu.re lonnal

version ol ed.led nuerprelabons
ol
l>acl

l.nnied, exiendn.g lo
ca.se,s

conn

largely replaee.l oral
pleadings,

Ihe opinion, e,s,senlially

r,

ca.ses,

shdemeni

Keporls .nclnded wnllen
pleading,s. which
ol ihe i.ssne ol

dealing ihe model lor modern

law

al

haml. and a repori ol

The docirine ol precedent
spurred Iheir devclopinenl as
lawyers songhi anlborily, and
a co,n|x-lilive edge, lor
Ihen
n.se

orca,se

hi.slorie,s

and argnmenis

ol poinls

reporl.s.*

oh law. Like Ihe Yearbooks
Ihe Noininalive

rcpoils were largely inlormal,
an inlormalion .system dial
develo,x-d hecan.se ol a markei

aeed.Vone winch Inrlher
Ihrsed

and preccden,

solidilie.l Ihe

organixe.l).

anlhors were responding
prolTcrcd coherency and

ol eslabli.shing

7

law's

preemmeni

characlerislies (c.g. ca.se

Nominative reporls were also voinniary
crealions,

lo ihe desires ol Iheir

conlemporaries and ihe inleresls

hnl

in law's

aiillioriiy.

Nonnnalive reporls
need

common

prolil'eralcd

.somewhal

in

America

in respon.se lo Ihe

an American variani ok common law,i"yel
one which was

perceived
.slill

very

’

See

I

hek.s alx)ve

and

hi.s

di.scu.ssion ol Ihe lirsl noininalive
reporl.s (eirea

1571)

Iniereslnmlv Ihe

wonhl nol appear nnlil ihe mid
r!
7 0.V
Ins eondilion
is il.sell worlhy ol examinalion,
ihe power ol reporlers was lii-lilly hound
wilh ils
a i^iage, since a lelalive minoriiy would
he conver.sani in I, aw hrench, knowledge ol law's
luineiples ind
luiels, nol lo nienlion ihe ca.ses giving
lile lo Ihein, would he lighlly held
and managed.
X See
general drsciission ol Noininalive Reporls and
ihe inihience Ihey had on ihe rornis
case opinions ((;ro,s.sman, W4).
'

ol

modern

I

^

Did Ihe reporler lill ihe need or did Ihe crealor ol ihe
reporler ihen sliimilale a way ol praclice a
and luaiupulaling aulhorilalive inlormal ion? This is a
challenge lhal conlemporary
Maikeling Rh.Ds are con,sidering in diHereni conlexis. In my
line of analysis Ihoiigh
slick lo consliliilive
consi
guns and siiggesl lhal caiisalily is imillidireclional.

way

ol acciuiring

I

See excellent irealmeni

ol dillereni legal

inlormalion lechnitiues in relation lo

Herring (19X7:32).
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common

law

much conneclcd
organ.., ng ol

lo

Us English hcncage.
NominaUve reports were alone

Amencan

ihcmselves had begun

ease law lor only a short
period, by the early

to integrate

,n the reporting

and

Igtligs courts

ease reporting into the.r
institutional

m.xf Judges,
lawyers, and legtslators
ree„gn..ed the .s.gntfieanee
of an information system to
court
unetion and legit.maey by
a,,s.gn.ng reportmg dut.es
to court employees,
or suheonnaetors
’

i

m some instances.
ihe ma,ss of ca.ses,

Neverthele,ss. the law, conceived
as the principles and tenets
inherent in

was

still

court sponsored, were few

Lawyers and Judges were

largely unrecorded. Written
reports, whether nominative
or

when compared

still

to the

case law from which they emerged.'^

forced to organize and

manage

the information neces,saiy for

their respective practices,
the reports, while increasing
in

importance and depth of
coverage, as well as providing a
model of what was possible, could
not completely

comprise an individual's inl'ormalion
system.

The combination of nominative and
and universalizing power

court reports

ot the regional reporters privately
provided

publishing. 13 In the

mid

opinions, and at the

same time

to late

1

8(K)'s

methods

ditticult.

by the

the organizing
likes of

West

courts were creating an increased supply
of reported

the task of organizing

either private or court officers, could
feasibly

as well as structured

was subsumed by

them became more than

individuals,

manage. i4 Dilemmas of scope and breadth,

knowledge representation and organization, made

The West Publishing company appeared

to

the previous

normalize the knowledge

^

^ See
general di.scus.sion ot early reporters and
insuiuuonal practices (Joyce, 1985).

tlieir signit ieance to

Uien developing
*
^ Court

12 Berring cites Hicks, in
1848 Uiere were 800 volumes of law
reports (Berring, 1987).

1

3
-

West by no means was alone

Edition Reporters, Lexis
l"!

/

in its efforts, mid of course it still has competition
Nexis, iuid a raft of Internet laeilitated arehives and indices)

(c.g.

Lawyers

In substance our law is excellent, full of justice and good sense,
but in form it is chaotic. It
has no systematic arrangement which is generally recognized mid used,
a fact which greatly increases tlie
labors of lawyers and causes unnecessary litigation" Terry (1920:
61).

rcprcscntalion scheme,
cover
ol

all Juri.sd.ction.s,

and provide a low

eo,si

produet

u, the

market

American lawyers.

C Law and
.

1.

The
and actions

I

nformation

Information Systems

soctal reality of law has
consistently been the prodttet
of coneeputali/ations of.
relattve ut, legal

forms and informatittn; whether
those are conceptual, /.ations
or

actions of individuals faced
with contemporary legal
insltlulions, actors, and practices
or

with pre-modern oral cultures
and Justice

traditions.'-'

Law

helps structure understandings

of authoritative, individual, and
collective actions, Uicxse
understandings are grounded
direct experience

and .second hand knowledge, acquired
from authoritative and informal

sources.'' Informal sources can
be as abstract as intcrsttbjcctivc
knowledge bases
cultural values

in

and predtspositions grounded

in

empiricism and hearsay) which maintain

cyntetsm and distrust of law and law
enforcement

America (Mcarcs and Kahan,

1

(i.e.

in

minority communities of urban

998). Fomial, or authoritative, sources
of legal knowledge

include legal education, and most
importantly for Doctrine as Data, .systems
developed to

manage

svsien,

law's hard data,

h,.|i,

I

hw

,

i.c.

federal appellate case opinions.

“> I'"

?

“I " 'vgal

t his kind ot magic is
necessary it law is to work. Akso, Ethan Kalsh
(Katsh, 1989: 8-9) conUiins a
general di.scussion ol law’s intormatiomU qutdity.
Law does not simply consume or produce inl'ormatioir
law structures, organizes, and regulates information.
The effectiveness and operation of law depends on
controlling access to .some inlormation and highlighting
or directing attention to otlier infonnation.
’

See Wilson ( 1983) for a thorough discussion of how
individmUs gaUier knowledge of their
Wilson suggests tliat for tlie most part individuals gatlier knowledge
Uirough .second hand
accounts, tliat it is simply impossible to experience enough
of tlie world to gatlier enough intellectual
cxlder lor a lull .sexual life. Therefore, assessments
of what and who to believe when confronted wiUi .second
luuid knowledge, or accounts, becomes critical to
individutU tuid sexial life. Determinations of audiority is
key to tliat endeavor, <uid such determinations are often grounded on
political, personal, or even fashionable
cnXria
'

^
social worlds.

Berring suggests (Berring, 1994: 7) tliat legal education was constructed
on, a foundation of
tliat Uiought was given structure tuid metuiing by
Uie information system tliat

abstract legtU tliought and

produced legtU educaUon. Berring attributes Uie Ltuigdellitui case
as die key lactor in die developing educational system.
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meUiod and

its

relation to die law library

Legal authority
sen.se ol

in

Anglo-American law

is

found

in ca.ses

them. Biackstone's
attempted codification of
Anglo

and practices of making

common

law pnncipies ,n an
organ..ed treattse set the stage
for a market which
sought synthe.sis and stntcture
tn an
expandtng domatn of legal
material. While Black.stone's
work has been enticed for bias

and oversimplification of
disparate case material,.*
he nevertheless estabhshed
expectations
that common law princ.ples
could be ascertained by
scholars and .,udges from
case
optnions. That act would
make use of knowledge structures
or abstract.ons to order and
organtze data tnto mean.ngful
categories or narratives

m

ts

meaningful to understanding cases.

all

(e.g.

intellectual tradition.s). Doctrine
a class of knowledge structures
hke that of pnncipies and tenets,
an abstraetton which

ts

Common

law prtnciples.

tenets, and doctnnes could
be dtstilled from appellate cases
manifesting law’s structure and
parameters.

tavVSeW
Written judicial opinions are the
bedrock of American legal education and
practice. ><> Dean

Langdell

s ca.se

Iramework

lor

method and

American

the Harvard

legal life

vibrant and contemporary through

system, the

West

and
its

Law school

its

library set a standard, building
a

authoritative materials

which has remained

association with law's preeminent information

digest and reporter.

Information systems are mechanisms or practices
to store and provide access
objects

(i.e.

a database and organizing

/

to data

access techniques). Data objects are discrete

See Duncan Kennedy s analysis (Kennedy, 1979)of Biackstone's
work

.

^ driving force behind tlie legal system, tlie concept of abstract
legal principles as extruded
opinions of appellate judges has survived the succeeding waves
of jurisprudential tlieory crashing
on die beaches of American law. Legal realism, critical legal
studies, critical race tlieory, and each otlier
variant on tlie traditional tlieme laid siege to tlie old
grand tlieory of tlie common law. But tlie system of
legal research, of finding primary sources and interpreting
diem as if diey are [*16] nuggets of absolute
audiority and trudi, survives and flourishes. (Berring, 1994:
49)
roin

liie
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which conslitulc the base

lilies

Which ihese systems are

huilt^

names, phone numbers, and

units

Data ohjects can he of all
variety and type, index
cards

addre,s,ses are

system. Alphabetization
of the rolodex
u,sers

know how

system

is

an inromialion syslcm,
ihcy arc the stnlT upon

ol'

is

simple data obiects

m a rolodex

one possible organizational

will,

inlormalion

,siruclure,2o ihus

look for desired dala objects
and addition of new dala
objects to the

lo

regularized.

Inlormalion systems help

make

dala objecus understandable
though their

organization and retrieval
mechanisms. Nol that Ihe dala
objccLs are meaningle,ss unle.ss
encapsulated in such systems, but
reliance upon iheir form,
location, and access routines
significant to ihc information
seeker, especially

when

there arc

struclure of the system corresponds
to prevailing categories
or
lho.se data ohiccts.2i

This

IS

hands

may

especially

(i.c.

.so

editors).

/

dala objecks and the

knowledge bases about

Information systems structure elements
of meaning for dala objccis.
for

syslcms indexed or organized on subjcci
areas a.ssigncd by human

Sy.stems which index exclusively on
the textual conlent of dala objects

also impute significam

querying

many

is

meaning

to those dala objccus. but ihai
is likely

.searching activities of users, and the
pre-existing

knowledge

more

lied lo the

ba,ses they bring lo

bear, rather than the editorial actions
of .system designers and managers. If
anything, ihe
latter

systems

challenge or

(c.g. lull text

at least

Lexis

problematize

/

Ncxis, Wcsllaw, or probabilistic inference
InQucry),

some of

the abstractions

and knowledge sUucturos

associated with cases by law's knowledge experts.

While most such indexes are alphabetically ordered tliere are other
ways ot iUTiuiging tlie cards,
by Irequency ol contact by numerictil address, by relative
fondness for tlie referenced individujil. The
organizational scheme is only limited by tlie dillerent characteristics
which can be derived from
tlie

objects

and

tlie

desire ol

tlie

indexer to structure

tlie

dtitabase so as to

21

implement

daui

tliose desires.

See lollowing discussion of tlie West digest and reporter system luid its correlation
to prevailing
notions of law's categorization into subject areas tuid classifications
of daUi objects (i.e. cases).
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2.

Law's Information Machines

.nlormafon systems

their associated
practices ot orga„..at.„n

and ntanagentent
iransiorm data to inl'ormatton
tor users of those
systems, in iaw these systems
ntanage an
ncreastng array of data, from
enormous eivii
iitigation

document

eoiiections to

Supreme

Court bnefs and opinions.
Doctrine as Data pnmaniy
focuses on .systems managing
iederai appeiiatc case opinions.
Presentiy, the Judges opinion
,s considered the

authoniative data object for these
sy.slems; while .systems like
Lexis
statutes. adm,n.stralive rules,

data object for legal authority

/

Nexis

and a wide range of .so-called
.secondary
is still

the ca.se opinion. This

was

most

al.so

tnclude

.sources, the

not always the

primary
as

ca.se,

lawyer's arguments were at one time
considered part of the authoritative oni
opinion, and

included

in the

data object.

The

implication

is

that these information .systems
relleci

understandings and a.ssumplion.s at
moments of system creation and maintenance.
Such
rcllcclion

does not significantly

alter the data object's physical
pre.sence in a

Irom that fixed point of information on
paper, or electro-magnetic
content

IS

disc, the conceptual

subject to mediation and interpretation
by system designers and users.

Systems which manage law’s authoritative materials
are more than

document handlers, they

The

medium, but

objects incorporated

rather than simply data

just

automated

also tend to structure or alter meanings
attributed to that material.
in,

and then transmitted between machine and

any longer. Machines organize data

user,

in particular

is

information

ways and allow

access to that data through structured queries and interface
protocols. Objects flowing from

machine

to user

have

identifiable, if

result ol a lunction of practices,

complex or contested, meanings. Meaning here

one which takes

into account the

is

the

words or symbols

representing that data object, a so called empiricist notion,22as well
as the context, expert

knowledge, and associated interpretations of those objecLs

99

Sec discus.sion (Brighiun, 1978: 17) of

positivi.st

metuiing of Wittgenstein and Harrison.

89

in

and out of

their specific

or empiricist theories of language and

mlormation machines. While
meaning
things. Ihis projcci

auempts

U) pry at

ollen in dispule because of
Ihc lu/./,inoss ol such

,s

some

structures and practices around
Ihese

machines

which help make case opinions and
doctrine meaningful.

Case opinions can represent

dilTerent things, for insianec a
doctrinal sea

change or

affirmation, a statement of die law
in a particular conslitutional
area, or a travesty of just.ee.

Work, and law,

at least parually facilitated

by these machines carry with them
concepts

attributed to such informational
objects:

current system to replicate itself
^ Painlessly. Their categories mirror precedent
and existing
''
'
'=8^' ‘'’'™«''t and constrain novel approachc.s to
h^lat ^‘a ^
Within one or more of thef>e sSystems finds
the
u
ol legal research
greatly simplified. Beginning with
one idea, such systems
quickly bring to light closely related ideas,
cases, and statutes.
ike
a workshop full ol well-oiled tools, making
work easier. Relying on ton
exclusively, however, renders innovation
more difficult;
innovative jurisprudence may require entirely

SaT
^

xSeSm

new

undeveloped or unnoticed because our attention
ones. (Delgado and Stefancic, 1989;
208)

It is

is

tools’ tools often left

absorbed with manipulating old
^
^

very difficult to completely separate legal scholarship
or practice, and therefore law's

social reality,

Irom the structuring power of these information
machines and the knowledge

bases upon which they are drawn.

Machines and Abstractions

3.

Data

is

ol course infomiation,

phenomenon, representation

is

it

is

a representation of

by default a conceptual transformation, with meaningful

attributes being attached or attributed to that data.

inlormation

is

some observable

Any

problematic, but what can be stipulated

attempt to distinguish data from

is

that highly categorized legal

inlormation systems attach more interpretive authority to data objects. Systems which

case opinions as merely related collections of phrases and terms as Lexis

InQuery does implies a lower
Abstraction

is

a mediating

/

Nexis or

level of abstraction than that of West's digests

power of infomiation machines, and

90

it

is

treat

and

reporters.

considerably more

‘lillicul, ,0 .sustain

highly ahsiraclctl conccp,.s
in

inlc-pteitve notions
tiotc Ihe pre,sence,

I,

he utea of law

,..e.

dunes winch do

n,t,

as u, the

Wes,

digest,, hu, ate touch tnote
likely ,o

occurrence rrec|„ency, and
distrihntion

wiihin a rclalcd collection

ol'

no, calego,i/e on

concepts

ol

(t.e.

as ,n InQttery)

objects.

Data as Doctrine was designed

io step

away

as far as possible from
abstraclions
nihcrenl in indexed inlornutlion
systetns, to minimi/.e the
impact ol expert knowledge on
.searches

and subseqneni analysis. But
as

will he discu,s,sed

the core identity or profile
of the dau, colleclion

ctopelling

interest doctrine.

is

ts

lo collect ca.scs

Re.searchers can try to treat ca.ses
as nterely data ohieefs

which exhibit an abstraction

interesf doctrine in free exerci.se
law),

you should be prepated
Ralher
prachcos

ol

Ihttn

became

Iron, abstract, ons

knowledge

ttn

one

will, as

,ho.se ca.ses

many synonyms

abstracted index or other

away from

abstraclion,

became

it

ba.se

ail

the

more apparent

if

the

compelling

as compelling ittferesls,

knowledge

ha.se.23

ihe focus of alicniion, the

alter the

meaning of

the object of this project's investigation.

became

it

as doctrinal, bn,

like doctrine (i.e. at least

inlormalion machines which either attribute
or

abstraction doctrtne

away

to consult

stcpptng

in sub.sec|nenl chapters,

defined by an abstraclion, free
exetci.se

containing particular terms and
phrases which identify
goal

more

the

By attempting

that they are central lo

to stay

an existing

aboul law, and that different information
systems have distinct inflitenccs

upon, and arc inHucnccd by, lhal dominanl
knowledge.

4.

Mechanisms

lor

Machines, Practices, and Meaning

managing case opinions,

Ihc hard data

ol'

law,

aUempl

ihc desires of evolving information markets. Since
the turn of the century

has leigned supreme

7 '^

See work

lull text retrieval

knowledge

in satislying

(e.g., Blair

may miss

a

these needs with

its

Lo satisfy

West Publishing

universal coverage, unic|uc indexing

and Maron, 1985; Herring, 1986; Dabney, 1986) wliieli .show dial
ol on point eases when searehing lor a complex expression or

number

structure repre.sented in a variety ol

ways

;ind applied across a

number

ol eontexLs.

legal

.scheme, and slams as Ihe
relcrenee backbone ol law
libraries. Wesl's indexing
and marke,
dominance has placed a dislincl
slamp r,n law and legal educalion,
delining ways ol'

knowing, and .shaping our
underslandings of Ihc source
malerials of American law .24
|,
ih.s Stamp which
incubales new desires and
markels, inspiring .scholars and
informalion
professionals lo explore

On-ime
documenl

new ways of knowing and

legal databases like Lexis

libraries,

and

acce.ssmg ihose same malerials.

Ncxis and Wesilaw, compaci

/

j,s

di.se legal

Arlificial Inlelligence software
.syslems lo assisl legal professionals

are law's newesl informalion
machines, perhaps salisfying developing
marker needs.
I

he.se looks reside wilhin

relricval

Iwo basic camps

for

and cxperl syslcms.25 Informalion

a.ssisl u.sers

compuler

rclrieval

by modeling and ultimalely aulomalmg

a.s.sisled legal re.search:

informalion

and expert syslems are designed

certain law practice

Expert

la.sks.2<-

systems, which often akso contain
informalion lookup and retrieval
funclions, lend to
a lop

down

ulili/.e

Slruclurc, asserting ihe existence
of a relatively fixed and quanlifiable
legal

expert knowledge
cxpcrii.se

lo

and

its

ba.se,

one crucial lor organizing and inlerpreiing

application lo discrete

ta.sks

can be modeled

in

data,

and

that

such

software algorithms and

databasScs.

Expert

sSysSlcms

attempt to mimie legal reasoning through rule
struetures

then statements) whieh produee diserete
answers or outputs.

expert systems
is

quite rigid,

that the

it

is that

(i.e.

il7

The major ehallenge with

eapturing legal reasoning and expert knowledge in
diserete I'unetions

represents a snapshot of legal knowledge and praetiee,
and presupposes

snapshot will be valid lor some time, or

thus ean be altered with

new

il /

at least will

then rules. Perhaps in

ehange only inerementally and

some

areas of legal praetiee this

is

24

discussion ol tlic power ol West Digest and Reporters in the creation
of law's "universe of
thinkable tliougliLs" see Herring (1994: 15-16).

See work (Zeleznicow

The

juid

piUxidigmatic task

Hunter, 1994) For a

that

tliese

two models.

pre.senhition ol <m inlormation need (e.g. perform a .search
argument for a given factyiaw pattern); .second, the development
need; and ruially looking-up mid reporting Uie findings in a

is: lirst, tlie

ol cases for precedent or construction of mi
ol mi inlormation representation lor
memiingful way.

more thorough ireaUnent of

92

appropria^-.

whcc

"hard ca,scs"

discrete answers are
legitimate.
lact,

most areas

„l

law practice

ol'

1

ca,cgon.aUo„ „r

U.wever

rec,uire

reasoning and argtmtent satd
dominant

l

it

are n„n,n,i.ed, and

seems unlikely

that tins is the

norm,

that ,n

u.xiness and interpretation
for the tmttlog.cal

tn that practice,

and ln»iness

,s dilTrcnlt, if

not

impossible, lo model in struelured
il7 then rules.

Information retrieval applications,
like Lexis

/

Nexis, Westlaw, and InOtiery,
shy

Irom the aggre,ssive stance of
expert systems. Adopting a
bottom np approach, inibrmation
retrieval applications ntilixe

and access. Inlorntation

elemenfs of the dau, ohjeefs
them.selves lo sUnetnre organi/aiion

retrieval

systems put the power

rather than designers and
associated

wide open

tools,

knowledge

experts.

in the

hands of system

Such systems can be

.users

corustdered

allowing the parameters of practice
available lo knowledge workers
to be

as nndelined as they wish, really
only being constrained by the
limits of their search
strategies and the language and
structure ol opinions as they are
created by indges.27

Systems

InQuery for retrieving and examining

like

derivation of

knowledge from within

not be obvious lo legal
related

document

knowledge about

knowledge

legal texts

akso allow for Ihe

collections of related diteuments,

experts, and that only

collection.^* For this project InQuery

a collection of

may

documents

(i.e.

knowledge

shows up over

that

may

the stretch of a

was appropriated

lo .seek

case opinions) held together by a distinct

abstraction, the compelling interest doctrine
within Free Exercise case law. InQuery, and
olhei culling

edge inlormalion

retrieval systems,

improve document

retrieval relevancy

This IS no small consU-aint. Search techniques in Uie
age of Boolean searching (more on this
subsequenl chapters) are restrained by lack of experience
and exposure of users (luid Booleiui logic is not
easy once you pass die basic
/ OR operators). New

AND

interfaces

(i.e.

Natural Language searching)

in

reduces die skill level neees.sary ol a searcher, die.se systems
rely on technology like that of InQuery, which
seeks to map relationships between daUi objeeLs based on
the presence of terms and phrases, as well as the
creation of synonym look up tables (i.e. as.soeiation thesauri)
which expand searches greatly by ineludine
synonyms to terms in die original search profile.
In diis work (Aronow, et. al.: 1995) InQuery was
used to nuuiage a national daUiba.se of
doctors notes regarding asdinia ;uid breadiing related disorders.
InQuery exposed knowledge about asthma
alUicks that dtx'lors were not audioritatively aware ol, but when
a large collection of dextors notes was
examined tor textual relation.ships it was tound that night coughs had a high correlation to
ineidenees ol
asdinia exacerbation, thus adding to the stock of knowledge about asthma

through more nuaneed
“undersianding" of both the
expressed informal.on need (i.e.
database query) and the
infomtattonal representation
of documents in the collection

(Jing

and Croft, 1995). Rather than
importing

knowledge from experts

to design

collection handling, InQueiy
and other information retrieval
.systems

employ a

all

amount of expert knowledge while
looking
them

to derive further

to the

document
limited

documents and relationships inherent

in

knowledge.

All of these systems utilize
defined practices for manipulation
and organization.

Meaning
experts

for cases is tied to those
practices.

(i.e.

should look
relevant

In systems such as a

Yearbook knowledge

lawyers) were the key players,
they defined not only what the
data object
like,

or contain, but they also chose
which cases were of import to their

community of lawyers and judges. The
Yearbook recording lawyer was

responding to the needs of variable
markets, they were neither universal
of all data object types) nor
comprehensive

was an

idiosyncratic endeavor.

Meaning

were translated

covering

for data objects

and the community of lawyers populating
desires

(i.e.

it,

to their

all

(i.e.

representative

jurisdictions and courts),

was inherently

tied to

needs and wants, and

how

it

each market
those

into the activities of the recording
lawyer.

West's digest and reporters on the other hand
were universal and comprehensive,
normalizing the data objects to an extreme,

approach ot the Yearbook authors.

undoubtedly

lost in

Particularities

forth in Yearbooks.

scheme and

editorial practices

from the idiosyncratic

and nuances of the data objects were

West's editorial and organizational

emphasized and brought
categorization

at polar opposites

More

efforts,

where

significantly.

as they

were

West adopted

a subject

which assigned headnotes and places

for cases

within that scheme, further attributing and altering the
meaning of cases. Such schemes
also lock

up or take a snapshot of the existing knowledge base of law

notwithstanding their incremental strategies for growing beyond that

Computer systems

like tull text

Lexis

relatively unstructured data objects, with very

/

Nexis and InQuery

little
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in those categories,

static representation.

treat the

cases as

editorial organizing as with West's

hardbound producdon. Fu„

cext replaced ed.toria,

nred.auon w.d, Ure power u,
n„d data

Objects based on textual
content. InQuet, expands
that

between words and phrases

power by

in the collection,
thus increasing the

queries, and potentially
enhancing the suxtk of

tdenttlying assoctattons

reach and scope of

knowledge about such

collecttons. The„se

systems are entenng a world of
legal educatton, research,
and pracuce which has been
intimately

fed

to

West and

the

law

not part of these computer
tools,

library.

all that

Subject area classification and
categonxatton are

matters

is

the content of the dtK-uments
and dte

conceptual relationships and patterns
within collections. Since West
has been the default
lor over 100 years there
is predefined meanings
associated with cases in that system,
and

with collections of cases
corresponding to particular subject
areas of a digest. Computer
tools olten problematize that
structure
ca.ses together

beside

by bringing into question what

West editors and long standing epistemological

practice and education.

really lies groups of

traditions in legal

DKI

INIIKW and

OVKKY

I)IS(

-

I.KXIS

/
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he-cnine-s appare-nl Ihal

a„ln,nale-d Inll
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e-xi.sliii(;

dala

is

law as

and

knnwie-elpe-ahle-

m

pi„je-c, .snnplii

a .se-a,ch prnlile- In,

law

Ihe-

ii.se-

die-

by

ilie-

s„h|e-c,

like- cninpi-lliiij; nil,-re.si

cnlle-clinn capalnl„ie-s nl Innis hke-

knowle-ili;e- ha.se-s.

ami

To

e-xplnie- Ihc

p,o.s.-,ice-

dala

and
.se-l

in

piaclice-s

a.s

a

mie- nl niachnic.s in inanile-slinj. dncliine-

addrc.SeScd.

I.

(’()m|)iilcrs

(

and cn-

hi,ni};hl In lij;hl Ihe- .sipnilicance- nl
inlennialinn inaclinics

1^.

liese

I'lil.s

an ah.sliaclinn

le-xl .se-a,ch

le-pre-.se-nlalinn nl eincliine- in cnn.sliliilinnal

I

and made-

In lad, alle-inplill(; Ibis lask
prnhle-nializ.e-d dnenine-'s In, in

.sn.slainini;, in

lliroii^li dial

.shape-d

is

prnvidiiif; acce-.ss In ihal elala.

docliine- nl cniniK-Minp .slab-

.s,H-c,lic: a

collcclioii.

inlnnnalion machim-.s, and

n-.sidc-.s in

piaclice-s loi Imle-xint;

llial

n,

.so,

ihc- l,„.)„c-,y

„,a„a):c-,„c-„l .syslc-n, ,„ ,„clc-, in
analyze- occ„nc-„cc- r,.-.|„c-ncK-.s

ocainviicvs

a >lala

„l ,c-l,,i„n ca.sc-.s a,
,S„|„c-„,c-

Ihcn

i.s

Nnxlx

l,nxi.s /

and dalaha.scs

machines emerge Irom

prc.scMil

Ful!

i\“x(

Itack^roiiiul

now

o|)porlimilics lor legal inlormalion machines.

>seveial inlellecinal sireams: onl ol

<)

6

compulei syslems

engmeenng and

Ihe creation of operating
systems configured to manipulate
documenfs.i

and also from development

human

in Artificial Intelligence

intelligence, or at least

some

intelligent

and old legal infomtation
market entranLs
Artificial Intelligence efforts
in

computer science which uy

human

to tacilitate

and

tasks,

to miniic

finally the de,sires of

computer assisted

legal research.

law are divided into two basic
camps, infomtation

and expert systems. The following
introduces information

retrieval

new

technology of

retrieval

full text

databases, systems well entrenched
in the markets of legal
practice and scholarship, and

representing the most accepted and
commercially successful of computerized
legal

infomtation systems. This market has
been largely dominated by Lexis

Westlaw and

their

on

line legal databases, yet with the
proliferation of

technology and vast computer networks
there

is

/

Nexis and

compact

disc-

an increa.sing airay of sy.stems and

products providing access to law's data.
Full text systems like Lxxis

designed

to

/

Nexis are document

retrieval

manage document collections by organizing and

machines. They are

storing data objects in a

database, creating indices to those objects,
and providing a query language to manipulate
the index

document

and gather relevant documents.2 Law has
retrieval

traditionally

and information management, however

aerospace and applied science technologies of the
1960's

to

it

been

at the forefront

of

required the burgeoning

spur markets for

full text

indexing (Krevitt Eres, 1980; 134). The associated
explosion of technical documents and
intormation objects drove the development of "finding aids,"
computer systems for making

masses

of information meaningfully available to users
(Krevitt Eres, 1980: 134). Indexing

techniques evolved with the processing power of computers, allowing
for the brute force

and universal coverage of full

^

PC

text,

where every term

The dominant computer operating system,

market, has been

UNIX

in a

document

collection

is

indexed.^

aside from die ubiquitous Microsoft enuaiiLs in

tlie

(Kaare, 1983).

2 For a more formal model of information reU-ieval
see (Dabney, 1986: 7)

The tlirec major developments leading to full text: first, Uniterm, an early 1940s multi term
indexing system developed by Mortimer Taube; second, Unitenn was supported by ccxirdinatc indexing
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leclinol,.,;y

clean

llie

when Wesllaw was

Inll lexl capahiliiie.s,

Iinpiiivcd conipiilei |)ioce,ssing

o,

Idhd, pc, haps .sensing die

was only Inhiiogiaphic

in
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data ohiec.

(i.e.

,he ong.nal case
opin.on^) hy enabling
.searchers

developed Wes.law as a
d.rec. response
to

.0

Lex.s

/

Nexis, a. presen,

Wes.

is s.ill

s.ruggling

catch up in the expanding
on-line market.

2.

Organization and Indexing

Theoreiically subjec.
ca.egorixaUons and .heir edi.orial
m.erpreu,,ions ol ca,ses are

made

less signif.can,

by

lull .ex.

n,ach.nes like l.xis

organize ca.ses inu=rpre..vely,
.hey
than relying

on .he

subjec.. vi.y

u.se

bru.e force .0

/

Nexis. These machines do
no.

manage documen. collecions.
Ra.her

and elegance of an ednorial
scheme wh.ch ca.egorizes

or iheir parks for indexing,
each case opinion

is

ca.ses

considered a .ex. documen,
compri.sed of

terms and phrases. Case tex.s
are organized in.o fields
corre.sponding .0 elements of .he
opinion (e.g. name, dale, body
of opinion, opinion wriling
judge, dissenl, di.ssenl wrilmg
judge). Ca.ses are primarily
indexed on ihe lerms and phrases
which conslilule ihem,
therelore rehicval of cases
depends on die presence and paliems
of Uiose lerms and

phrases. Fields provide another
level of indexing by breaking
cases in.o sections which

correspond
fields in

.0 su-uctural areas

documents

.ha,

Will not present law's

An

inverted

phrase encountered

correspond

index

is

list

and readers. Short of creating

in the traditional

machines

like

Lexis

/

Nexis

way.

used to manage these documents. Each
unique term and

entered into a master term/phrase

occurrence ot a term or phrase
relerences Irom

to writers

.0 subjec, categorizations

mandarin materials

list

is

of significance

(i.e. its

location)

entries tor each term

is

list

for the collection.

recorded in the inverted

and phrase

to the

list,

Each
creating

documents containing them.

Searches are term or phrase based, users query
these machines

to return cases

with terms

^
anoUier story to be told regarding proprietary claims to
case opinions by WesUaw and
exis //NT
Nexis. Essenually Lexis / Nexis is foreclosed from
using any West reporter text or ciUitions
wiUiout licensing from West (who is not inclined to
do so). Therefore Lexis / Nexis has had to procure
access to ca,se opinions incrementally, via official reporters
and by soliciting individual judges.
I
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,hey cnsidc,,s„„inca„, ,o ,hcir
.csearcl, neeCs.^ .Such
.uachlncs pu,
.c.sca,cl,crs and
pracldioncrs in di,ecl coniac,
will, ihei,- da,
a. wi,l„„„ ,he na-d ol
Ph.-a.scs

hy cdiuu-s, „,hc-

n.ediaiion

,sch„la,s,

and

.snbjccl ca,eg«,i„,dii.n.

Ihc Icilldwing .scciion,
such ,an cmancipalion

is

1

lowcvci-, as

lliis p,-,>jccl

explores

in

nol necessarily mci will,
unahalcd

acccplancc or appreciation.

Strengths and Weakne.sses
The slrcngihs

„l lull icxl a,c bcsl
.seen in conirasl lo

prollccd weak„es,ses nl ihc
ed,ced indexing and c.unplex
layering ot p,.e-exis,ing
l,a,d bound .systenes like
Wes,,.. In
lh..,se

systens which depend on l,nn,an
ediling .here

c.hln,g .schen,a

ahogeiher.

-I

which

will ,.esnl, in

he power

lo aece.ss

croneons

many

is

Ihe po.ssihiliiy ol variance
Iron, ihe

referencing, or worse,

lo.ss

of dala ob|eci

cases quickly and ll„-ougi,
muliiple channels of

c|ue,y,ng far exceeds whal
an ind,v,dual can

do nianually,

depll,

and

delail can he a.huned
cpnckly, wilhoui n,uch i|ue,y
prcpa,alion or background ,e.sea,ch.
Al base Ihough, Ihc
...ajor dislinelion,

.e.sea,cher

and .some would say improvement,

The

dala

is

mosl easily represented
system organizes

Nex.s
t

. 111(1

Ihe direci conncclion belwcen

and dala. The normali/,alion of
West subieci calego, i/,ing and olher ediling

enforced a systemic status quo,
categories.

is

Wcsllaw

its

liave

full lexl

challenges lhal mosl directly by no,
incotporaiing

wide open, available
in Ihc

lo all tho.sc

who know how

provided c|uery language, and

iho.se

lo ask qucsiions

most aware

ol

how

ihe

documents.

''i
added

ype a suiluicc or collection

riilereiitial

ol lerni.s/

and

lor lJic.se dauiba,scs. Enhaiiccnicnls lo
both Lexis
probabilistic retrieval tecliniques iiilerlaeed
by Natural

phrases

wliicli lie/slie thinks is .signilicanl

icrnis or phncscs is nol solely deierninialive,

or captures his/her

it is po.ssible lor a documents
relevancy to be relatively high
conuuns synonyms or associated terms and phrases to
iho.se supplied in the ciuery The
iidormatKin repre.seiihiiKin ol the query is
expanded Irom Ihe query’s constituent terms and phrases by Uie
u.se ot such tools as as.socialion
iJie.sauri (ba.sed on things like co-occurring
or synonymous phrases)

because

it

See nice

di.scu.ssion ol lull text (Berring, 1986: 41-4,3).

/

Thus can be a weakness
as wel, as

a strength.

Full text ntaeh.nes
allow re.searehers

query databa,ses of law's
ntandann ntatenals without
expHeitly .ncorporattng a
subiect
categonxatton like tho,se of
tradtttonal digests and
reporters. But legal real.ty
,s a re.sult
U.

many

of

years of legal practice
and pollt.es grounded on.
and expre.s.scd

ex, sung
re,search

.ntomtafon ntach.nes and

their practtces

endeavors origmate front an

ways of knowing

law. Therefore,

machine they a,ssume, and reaffirm,

wanting.

Maybe

there

is

,s

legal

pred.cated on pan.cular

that the temts of those
questions

subjects not typically indexed,
e.g. black
left

which

to

questions are asked of a legal
inforntation

relative to a specific historical
authoritative interpreuttion.

be

knowledge fed

of.ndexing and access. By
default,

.ntellectual tradition

when

tn,

women

mean

When questions

.something
are

about"

and employment discrimination,
we may

no agreed upon unity of
knowledge pursuant

to certain

suhjecLs in traditional machines
like the digest and reporters,
but there are analogs and

ckxscly related areas of law upon
which to draw reasonable assc.ssments.

and relations arc created
sustaining them. So,

relative to expert

when questions

knowledge

bteses

are asked of Lexis

/

The analogies

and information practices

Nexis or Westlaw,

il

is

more

than likely that tho.se questions
arc the product of knowledge
practices of the edited world
ol digests

and doctrine. The structuring power
of default conditions

4.

Other Challenges with

Full text inlormation retrieval depends
entirely

significant.

Full Text

upon the words

be stored and accessed. In subject indexed
systems humans have
distill

is

in the data objects to

to interpret

words, and

sense Irom not only the physical presence and
stream of words, but the associated

contextual and conceptual understandings of those
data objects. In law this

is

pronounced,

part ol the meaninglulness ol cases has long
been associated with an interpretation and

Sec Richard Delgado's discussion of West Digest categorization
scheme and
women and employment discrimination (Delgado and Stefancic, 1989).

cases on ^
Black

that since tliere is not a subject categorization
as
tiius It

becomes more

such

it

becomes

difficult to lu-ticulate claims of black

101

difficult to find

women

tlie

his

In

sample setuch lor
Delgado notes

it

relevtuit ca.se law,

regarding workplace discrimination.

imd

placemen, o, those cases
technique ignores such

m

knowledge bases and pracuces.

meanmg,

this is

Full tex, as an organixauonal

both advantageous tor

liberating quality, bu,
also disadvantageous
because contextually sensitive
mterpreuttions are deiaui, in law.
Full text presents three
basic problems assoc, ated
wtih dependence on words
as

organization base units:

tts

synonymous words, ambiguous words,
and complex expressions

(Dabney. 1986: ,8-19). These
problems focus on a panicular
characlen.stic of the forms of
case opinions, and their place
in interprelation and
statemenfs of the status of law.
Legal
writing, particularly case
opinions, relies on a group of
practicing actors

schooled and situated vis-a-vis
social and

on many

practices, implicit

and

explicit,

political

phenomena. Legal

which give

levels of

meaning

who

are similarly

wming
to the

is

dependent

words and

phrases comprising such things
as cases.

Information retrieval has as

its

staled lask the effective
prixiessing of user queries to

identily relevant data objects to
that u,ser and then returning
those

perusal.

Measures of

retrieval efficacy.

percentage of
ol relevant

Maron,

1

is

and precision lend

Recall measures

the

in

well

all

provide benchmarks for assessing

relevant

documents were retrieved

(i.e.

of all those relumed.* The study of Blair
and Maron (Blair and

most noted examination of full

text

systems for

their efficacy at

retrieval.

5.

Blair and

system tor

how

to

for iheir

relevant documents returned), while
precision measures the percentage

documenis

982)

document

total

recall

documents

recall

Maron

tested

Blair and

Maron Study

IBM's Storage and Information Retrieval (STAIRS)

full text

and precision. The STAIRS system had been specifically configured
as

o

See Berring’s discussion of recall (Berring, 1986; footnote 51): "Recall
is Uie ratio of tlie releviuit
dtx'umeius retrieved by die search to die total number of relevant
documents in die database. For example,
il a database consisted ol 1000
documents, 100 of which were relevant, dieii
a .search diat retrieved 50 of die

relevant documciiLs

would have 50%

Recall. Precision

die rado of relevant

documents retrieved to toud
dcxuniciiLs retrieved. For example, if a search retrieved a total of
75 documents, 50 of which were releviuit,
then die Precision would be 50 / 75 or 66%."
is

an expen

a,s,s,s.un.

(y«

rcrieval xysicm)

in a co.p„,aic law
s,,,,
1 he database consisted
of roughly 4,),.X.„
docuntents and nearly
35.M)(X, pages o, text

STA.RS

aliowed tor Bt.olean

,e.g.

coordinate tndex.ng, querying

o, the

database, as well

as lachtated held level
searching within data
ob,ects.

STAIR.S also en, ployed a don,
tun
spec, I, c thesaurus^., find
synonynts and related terms
and phrases to t,t,ery tenns
and
phrase, thus expanding the
po.ssibiiities lor the
particular inlormation
representation of that

query.

Researchers were pre,sented
w,th

each request was translonned

to a

information reqttesus by litigating
attorneys,

,51

STAIRS

query, executed, and the
returned documents

were screened by researchers and
attorneys,
than 7,5% then the query
recall

or

was

less than

know of an

75%

was relonnulated.

if

the atuuneys estimated
the recall to be less

Recall a,s,sessments are curious.

attorneys wotdd have to

know of specific

To

as,sert that

materials not rettn ned.

area not dealt with in the
returned materials, or simply
act on a httttch that

something was missing. This would
prove

to

bo the most problematic of the
two

measures.

Precsion was de, ived

alfcr the last iteration of
queries for

each of the original 5

information request by the attorneys.
Piecision values were pretty high,
on average about

79%,

howeve.', the recall, estimated to
be at least

dolcrmtncd

to

75%

by the attorneys on the

was

be only abotti 2(1%. Blair and Marc,
suggest that their attorneys randomly

sampled the materials

in the

database to determine that there were

diKitiments yet to be lound by the .search
engine, thus low recall.

problems with

lly,

this

method

ol unulysis

in fact

many

There seem

desirable
to

be

however.

icsaurus IS a look-up Uiblc, they can be automatically
or manually
xr
cons^uclcd lor
pjirticuhir knowledge domains ( e.g. .specilic
thesaurus for eontexLs of corporate liability law
or asthma diagiu)stics m mediail research).
Queries are expmided by adding Uiesjiurus entries for a
given
query s tenm and phrases. Thesauri depend on
particular relationships or associaUons, most are
grounded on
synonyms. The InQuery .search engine utilizes an automatically
constructed tlie.saurus, an InFinder, to
expand user queries. InQuery uses an as.soeiation tlie.saurus,
dial is, ratlier Unui ero.ss-refereneing based on
siniilar memiing as with a traditional
tiie.saurus, InFinder cross-referenees on
co-occurrences between terms
I

I

(Uici pliriLscs.

.

The auomeys sUucurcd
Characcensdcs both l.nked

to

Uicir

cvaluaUon of .curncd and
non-roturned malcnafs on

and tndependcnt of part.cular
tcmt or phrase occurences

the data objecus. Tlte
concept of an "on

pent" case

,s

wedded

systems and knowledge practices,
subject categorization
practice that has

some

drag or gap. simply,
then a

full text

if

system

significance here.

is

going

to

This being the case there will
be a

make

Random sampling and

a sound approach, hut the
evaluators arc part of the

variance prtiduced, they structure
the recall gap.

A

random sample of attorneys would

spreading the decisional weight
around a

this,

bu.ll in recall

them not.ons of on pomt,

never reach lofty recall heights.
is

.nformahon

an example of a knowledge

the evaluating lawyers
are hring.ng w.th

extrapolation ol tendencies lound

improve

is

to ex.si.ng

in

a strong case that the recall
assc.ssment process

is

bit.

Neverthele.ss, Blair

valuable and

is

and Maron

accurate given the

context ol this particular information
retrieval experiment.

Why?

IS

the next question.io

The indeterminacy of words and

laden environment of legal information

depending on the context the domain

ol

is

the likely culprit.

the

complex concept

Words have synonyms, and

synonyms can change considerably. Thesaurus

construction for domains of data, and
use in conjunction with search engines
can alleviate
this

problems somewhat. Words are also ambiguous,
subject

There

is little

ol similar

to

competing

interpretations,

can be done to make computers distinguish
between competing meanings

that

words and phrases, other than developing association
or use

indicate particular

word / meaning combinations

profiles

which

likely in textual contexts that are subject to

luzzy categorizations. Certain meanings for given
words can be ascertained by paying
attention to those

words and phrases most closely associated with them. This

stretch than a simple

synonym

perhaps the greatest challenge

or association thesaurus.

is

Complex expressions

a harder

represent

to full text.

10 For
good discus.sion see work by Berring and Dabney (Berring, 1986; Dabney, 1986).
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aw
'

.nvolves

ough much

,dea.s.

sometimes neatly correlated

less so (Chtldress.
1984).

to

narrow textual express, on,
often

For those concepts wh.ch
are arUculated

but not necessanly
linked to a ttght donta.n
of words and phrases
uselul.

what

Th.s begs the guest.on,
what

ties the ca.ses

For

t.es these

together said to give

this project doctrine,

life to

concepts together, or more

ambiguity, but with

is

it

is fairly

suspected

forth to use full text
Lexis

/

to the point,

and a particular knowledge
repre.sentalion of one,

common

(i.e.

and

compelling mterests),

distinct,

many synonyms. The complexity
does

regularity, or at least

not ten ibly

these concepts.

collating concept.
Nevenheless, the doctnnal choice

complex knowledge expression,

full text is

,n text

Nexis

to.

give

With Blair and Maron

to define, delimit,

with

in

little

way

in

,s

the

alhe.t a

apparent

a sense ,o textual

mind Doctrine

and acquire a collection

as Date set

that

rea,sonably articulates the
compelling interest balancing test in
the realm of free exercise

law. That endeavor

however tends

to

suppon Berring, Dabney, and

contentions about the constraints of
full-test systems

Blair and Maron's

when querying based on a complex

expression.

C

The Process

1.

1 he case collection
particular terms

was

and phrases

-

Lexis

Nexis and DoctHnP

/

Definition and Discovery

to

be defined

in

in defined patterns),

purely textual terms

was planned

to tag the data objects to manifest

creating subsets of data.

The primary

possessing

querying and collecting from a database

of cases was to be largely automated, and
then some cursory
cases

(i.e.

distinctions

some

human examination

of those

basic distinctions, essentially

were whether the claim

to religious free

exercise violation were sustained or not.^^ Finally,
each virtual subset, and

some

Otlicr tagging includes cases dial involved prisoners.
Prison cases repre.sent distinct treatment
ol Iree exercise claims after O’lone v. Estate
of Shabazz. 482 U.S. 342 (1987). Prior to Uiese cases die
compelling interests doctrine was part of die evaluative mix,
or balancing of interests. There fore cases
prior to diese should legidmately be in die data
set after however die balancing test was dropped in favor of
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c«mb,naUon,s .hcreoi; were

be analyzed lor concep,
ocacTcnce.s and co-oceunence

Co

using Che InQucry
probabilisuc miormalion
rcirieval system. The
poim of ihc
InOuery exploration was to
determine what the most
signifteant ,x,-etitTing eoncepts
in eaeli
subset were, and then
determine what other phrases
are most highly a,ssoeiated
with them
n.s

U was hypothesized

that this analysis

compelling interests imputes

in the decisional

consistency or coherency
represented

Ircqucncy associations which

The lollowing
suiry, to define

n

attachment

to

may

in

is

is

element of the constructed

ca.ses con.sidered relevant
to the

ba.ses

and whether there

be correlated to doctrine's
presence.

compelling interest doctrine
nature of diK-tiinc, and

lltiid

and traditions which, while they
may be articulated

However, attempting

to

in full text

capture

Ihc intcrsubicclivc nature of
doctrine

who

coherency
teach

in

that

may

systems

like

Lexis

/

in

ius

some

Nexis.

iLs

it

more

in a textual

fully,

be allribulcd to ca.scs

form as described herein

and perhaps probicmatizes any

.said

manifesting

it

by the knowledge

law schools, who write constitutional
commentary, who reside on

Icdcral appellate benches, and

At

ca,ses,

already meantngful. largely defined
and understood by knowledge workers
like

centrality or

experts

mix of these

That attempt however exemplified
the

knowledge

this re.searcher.

shows

understanding what the doctrine

oecurrence frequencies and
co-occurrence

information machines, are not readily
pre,scnt

Doctnne

useltil for

de,scribes the attempt to .satisfy
the first

and collect the

Ircc cxerci.se law.

might be

who

order and structure acce.ss to law's hard data.

simplest, this phase represents the acquisition
of federal appellate opinions

manifesting compelling state

intorc.st doctrine,

and the division of

dispiBition, producing several files to be processed
by InQucry.

tho.se

opinions by

While reviewing

legal

research rclcrcncc texts the lollowing passage .seemed
significant to this pha.se, as well as
to Ihc larger

questions of the project:

a adniinisirative purpose rationjility test. That is, il iJic challenged
policies were administratively rational,
then it was not an issue lor tlie courLs to intervene in.
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'Kw

lltk'randalm^Hnm

pul>lishint; H'clmolopies,

.slKHUc,nK,keWcM,aw'you/Ma,^;4';ltnK

Why

was

il

Ix-llcr lo

use cninpulcr dalala.scs

ol

law lor narrow searches,

palleni or jiiilge, or lor a eilalion
or parlieular ulierance,

concepis?
uinls.'

I

docirmc
iiiighl

Were

lor inslance,

lo

nol elleelive Ibr hroaci

nol so-called hroad conccpis
Ihc coinpilalion of smaller legal
lingnislie

he passage indieales

cxpccl

hiii

like lor a lael

which

he markers

dial Ihcre is

is

hard

somcihing ahoul hroad eoneeins, perhaps

lo coinplelely

caplure in words, or

al lea.sl

words we

ol dial doelriiie.

Legal praclilioners and scholars Iradilionally
learn doelrine IVom die experl

knowledge bases
oiilset, Ibis

ol legal ediiealion

work died

and academic disciplines, llmnigh experience.
Ai die

lo mniinii/e reliance

on

lliese

knowledge bases,

galliering opinions

by searching lor cases wilh only die broadesl
hallmark characlerislic lerms and phrases,
i.c.

docliinal markers or signiliers.

colleclion

was impeded,

se<iich piolile missed.

I

yel

il

'2

Despite die power of Lexis

made obvious an clemenl

his clemenl

il

depends on how we know

depends on how we "gel

1

Nexis anlomaled

die siibjecl doelrine dial die

presenls a gap, one worlh sliidying as

explores die conceplual conlenl of judges words. Such
gel

ol'

/

il,

and

ol

is

lliis

projecl

a first step, for clearly

course die reverse,

how we

how we "know

il"

il."

Doctrinal markers or sigiiilicrs are

niili/ed lo execiile .searches tor desired

iJie

compelling

key deseriplive concepts

stale interest

/

ol dial doelrine; they :ire

tree exercise ca.ses.

A

2.

The

initial

step

Doctrinal Signifier

was defining case charactenstics

and domains which provide
guidelines

(i.e.

dixtrinai signiftcr or profile)

for identifying data
ohjecfs in Ute database. This

•seemed to he the easiest part
of the endeavor,

at least until

some Lexis / Nexis quenes were

executed and questions arose as to
scope and expression of the
doctnne, not
role

compelling interests played

in the decision

presence of the signifiers "compelling
criterion for selecting case
opinions.

to

mention

represented hy the case opinion.

stale interest"

and "free exercise" was the

The domain of cases had

ihe

The
e.ssential

to he delimited not

only by

suhicet matter and pre.sence of
doctrinal signifier, hut temporally
as well. Coinciding with

expert knowledge about free exercise
law from commentary, .scholarship,
and pedagogical

expencnce,
Standard,

was known

it

that the

became operative

compelling

interest doctrine, as

pan of the

strict scrutiny

in free exercise Jurisprudence
in 1963.

Authoritative knowledge around constitutional
law had a profound effect from the

beginning. That knowledge

commentary,

texts,

is

the product of scholars and judges,
and

and scholarship about the compelling

is

articulated in

interest doctrine in free exercise

jurisprudence. In addition to the basic subject
area domain knowledge experts stipulate
that tree exercise Jurisprudence, at
least at the

Supreme Court, was divided

phases, and the phase articulating compelling
state interests

famous Sherbert

The data
interests

and

in

1963 and end with Smith

set is explicitly

in 1990.13

drawn from Supreme Court treatments of compelling

Supreme Court s behavior and

deline a data set including landmark
^

to begin with the

tree exercise, as well as those carried out in the
federal circuit courts. This

posits that the

1 -

seemed

into doctrinal

doctrinal expressions in opinions are used to

Supreme Court

cases,

and

less

known Supreme Court

As

it would turn out die deaUi of compelling
interests in SmiUi was perhaps overstated. There
be religious freedom cases at die federal circuit level where comfxilling interests
were pjirt of
die decisional mix. Additionally, die Religious Freedom
Restoradon Act (and in 1999 die Religious
Liberty Protection Act condnued to keep compelling interests in free exercise law.

conUnued

to

Thus

would include cases
decisions

become

diat

came

after

Smidi

.

It is

aiiodier project to investigate die

policy and praedee in die lower courts.
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die data set

way Supreme Court

lu.iluiun(uiuiic,i.si!so|)iim,Ms.
as sudi iniUs

""

|(.

i.vci ilr

""

".smunonal h,c,a,d,y
.sm,d„,o Ihc

Can,

aPI-Ncalions, an.l

as aiillioiiialivc

n,

wind, ,ldines

wind. Ihoy

.icincs

,l,e

nxisl.

Accn.ln,,

me

comes
Chen, IS

riisl.

(

when

'on,i un.le,

And

as

,cally

^'CIS Insi,

is

,|

Him aelnni deall

wonid he

and niakinp

|)raclice.s, in

declines lo challenge

n,

piving

„l,en ihe ,evcr.se. Cnnsulonni;
iha, ve,y Inile

any

.li.simcl

Smilh

lile lo

kmga.

niany cases pass ilnonyh Ihe

.several cncnil

ihe Snpienie

eompdhnp

can,

dial, Inn

helween

ca.ses .snh.se, |nenl lo

Conn's decision hy

law and .scholaiship aie lixed on ihe Conn.

does incorporale

a dlk'il and Smiih
i

which are

a

more

would

holislic

die

he inslniclivc, hnl

iremnieni in dial .same period. AHerall,

nne.es,

decisions allectmp Ihe slalns ol law.
Hence Iheie

docliinal lelalionship, .snggesling dial
in

colleclion

rnakn.p .Indsinns, „,u.s, an.l

give and lake helween Ihe Iwo
appellale leveks. Neve,lhele.s.s, ihe

expul knowledge

Iiileiesls

nl„n,a,dy slaU- c„n„s

a.ul

ihe ease in ilns dala sel,
even alle, Ihe

will, Ihe ilocn ine,

"ilerpreling Smilh

vcy

ign.al inns.l.cln.n

m-ch ine was jellisoned hy Jnslice
Sadia

n di.scmsive

a,

()i'ccc(lcnl,

l„ .loeu ines,

l„ Ihc

,l,o

law, alTi„nn„

i'

Kivinp

iluii

„a,l„n,nal nn.lorslan.ln.ps

,l„ws ,o Ihc chcnls. Ideal
,l,sl„d ennts,

i,

Iki

il

is

view

loo

would he

die docliinal

lo lx- exploied, dial colleclion
.should

pmjeci

Snpienie /circnil

ol die

Conn's Irealmenl

.so

.•dil.nial, o,

his

I

is

ol

conipellnig

circnil

iiandesled

conn
in a lexi

he delensihle on docliinal

giound.s, despile hierarchical or insliliilional
consideradons dial

may

Ix’

used

lo ciid(|iie

lliis

(Icdsion.

Inlormalion
slriiclured

known

is

aiilliorily

ami Ihc syslcms and pracliccs associalcd wilh

whal could sensibly be asked or proposed. The way an area

ol

dial aulhoriiy

law and eases

Ihe produci ol exposure lo sysleins inhereni in aeadeinie
disciplines, libraries,

and prolessional

lile.

(laps or c|ueslions arise Iroin Ihe

Iroin Ihe condilions Ihey represeni,

slaliis ol

and Iroin Ihe apidiealion

ol

Ihose knowledge bases,

new

looks

and research

is

agenda., u, the eomextual
world Urey authoritatively
de.scribe.
clearly

more than

just cases,

more

than just data, hut can

it

Con, pell, ng

he manifested

data? can those data ohjccLs
be the site of doctrine for
analytical purpo.ses?

doctnne must the analysis be
focu.scd on the

making sense

in,

and

ol,

lull text

Lexis

/

Initial

little

human involvement save
However,

results.

to statistically calculate cither

false positives

Recall, typically the

this

(i.c.

most

because

it

human

for proposing the quei^ and

researcher

recall

few returned documents

that

the need to

No

attempt was

point),

was

nccessaiy.

significant statistic to information
retrieval efficacy, while
It

was determined

documents returned, therefore

altered results in a signilicant

still

their

however because those

that a

few missed data

adhere to the same

lots

A few false positives identified

of missed documents

meant unacceptable

mis-hits might introduce a concept occurrence or co-

occurrence that would give a false impression of the conceptual
content and pattern

were on

still

absence should not have

way, unless of course there were

such that patterns were obliterated.

collection.

examine

that very high precision, that

were not on

objects were acceptable because they
would, hypothetically,
doctrinal patterns as those

felt

and precision.

was concluded

important was seemingly less so than
precision.

precision

their practices of

Queries and Results

query rcsulLs lor some rather loose
determinations of

lew

to study

Ncxis, and they sought to find
Supreme Court and federal circuit courts
of

perhaps downloading the

is

Or

and

define and discover the relevant
data objects were simple queries
of

appeal ea,se opinions with

made

communities and

in ca,sc,s

ease deeisions?

3.

Initial eltbrLs to

interpretive

d.Ktnne

intere.,,

in the

This analysis ol doctrine could withstand missing some data
objects which

point, but could not handle

many

objects that were inappropriately included for

lear of stilting the conceptual representation. False positives
cannot be easily controlled for

using

lull text

Lexis

/

Nexis however.

Bul, arc not false
posiiivos only thal because
of researcher interprelahon?

Do

no,

returned cases satisly the
queries equally well wiih
Ihosc hits considered
appropriale
candidates for the data set7 This
.ntpHcates the knowledge
representation of the que.y, iha.
-sc

in

some

instances, that does not

pointedly,

match up with what

the user really warns, or

are no, these false positives
likely represeniaitves
of compelling mterests?

doctrine that

answer

is

more

broader lhan Ihe user wants,
thus capturing more cases
than nece,ssary. Also,

is

ts

of mterest, Ihen

why

If

i,

is that

exclude cases which are part of
its discourse? The

straightforward, to capture a data
sot which, as a clump, can
arguably represent

compelling mterest doctrine's
determinative inlluence

in free exercise law.

Cases with

compelling inlcrcsl language, and even
application, from Establi.shment
for instance
likely represent a different
set of standards

The
1

963 and

Lexis

/

1

text of "eompclling state interest"

990 provided

Ncxis

in the

(Supreme Court),
Federal Circuit),

CLAIMS

and

initial

Gcnfcd

USAPP

DIST

or metrics.

and "free exercise" and a date range
between

query parameters. The

library

and Courts

file.

(Federal District Courts),

CUSTCT (Customs Court), CVA

TC

first set

CIT

(Tax Court),

US

CACF (Court of Appeals for

(Court of International Trade),

BANKR

(Court of Veterans Appeals).

Irom the Supreme Court and Icderal

of queries were executed on

Hits are from the following courts:

(Circuit Courts of Appeal),

(Federal Court of Claims),

listed further

/

will

circuit courts of appeals

(Bankruptcy Court),

To

delimit between cases

and those from

all

others

querying or editing would be necessary, however there
arc very few

compelling interest tree exercise cases from these other
jurisdictions. Querying performed

two invaluable
to

tasks,

:

first, to

put the researcher in touch with the data through a machine,

give him the chance to take a measure ol the data, to sec

qualities, second,

Appendix

it

its

inherent and implied

problematizcd almost every concept that the

A outlines and

initial

queries relied on.

describes the basic queries of the iterative search process,

beginning wide open and subsequently narrowing and rcarticulating

to attempt a better

between the desired information representation, or approximate representation, and

the

fit

researcher’s develop.ng
underscand.ng of the .nfornradon
sysconr's handling „f da,
a ohioccs
(I.e. relevance
feedback). Each query in

Appendix

mceraclively. results were
available en
/

Nexis' Lexsee case lookup

A

was execmed

Lexis

in

/

Nexis

mass and could be scanned
individually using Lexis

facility.

P. Resulting Shup.

poptHne

i.nH

False positives, those cases
hit "rightly" but that
were not really on point with
respect to the desired application
of compelling interests in free
exercise, brought dictai4

and authoritative understandings
of
searches of ease opinions

where

lields are

treat all

free exercise case

law

to the forefront.

Full text

terms and phrases similarly,
save for those instances

employed, and even then

all

terms and phrases meeting the field

requirement will be treated similarly.
Full text machines cannot
distingui.sh between dicta

and the meaningful or determinative
presented

in the

Lexis

/

than
ol

IS

of the decision. Doctrinal terms
and phrases as

Nexis queries are just as

textual presence in cases

significant becau.se of

text

its

is

cases

occur

easily sustained, but determining

presence

in the ratio dicidendri^

in dicta

as not. DiKtrine's

which doctrine

most

is

depends on more interpretation

currently incorporated in full text
information management. This indicates
notions

doctnne are well established already, such

ought

likely to

to be outside the set.

we know

that

we know

pretty

For instance, to study compelling

that cases about religious displays

much what

stale interests in free exercise

on public properly

(e.g.

clause) that discuss areas of case law related
to free exercise are not useful,

scope here. The

set is to

have cases which manifest the compelling

in Iree exercise law, scholars

that criteria

and practitioners can

sorts of cases

Establishment
fall

out of the

slate interests doctrine

when a case meets

pretty well ascertain

because the categorization and inclusion based on doctrine or other
subject area

14 Dicta

is

considered

rationale or reasoning

(i.e.

15 Ratio
decidendi
rationale or reasoning.

tliat

part of a written opinion

which

is

not

piirt

of

tiie

decisional

mix or

die ratio decidendi).

is

considered

tliat

part of written opinion

which contains die decisional mix or

di.sCincion,s is

un cxpcnencc driven

mtelhgence and Ure

Machine

sk.ll.

learning,

c<,n,siUuenl skills lor case
ba.sed learning

and ihe model,
ng
and reasoning.

ol

lunnan

,s siill in iis

nascent form.
Doccrinal

synonyms

lor a

dilemma. By randomly .sampling
Nexis search
It

became

(i.e. ca.,es

with phra.se "free exercise"

strict scrutiny

government

standards

imposing

readers and editors

was laced with

in

is

rinding a

cxprc.ssions in language,

might have

it

compelling government

way

Full text is devoid ol the luzxy
logic with

lail early,

however

to incorporate that luz/.y logic
in the doctrinal

it

is

the authorities of fuzzy categorization,
the

the separation

ol'

lor roughly a century

analysis from the

ol'

American

by asking questions about doctrine

that lull text will

where useis going online

West

in Iree text, "liberates

research can in lact even evolve without

some

knowledge management which

information space.

knowledge

legal

like

lil'e.

This proJecLs

compelling

domain of possible

results.

have a profoundly different inlluence on law,

them Irom any requirement

thoughts into a pre-existing form" (Bening, 1987: 26,27).

in law's

which

collections, people can relatively
easily

interests subject categorization is implicated,
thus structuring a

practices of

compelling

and given the problems of ambiguities and
complex

looked as

which have held sway

believe

overriding

related to a cxpre.s.scd inlormation
need. This phase ol the

The challenge exposed here

Some

inlere.sts.

of inleresLs

be eonsulted.

to

attempts at separation

/

them between 1963 and the present)

to expre.ss the notion ol
a balancing

make .sen.se of data

delinilion and di.scovcry elTorts,

structures

(e.g.

this burden).

determine when a data object

editors,

ways

relumed with a wide open Lexis

interests, overrtdtng state
interests, interests ol highe.st
order,

.iuslilicalion lor

project

expre,ss.on (Dabney. 1986)
po.sed a .sigmlicam

free exercise ca.ses

clear that there were other

implied by

human

complex

It

remains

pre-existing form and

to

to

fit

their

be seen whether

move beyond

the

create things like logic and sense and rationality

CIIAPTUR

WKST AND DATA SK
A.

inleresi doclrnie challenge

ol Kiols like

Uxis/

docirine's lorn,
inlo, n,alio„

To

ol law.

u,lorn,alio„

I

is

shaped and incrperaled imo
knowledge hy

n.dexing and access. This
proJecM .songhi

search prolile lor the snhjecl
colleclion.

compelhng

COI.I.KC |()N

Introduction

resides i„ machines, and
|..•ac,iccs lor

I

VI

machines and

heal the data

machines

iillimalcly helps

on

antomaled

p,

.sel

in

Ihe

hecanrc apparen, lhal ahsiraclions

la.sk will,

like

and colleclion capahdiiies

lx,xis/ Nexis p,-ohlemali/cd

case opinions, and hi'onghi lo

light ihe significance

aclices lo sustaining, or challenging,
existing

of

knowledge

ha.ses

as a ,ep,c.se„lalio„ ordocninc in
conslilnlional law ihe „,le

in nianilesling

how

il

nse con.pciling slale inleresis
as a

Inll Icxl .search

Nexis. In lacl. allempling ihis

and pie.scnce

cha|>lcr focuses

lowever,

1

,o

West

or facililaling doclrinc needs lo
he add,e.s.sed.

digesl and ,cpo,lc, .syslen, p,„vides
accc.ss

lo,

I'his

and

shape eoneepliiali/alions ordoelrine and
ease opinions.

Sinee Ihe

liirn ol

ihe cenliiry

West Publishing has reigned supreme

mlormalion needs oh Ameriean lawyers, propelled
by
indexing seheme, virlual monopoly

ol eireuil eourl

in salislying the

universal eoverage, uniciue

its

opinion publiealion, and stains as the

lelerence backbone ol law libraries. West’s indexing
and market dominance has placed a

stamp on law and

distinct

understandings

new

ol'

legal education, dcrining

the source materials of

ways of knowing, and shaping

American law.

'

Il

is this

stamp which ineubales

desires and markets, inspiring scholars and inrormalion
prol'cssionals lo explore

ways

new

manipulating those same materials.

ol

*

We,sl ha.s

llic

power,

IliouglU.s" (Herring, 1994;

ilirou}>h iJic digc.sl

and reporters,

P'S).

1

I

4

lo help create law's "universe ol iliinkable

West

B.

1.

The Development

The combination of nonnnative
and
the organizing

court reports (see Chapter
4)

and universalizing power of
the reg.onal reporters
privately provided hy

m the mid to late

West publishing^

reported opinions, and at the

IStKfs courts were creating
an tncreased supply of

same time

the task of organizing

them became more than

individuals, either private
lawyers or eourt officers, could
feasibly

scope and breadth,
previous methods

a.s

well

difficult.

a,s

managed Dilemmas of

of knowledge representation
and organization,

The West Publishing Company
appeared

West

made

the

to nomialize the

knowledge representation scheme, cover
all jurisdictions, and
provide
the market of

was suhsumed by

a

low cost product

to

American lawyers.
integrated the numbering of official
court reports to link

ids

products to

existing standards. Court reports
had initiated a system of numbering
volumes to associate

them with particular jurisdictions and
each

other, this

gave West a significant leg up on the

developing market for authontative legal
information (Berring, 1987:33). Moving
further
yet from the disparate narratives of
nominative and court reports.

coverage and standardized data

objets. After data normalization

existing jurisdictional indexing systems

(i.e.

pcispective,^that vaulted

and integration with

or marketing decision depending on ones

West beyond competing

systems.-^

no means was alone in its efforts, and of course it still has
competition
/ Nexis, and a raft of Internet
facilitated archives and indices)

Cl

Edition Reporters, Lexis
3

for universal

court numbering), comprehensive case

was West's other major innovation,

reporting

West suove

(e.s,,

Lawyers

„

In substance our law is excellent, full of justice
and good sense, but in form it is chaotic. It
has no systematic arrangement which is generally recognized
and used, a fact which greatly increases die
labors of lawyers and causes unnecessary litigation" (Terry
,1920).

Sec a discussion of West's decision on comprehensiveness
23 American Law Review 396 (1889).
^

The West Company

jurisdiction.

It

prided

itself

on

in

:

Symposium of Legal

Publishers

established a system tor receiving copies of opinions from every
and verilying tlie text with the judge who wrote tliem.

gatlicring decisions

After the

initial

publ.sh.ng of West's Syllab,

in

1876 the company began

production of the regional reporters,
sianing with the Northwest
Reporter covering courts

Dakota Territory, Iowa. Michigan,
Minnesota, Nebraska, and
Wisconsin. West's
competitive advantages were low
cost products, efficient
and effective producttve
.n the

processes, and ultimately national
coverage (Woxland, 1985:

commitment

to

comprehensive coverage meant

perusal by lawyers,

it

also created a

individual could reasonably

that

many

1

While West's

19).

cases were

now

available for

mass of cases which were immediately
more than an

manage without some overarching indexing
system. Enter the

digest in 1887.6

West outpaced

the arrangements of the other
edited reports, providing lawyers
and

scholars with access to nearly

needs and then
normalization

come

calling.

all

cases,^ allowing

In a sense

m place of variable interpretations and comments on a select

inquiries, to ask

How

emancipation

are searches formulated, and

much

by association

batch of cases

in the

how

same way

does a user

their basic

meaningful questions of the database? Professionals
wanted

when presented with them

way

this

databases are today, but was immediately
faced with a dilemma;

access the information?

but

to structure their informational

what West offered was comprehensiveness
and

considered significant. The profession
embraced
full text

them

all

the cases,

they reached for the security of an editorial
stmeture, and a

of making sense of that mass of material. West
was there once again.

Secondly, West established a uniform format tor reporting. All West
reporters were designed according to
tlie same formula. West produced a sterile
court reporting system that guaranteed reliability tlirough
similarity. Caption, syllabus, and headnotes appeared in tlie
same form in all jurisdictions (Berring, 1987:

^ For more Uiorough exploration of diese events see
(Marvin, 1969: 67; Woxland. 1985:

^ All cases in tlie 1800s tor die original
Nortliwest Reporters region were very likely recorded
however, in die 1990s it is quite probable dial diere are cases which are noted but not reported due
die relative importance associated widi die presiding courts place in die judicial hierarchy.

Uierein,
to

15-16).

Digest and Reporters

2.

The

digcsl system of keynumbers,
hcadnoles, and subjeel ealegoii/aii.ins

rneorperaled inl„ the

an expandable base

West hne

t>r

ol

produets

m

1K87.«

West established suh|ect areas with

eategorics to organize or index
eascs.'>

universal subjeel thesaurus,

was an allempi

was

The

original calegorizalion, a

to distill the essential areas ol
law, the

catcgori/ations stuck, shaping
conccpluali/alions of law since:

Mibjeel the,saiirus, while not unusual in
inrornialion
scienL-r reshaped
r?shai,vi legal research.
science,
Por when West Publishing created the Key
Numbei System, it not only enabled lawyers to
research cases by subject it^ilso
encouraged kiwycrs to lit every legal issue into
a certain conceptual
n lnrcwcitk^
Number sSysl^em provided a paradigm lor thinking about
th^
le think according to the West
categories. (Berring

r7

West developed
prognosticator
categorizations

its

ol'

categorizationsieu) coincide with the Harvard law
school and

the case

is still

method Dean Langdell.*

manilested

in the relationship

'

The

structuring

between

power

ol'

legal education

its

subject

and West

Digest.

The seven

digest topics arc: Persons, Property, Contracts, Torts, Crimes,
Remedies, and Government. The I'irst-ycar curriculum at Boalt Hall, a typical
course load lor major law schools, consists ol' Property, Contracts,
Torts,

Criminal

Law,

Civil Proccduie, and Constitutional Law. Remedies arc covered
in Property,
Contracts, and Torts, and Government is covered in Civil Procedure
and

Constitutional Law. (Berring, 1994: 35)

o

West had purcha.scd a .small publishing company, Lillie, Brown wiih United States Digest, and
exislmg iniellcctual property in then developing indexing techniques, the sUiff included one John
Mallory. Mallory is credited with developing the Digest indexing scheme at West (Hicks,
1942; Surrency
1990: 111-127; Woxland, 198.S: 121).
its

^

A

so-called universal subject tJiesaurus, with a

data object in need ol indexing. Ol course
but the es.senlial chanicleristic ol lilting

See (Wren and Wren, 1986) for
*

ol

.set

ol idenlilied subjects .said to incorporate

system requires some growUi for developing
cases to categories is determinative and dominant.
tliis

Jireas

any

of law,

listing.

Harviird l:iw .school, and more importantly die Htavard law library, was the site where the data
law would be housed, or more accurately, where it would be utilized by law's aspirant practitioners.
*

n

..s

no, ,„c a,n, o,

,hi,,

wo,k

nMnence on ,subsa|nom

m ,,y u, unlock Ihose dunces, hn, ralhc,-

sy.slem.s In,-

managing

legal

,o

acknowledge

,nlo„uanon and wha,

sensible nilaanccs in Ihe
d,.scon,-.ses o, suue and
ledcal appellate law, and

ihci,-

con.siiiuics

,e,search

on

iha,

law.

pmdum-^

P';i-^'oordiiia(cd in lluU

scholars forgot that choices had
existing categories as inevitable;
thus the ^
gestalt of

^

hPP

llic

case law was created. (Berring, 1994;
55 )

Tins

power

to assess

sense

is

not unique to legal information
management.

inlormation indexing requires decisions
about
uselul.'2 Users

mean,

to the

have

how

data

is

related, accessed,

to tailor their notions of cases, their
interrelations,

knowledge

Any system
and made

and what they

structures inherent in those systems.'^

Each digest category and subcategory was assigned
an identifying number,
keynumber, which would appear within headnotes
condensed, and hopelully

1

'

of

for a case opinion.

I

a

leadnotes were

distilled, blurbs describing the specific points
of

law for

that

case

P>abncy (1986) For a nice discus.sion ot ihe power and implications
of indexing lecliniuues

see (Dabney, 1986).

3
This WEST] subject arrangemeni lent its slruclure lo American
law. Because it was a
universal subject Itie.saurus, locating every point in every case by
subject, then placing the case in a
UK-alion in iJie printed Digests, it imposed a continuing structure
on tJie law. Language and concents were
normal i/.ed as the
I

I

West
its

editor prepared Uie lieadnoles lor eacli case, (remember West published
a print version
National Reporter System of every decision published), which helped to make tJie
law

in

comprehensible and lent overall structural coherence. Though West might adjust ifs subject
stnicture, the fact of a
structure remained. Commentators criticized West, but there is no doubt that its family
of publications had
;i prolound and continuing impact t)ii the way
information about law was organized. West's influence may
have saved Ihe myth of Uie common law from what kxiked like its inevitable demise (Berring, 1987: 25).

w,lhm a

particular subject category.
Digests are generally ordered
by sequential

keynuntbers
'

(t.e.

by subject categorizations),
and references

to cases wtth.n Ute digest

y the court, location, date, summarizing
blurb, and reporter

also organized
relationships

citations.

I'l

Digests are

by a descnptive word and
case name index. The digest
structures

between cases and

indices,

cases resided and are meaningful
cnlical altention,

and creates realms or boundanes
within which

in certain

ways.

It is

this

power which has atuacled

and perhaps stimulated the development
of new markets for knowing

law's data.

West developed
and reporters.
and

stylistic

Initially

a process for manipulating
opinions before inclusion into digest

new

case opinions are processed by
editors

forms I5 to prepare the data object
for the

who check

for citation

target infomiation system. Editors

then tackle the substance, preparing
headnotes and keynumbers for each identified
point of
law, which

IS

then passed through the discerning
eyes of senior editors charged with

maintaining structural consistency.

Scholarsi^have identified four essential problems
with the digest system;

human

editors

make

mistakes, whether in higher level data object
normalization, headnote

composition, or key number assignment,

system and forever

lost to correction.

if

not recognized

expand the depth of indexing so as

1

zl

fit

within the

to capture

For a nice overview of

tWren and Wren, 1986:

tlie

initial

and link the object
is

'

Third,

relatively rigid since all subsequent

domain of categories (more on

place of Digests and Reporters in

more complete

tlie

this in

next section).

legal infomiation

scheme

see

description.

1^ See (Berring ,1986:34-5) for detailed
descriptions of
7

effectively.

to

10-19).

1^ See (Berring, 1986: 32) for

1

can be incorporated into the

enhance precision editors are forced

despite layering of index and categories, the system

must be

it

Second, complex layering of indexing creates a maze

of understandings attributed to data objects, to

categories

first,

tlie

four essential problems.

Appropriate to Uie already existing stmcture and understandings of cases

witliin Uiat stmcture.

Finally, there

is

subjectivity

and defining power

decisions about what
matters, and

how

It

in the actions

matters,

of editors, they

make

m each case opinion, and those decisions

ure reflected in case
indexing.

3.

The Power of Indexing and
Categorization

Categonzation
critically

is

a key information

examined by scholars of

politics

management

practice,

one which has also been

and law. Categorization

is

the explicit

Identification or assignment of attributes
to data objects to facilitate meaningful

organization. Attributes provide domains
of meaning to those objects and shape

may

how

they

be used and interpreted. Organization
schemes are predicated on the assignment of

attributes

and correspond

to their

presence or absence.

Scholars have shed light on the power of
attribute assignment and categorization
a variety ot contexts, several are

more noted

politics.

assignment

attributes

here.

Giovanni Sartori presents one of

efforts with his exploration of conceptual
stretching

comparative
attribute

drawn upon

were

Sartori's

work

(Sartori, 1970).

the

in

rested on an unproblematic notion of categories and

To

Sartori the lines

between categories'^ were

clear,

relatively straightforward data object characteristics, or
at least readily

identiliable similarities. Occasionally a category or
concept

1

and transformation

in

would prove too

tight to

hi comparative politics categorization is a well used metliod for
organizing understandings of
individual nation states and tlieir different governments and governing
systems. Typologies are a significant
part of die comparative activity.

encompass

a

new

to .ncrease ifs

objecc

orcoHeCon

extensu.n-and capture

of „b, ecus, .he categorys
infen,sion...igM be
the

oUicrs) represent a classic
categori/,at.on

where places are always found
Core cntiusms

(e.g.

wayward

scheme

objects. D.gesus

like that with

(i.c.

abcod

West, and

wh.ch Staton worked,

for ca,ses, or rather
ca,ses are edited

and .nterpreted

to

fit.

Lakolt, 1987) attack this
normalization, destabilizing the

notion of tradtttonal
categonzation schemes. Such
schemes are con,s.dered con.servativc
and
imncated representat.ons of the
true complex,
ty of data oh, ecus, and that they are
practices

and systems which

lull u.sers

by prov.d.ng stmelure and
expectations. The

domain boundaries and associalod
data
"hard cases" which cither

fit

object attnbutes

is

abtlity to delinc

surely conslratned by a class
of

no existing category, or have
multiple interpretations with

respect to appl.cable attributes.
While careful not to dismi.ss the uulity
or tmponance of

categorization to

many

that categorization is

objccLs arc

information intensive activities,
scholars like Lakoffhave suggested

an inexact practice, yet one with
significant implications for

known and

u.sed,

and by association the play of actions
which

result

how

from

drat

knowledge.
In Collier

and Mahon's

revisilation of Sartori's

work

(Collier

and Mahon, 1993)

they explain that seholars eriiieal of
eategorization, ineluding Lakoff, were hardly

discounting categorizations, but rather
wanted the political and contingent nature of
categories

more

C ommentaries
the sense ol the

explicitly examined.

Duncan Kennedy's examination of

focused on the contingency of categorization.
Inherent

common

in efforts to distill

law were decisions based on ideologies and values which

foreclosed particular results (Kennedy, 1979).
Kennedy, as a point
legal studies

Blaekstonc's

movement, saw

man

for the critical

the contingency of categorizations and supporting
characters

From wSartori (1970), but tilso now general knowledge in information seience:
Inten.sion
ataibute profile, or definitive eharaeteristics, used to delimit
daUi objeets.
90

Extension

is tlie

characteristics of intension.

actual nuige of objects in

Note

the extension (no. of cases hit),

extension.

that tliey

tlie

tire

itie

collection idenuf ied according to

inversely related,

more defined

tlie

tlie

search profile

less defined

(i.e.

tlie

tlie

intension,

is tlie

defined
tlie

intension) die smaller the

greater

i.ke

docmne

was an

as directly connected
to the polittcal task
of leg.ttntation^

.nterprettve snapshot of the
contnton law.

method of abstraction

,t

was an

Blackstone's treatise

abstracted snapshot.

The

effectively cod.fied the
notions of a parttcular social
context, one

heavily tnlluenced by existing
law and legal culture.
Blackstone's work legitimated
the
legal status

quo of England

that condition

211

writes Kennedy, and the
doetnnal categonzations repre,sented

while facilitating legal
development

in particular directions

(Kennedy. 1979-

).

From an
(considering

early point in the development
of legal information sy.stems
the machines

C ommentaries

providing an intellectual model for
the

structure) attached attributes to
cases
characteristics.

patterns

Sometimes

common

by identifying and focusing on

particular

these are objectively observed,
or interpreted legal and factual

upon which many agree. At other times
however the

attributes are less structured,

and mu.st be cobbled together by a
variety of characteristics or interpretive
Richard Delgado picked up

this line of attack,

calegorization scheme, and connecting
law.

law’s

Delgado acknowledges

the

it

to the

acts.

tausing upon the contents of

the

range of acceptable conceptualizations

power of categorization, and

its

in

comforting, and perhaps

obfuscating, inlluences on users of legal
information. U,sers feel good

when confronted by

well entrenched information systems of
their profe.ssions, they satisfy needs that
users do

not recognize as being partially constituted by
the systems they query.

Existing classitication systems serve their intended
purpose admirably: They enable
researchers to tind helplul cases, articles, and books.
Their power is instrumental'
once the researcher knows what he or she is looking lor, the
classitication systems enable him or her to find it.
Yet, at the same time, the
very search tor authority, precedent, and hierarchy in
cases and statutes can create
the talse impression that law

But not

all

counsel

for, individuals or

users are

made

is

exact and deterministic. (Delgado and Stcfancic,

comfortable, especially those that are either themselves, or

groups whose potential legal claims are silenced by current

categorization schemes. Information systems resist rapid change, and thus legal work

grounded on them
incrcmcnlcil.

.s

slow

,o

move omo new

Dclpcido
fcauu dccrio'v
uttnes ihic
inis fV’\r
lor

iio
its

coneeptuai ground, change

bolh

in

,s

>

conscrvalivc influences on
law s ability to address

novel social and political
conditions, not to mention

new

actors in (hose scenes.

Sei"etd,Th''av1 ™^^

being

selected by the researcher,
thus rendering fhot
rather like molecular
biology's double hebv
thoughts, and approaSe^wlbrn^

useless.

database
function

The systems

^'^y^'^tems,

incremental reform remains
quite possible hu
lran,slornialive innovation
dilTicnll (beigado

moderate,

and Stefan'Jiriwj

It

make,s

,sen,se that

categon/,ation will enable
paritenlar noltons and interpretations
while

disabling others. Delgado
probes deeper by examining the
listings in legal inlormation

mdiees around the heading of civil

rights, his clTorLs dovetail
with other .scholars

who

attack standard categorization
schemes.21 U.sing concepts or
phra.ses wh.ch are mean.ngi
in

certam

disconr.se,s

of contempora.7

civil rights

nl

Delgado explores how the West Dtcennial

Digest deals incorporates and indexes
on them. The results are probably
more interesting
lor

what they do not contain

rather than

The Decennial Digest contains

what they

entries

do.

on slums and
one must look

ghettos,

in the Descriptive Word
Searcher to public improvemenus under the
inmV m
corporations. Another index contains
an entry labeled, simply,
races.
ric None ol the major
indexes contains entries for legitimation
false
consciousnesss, or many other themes of the
"new" or critical race-remedies
c olarship. Indeed, a researcher who
confined himself or herself to the sources
isted under standard civil rights headings
would be unlikely to come in contact with
s

1989

Delgado

s

-^^

^^^^Sado and Stefancic,

9^

claim seems substantiated, yet

it

would take more research

whether, and how, those missed areas are translated and
incorporated

to fully

comprehend

in existing

inlormation systems. For instance, Delgado queried a hypothetical
researcher, "what

law around the notion of black

women

is

suing for job discrimination on the basis of their

21 See for
example work by Derreck Bell juid Kimberle Willumis Cren.sliaw.

the

.s.a,us as

black

women,

not as a black

who

.hen happens ,o be

m

che class women, bu,
as
Ihe smgular enlU,.'
Exlshng md.ces lend no. lo
inco.pom.e d.e concep, o.' black
women ,n
the area ol job
d.scrimmation, there .s a h.sto.,,
and ca.egonzanon,
lor

discrimmalion on the basis of
gender and race, but not a hybrid
for law
area of

employment discrimination

for black

employmen,

in the particular

women.

Because of the structure of the
indexing systems attornevs
Black women have filed suit
under one catego^ or

for

£Xr™

^

dUntly discnmmatory against Black
women because the legal classification
Black women like the most advantaged
members of each group

To

sec further treatment refer lo

work by Kimberle Crenshaw challenging
anh-

discrimination doctrine manifested in
the authoritative sources and
practices of American
law.22 In

it

she claims that there

is

no space

for a

more context

sensitive dkscussion of

employment, and other discnminalion, under current
categorization .schemes. For such
di,scussions to
in ca.se

become

authoritative, or at least to have an
authoritative element manifested

law and commentary, new spaces need

interpretations developed,
.search

new indexing

to

be opened up, new categories and

facilitated.

Perhaps electronic legal databases and

engines will continue to shake the authority of
categories and practices of law which

re-altimi an inlormational status quo. In that
world law's mandarin materials are reduced
10

documents

in a text collection,

it

representations, present and luture,

what can be conceived of

remains

made

in law.

See (Kimberle Creirshaw, 1995).

to

be seen whether the knowledge

possible by unstructured data collections changes

~—Acquisition
Alter finding Uiat a Lexis

Nexis seareh lor compelling

/

exerc.se to be fraught with
d.fficulties
returned, and presence of

cicses.

Attempting

(i.e.

many synonyms

produce a precise enough data

set.

many

it

around law's hard dala, and

is

slate .ntercst wtthin free

extraneous, or false positive,
cases

for compelling interests),

and not

likely to

West's Digest system was used
to capture the desired

to capture the ca,se
collection

not easily quantifiable, that

Ma qipiilntinn

and

part

with Lexis

/

Nexis showed

that doctrine is

and parcel of a collection of
knowledge and practices

that Lexis /

Nexis was nol indexed

in

such a way, nor was Ihe

doctrine manifested with enough
textual regularity, to satisfactorily
procure a doctrinal data
set.

The following explores how West's

digest and reporters structure or
alter

conceptualizations of compelling interest
doctrine through efforts to define,
delimit, and
idcnlily case opinions with

To conduct
profile

that

which

to construct that data set.

examination an information

retrieval task is posed: define a
search

and identify the relevant cases which
exhibit the compelling

exercise cases.

West

interests

doctnne

in free

or other editors did not categorize on
the compelling interest doctrine,

they did however categorize on religious
freedom and liberties, representing the domain

from which the collection was drawn. This

injects a significant

element of legal knowledge

authority, but perhaps doctrine's relation
to that authority, and the basis for asking

questions about doctrine, needs to be incorporated.

To

collect the doctrinal data set several paradigmatic
cases were chosen, defined

authoritatively in

compelling
(

**^72),

state interests at the

Thomas
U-

commentary and

S. V.

v.

Supreme Court

Review Board

.

Indiana

(e.g.,

Wisconsin

Employment

v,

/

Yoder. 406 U.S. 205

Security Division.

Lee, 435 U.S. 252 (1982)). Each case was looked up each

West Supreme Court

I

texts23 of constitutional law, for free exercise

450 U.S. 707
in the relevant

Reporter, headnotes examined, and the most relevant description and

acquired these largely from two

texts: (Epstein ;uid

Walker, 1995; Gaunter, 1985

)

Key Nu^hcr-.,.

.he con, polling scale
.n.ercs. balancing
.s. choscn .^3

Decennial D.gesls, chose ease
cilalions and dcscripiions

were .demined and calalogued.
The dala range

pre-sen.

ta.
.stale

874 U.S. 898

,

1968),

carts

Che

applicalion of ihe Religious

lo the

Key Nun, her 84

slarled in

Supreme Conn's

interesl in deciding free
exercise cases.2s

otherwise have been valid due

in

Iron,

implied the

u.se of. a

More coniemporarily, cases

would

thal

presence of diKUinal markers,
hue concerned ihe

Freedom Restoration Ac. (Public
Law No. 108-141, 107

for ihose digest case
descriptions

balancing

test

i„

use o, compelling

stale's inieresi,

which

Seal.

were

omttted from ihe doctrinal space.28
Each citation for Supreme Court
and federal

was recorded

968

1968 hecai.se Sherhe,, „

inaiigiiral

14X8) raiher chan a balance
be.ween a con.siiiutional right
and a

appeal cases

1

of

coiiits

explicitly u,sed, or

between individual religious exercise
and ihc

inierc.sLs

of

Ihc state.

Using Wesllaw28cach

ca.se

corresponding

to the

recorded citations was scanned for

a Imal determination as lo whether
compelling inieresus (or

tagged lor whether the policy was
upheld or

noi.

synonym) were

applied, and

West supplied case synopses and

text

passages around key .search terms and
phra,ses like "compelling stale interesl"
or "free
indexes cases by descriptive characteristics
and areas of law,
r sF , .
,
relcrence
numbers to each pnxiuced cateecirv/
dcsr'riminn
category/ description
.

tlie

key system assigns
assi

25
Religious liberty and freedom of eon.science,
wiUi a variety of

subsections, 7l)

26

Interestingly, 5Jierbert was under key
exercise cases are under key number 84.

number 274, subsequent compelling

suite interest

and

Religious Freedom Restoration Act

free

(RFRA) of 1993 (Public Law No. 103-141, 107 Suit
doctrinal space, one certainly related to Uie free exercise
/ Compelling Suite
hitcrest but distinct because it is statutory
it exists in reaction to tlic jurisprudence
of free exercise /
Compelling Suite Interest. Cases from tlie Supreme Court were
cut off witli Smitli in 1990, there were
some circuit court ol appeals cases which continued to use tlie balancing
1

1488),

111

tact creates

its

own

AND

test after tliat,

examination of cases up tlirough tlie present. For
endpoint to tlie daUi set collection.

tlie

most part however. Smith and

hence

RFRA

my

provides

lui

This was merely automation of a manual task, roughly equiUible to finding tlie
opinion in a
luad bound reporter. The only distinction tliat might imply subsUuitive
improvement on tlie manual
process would be tlie scanning for search terms, again 1 suggest it is an improvement
of style ratlier tluui
lomi, tuid tliat doing so does not foul tlie analysis of traditional hard bound machines.

exeru,se

were exam.ned

won and

lost

by the

to a,scenatn

whether the doctrine wtus

utili/ed,

opinion, and disposition
fields. Pri.soner
cases wore

title,

becau,se free exerese
Jurisprudence tor pnsoners
took an expheit step

a.nrpelhng state

tnterest. instead

(pxeudo rational basis
prior to that

change

and deterntine

test)

adopting a

-legit, mate

who

tagged

al.so

away from

peneolog.cal .ntercst" standard

against which to weigh
a prisoners religious
rights.* Ca.ses

in treatment are .simply
included w.fh the ba.sic
subsets defined

on

disposition.

Due
"ctimpelling

to the

use of doctrinal synonyms

.social

(e.g. "significant

need") and the complex and
varied

.structure

government

interest

of Judicial opinions and the

nt.xing of dicta and ratio
decidendi often considerable
portions of text had to be
pr<tees.sed.
ilh

g

proximity locators and a relatively
robust notion of what constituted
doctrinal

.stgnilicrs the task

step

was

was streamlined .somewhat. This

collection.

Using Lexis

were easily located and

/

Nexis Lexsee

retrieved, storing

them

in

final Iist3'>,s the

defined data

command and download

.set.

next

seiwice ca.scs

an tnierim dalaba.se to be prepared
for

InQucry analysis.
Like

lull text

Lexis

/

Nexis the West hardbound digest and
reporter system did not

support a straightforward definition
and identification of the relevant cases.
West Digests
are indexed

by subject

Compelling

interests in free exercise

areas, with ever decreasing levels
of abstraction in each subject area

law

is

not manifested as one of those levels
however,

existing instead within another subject
area or spread across two or
the characteristics ol the cases

By

utilizing expert

interests in tree exercise

it

and

how

more depending upon

they intersect West's categorization scheme.

knowledge which defined paradigmatic cases of compelling

was possible

to locate

an area

in the digests

where

the desired

DLonc V Estate ot Sliahu/./. .482 U.W. ?>A2 ( 1987), juid Turner v Salluy. 482 U S 78
(1987)
esuiblishcd Uie less stringent reasonableness standard for
saue interests, free exercise claims by inmates
.

could be abridged by less

tluui

compelling

interests, tliose

administration.

30 See Appendix B

for daUi set case

list.

deemed reasonable given

die exigencies of prison

cases reside. West's inclusion
of headno.es and
keynumbers act as tdenttfiers and
pointers, thus the paradigmatic
cases pointed back to the
digest categories

where similar

ca.,es

could be Pound. West editors
make determinattons abou, what
constitutes

similarittes, levels of

sameness, and conversely
attributes of exclusion and
category

assignment. At that point however
the re,searcher had

to

manually proce.ss the

re-

dtge,si

entries, .screening for free
exerci.se first, then looking
for signs of a balancing
of interests

which

either explic.tly mentioned

compelhng

interests or implied their
tneorporation in the

of the case. This mjected
significant inlluence from
second hand knowledge and the
default bias of expertise tn the
.selecting
rat,,,

po,ss.ble ca.ses for the data .set
Ca.ses identified

had
or

to

be examined however

synonym, was

pre,sent

to

detenninc whether

,n fact the

siill

compelling interest doctrine,

and pari of the decisional mix.

Doctrine's sense and importance
.seemed undercut hy being excluded
from subject
area categorization in West.

and
lhal

their

West

One could

immediate doctrinal
in fact

atso argue that .since the compelling
interest ca.ses,

relatives, re.s,ded within

one category

Religious Liberty)

help rc-alTirm doclrinc's meaning,
or at least keep cases to which

been attributed hung together. Like Lexis

/

ol'

specihcally part ol their organizational scheme,
thus, like Lexis

/

doctrine operates below the level of

its

the experience with Lexis

that doctrine exists at least as

much

that doctrine

examine a context

it

is

has

was not

Nexis, compelling interest

primary functions.
/

Nexis and West showed more than anything was

in the

minds of professionals,

practitioners,

scholars ol law, as in the hard data ol law as a
quasi-physical component.
aic oltcn tapped (or

it

Nexis however meaning of the doctrine
pre-

dated these systems managing case opinions,
and the existence

What

(i.e.

and

These actors

part ol their occupations) to cither apply, or argue against,
or

doctrinally.

Both Lexis

/

Nexis and West digest and reporters were

challenged to capture a data set which reasonably could represent the target
doctrine without

heavy editing and tweaking by system
Irom the process of searching and

users.

retrieval, to

While attempting

to stand as far

allow search profiles

removed

to take the place

of

interactive

involvement of knowledge experts,

needed knowledge experts

to

give

it

life,

it

was obvious

that

compelling mteresLs

or rather, that law needs structures
like doctrine to

allow space for contests of
interpretation and application of
law

129
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CHAPTER

VII

inquery
A. Introriiirfinn

InQucry'

Data and

examine

,s

the final information

machine employed and examined

in Doclrine as
the culmtnation of a
constructed story. That story
provided an opportunity to
practices of case opinion
organisation and access in
several infonnation machines
is

which ultimately help shape
conceptualizations of
dc.scribed lull-text and hard

reporters respectively, and

compelling

dix-trine

bound information systems, Lexis
/ Nexis and West

how each was

u.sed to collect

state interest doctrine in free
exerci.se law.

acquire ca,ses as data

and cases. Previous chapters

showed

a data set defined by the

EfforLs to define, di.scover, and

that doctrine is sustained in

knowledge bases around law

much

or more so than in the textual
content of case opinions themselves.

point,

It

is

digest and

Or more

as

to the

sustained by tradittons of making
sense of cases, by the authors of
case

decisions as well as their interpreters,
implementers, subjects, and observers.
Stipulating
that

much

ol dixtrine’s

meaning comes from expert knowledge and

iaw, compelling interest doctrine

is still

Dixtnne as Data was designed
Slate interest

docinne

however affixed

to

to

practices around case

ease opinions.

explore the conceptual domain of compelling

in free exercise cases in federal
circuit courts

of appeal and Supreme

Court. That exploration meant subjecting
a collection of case opinions lied together by
that

dix-tnne

(i.e.

as a clump) to InQuery analysis in search
of coherency^ beyond that attributed

liiQuery

(UIK)

delinc'

hirst

a probabilisuc inference search engine designed to index,
manage, and provide access
InQucry is a producl of die Cenlcr for Imclligcnl Infonnalion
Relrieval
Uie University of Massachusetts, Amherst
IS

collections.

’

at

2 Coherency
is predetermined to a degree as
authoritative notions of doctrine
mid construct die corpus (i.e., supreme court and federal

Amendment and

tuid cases

circuit courts of appeal,

were used

to

focused around die

protections of religious free exercise, operatiomU in particular period
( 1963
Additionally, die language of a btdmicing test will be present
diroughout as it was a key search
prolile characterisde in selecting cases lor die data
set
That is a wide coticeptmd net however, and InQucry
identities all concepts, if diere are patterns or
occurrences beyond diosc “rigged” for purposes of set
its

present)).

.

y egal scholars and pracm.oncr,s.3
.„Que,^ .dencincs concepts
and
a,-t,ccurrence ,Vet,uencic,s
across a corpus oh
docuntcnCs^

used

It

Uteir

occun encc and

was hoped InOne,,

ct.tdd he

to

deterntine whether doctrine's
presence, attnhtned to
a cluntp of case op.nions
correlated with concept
Slate s tnteresLs

,.cu.ences and co-occu^nces
between those cases where
prevailed and those where
individual
claims triumphed.

hypothesized that for compelling
interest dtxttrine to be
coherent, the

some

set of standards

where

Ihtxse interests

were met

t,r

It

the

was

tntere,sts

or at least

satisfied,

ought to be texmally
present tn cases were tndtvidual
claims were .seconda^ to
official pohcy. Conversely,
in
Ihe other .set, there should
be .some patterns of text
which signifies how individual
claims

supersede

tho.se interests,

collection.

Compelling

lurget ca.ses using

West

and

that signiftcatton

intere.sfs

mtght be

pre,sent acro,ss Ute stretch
of the

were identified as determinative-

digests and reporters and
Lexis / Nexis,

m

ihe dispo.sition of

was

it

p„.sited that if the

doctrine mattered to the structure
and content of tho.se case texts,
and by

rcprcscnted decisions, then there
would he

coherency) between the two

suh.sets.

inspired, approaches to case law
and
lhe,se critics

provide a

were

way

right, there

some conceptual

This was po,sed
its

would be

distinctions

little

coherency

to doctrine,

rctiieval experiences

relied

nowlcdge

which challenged

to

we may

*^i«>wledge in
is

V

on an oversimplilied

and VI described search

the original or robust objective of this
project,

find tliem wiUi InQuery,

deliniiion ol die data set, or collection of
cases, relied

'.nnii -.(•

and

InQuery .seemed

to test this empirically.

dolinition luid collection,

.

doctrinal

structures doctrine, rca.soning, and
precedent. If

notion ol the relationship between
doctrine and cases. Chapters

S

(i.e.

in relation to critical, or
realist

Such an endeavor however proved too
amhitious and

and

a,s,s.K;iation their

on expert knowledge,

:uid the

determination of what should be in die collection ;uid
what should not.
part luid parcel ol a community of individuals,
situated in and around
tlie

legal institutions

tlie

re.search diereol

4 Notions ol ratio decidendi are inherently tied
to interpretive communities around case law,
sometimes they are clearly identified in die case text diemselves,
less centrally idendlied

at other insUmces die decisional linchpin
and agreed upon. The process of identifying when a compelling
interest was

determinative, at least piatially,

is lui

interpretive act quite often.

and showed instead

obicc. yet

that doctrine is hard
to pinpoint textually

one of the printaty

that ts

trachtions

and assign

around doctnne

to a

clump of data

legal stt.dy

and

poittical

science (see Chapter VIII),
to speak of doctrine
through cases. Those
experiences exposed
doctnne's other s.de, as logic
or parameter wh.ch allows
lor concep.ualixattons
of doctnnal

clumps of cases, but
rhetorical politics tn
texts are

ts

also llexible

enough so as

to

prov.de space for .nterpreuve

and around case law. Cases
are also vety complex
data

some of the most

d.fficult to

knowledge experts and them

comprehend, wtth

traditions of reading

.,r

objecLs.

true understand.ng held
out

Case
by

and making sense of them.
Knowledge

experts are the gatekeepers to
cases, or at least until very
recently have been, and part
of
their function has been
to show the rest of us
how to understand cases. No text's
meaning
.s

merely the product of word
defm.tions and the rules of grammar,
contexts of learning,

pre,sentat,on.

latter

and interpretation

all

matter significantly, but

lake on far greater importance.
With so

interpretation,

and given the

relative

much

riding

is still

pursued,

this project

it

comes

to case law, the

on contextual specific

complexity of data objects

them becomes problematic. While
InQueiy analysis of
as a clump)

when

like cases, InQtiety’s use

the cases labeled as doctrinal

on

(i.e.,

focuses on the manner information tools
and

practices inOuence notions of doctrine
and cases as data.
In the early

days of the computer era

it

was suggested

that electronic data

processing could be appropriated to study law
and judicial decisions (Lovenger, 1963
).

Computers make

it

possible to explore the terms and phrases which
appear in texts, to

them, to probe their relationships within substantive
groups of case

texts.

map

InQuery

presents indexing and access practices which treat
documents as textual streams of parts of

speech

(i.e.

nounphrases, terms, verbs,

contextually significant sections of text

documents on concepts

(i.e.

etc.),

with

little

distinguishing between

(e.g. ratio, dicta, dissent).

InQuery indexes

nounphrases) and association relationships between them,

relying on practices which identity concepts in a corpus, their
occurrence frequencies,^ and

5 See

below

for a discussion of occurrence frequency and

132

tlie

proffered significance of highly

co-occurrcncc associations between
them.

A picture or profile of the document

can be produced from them,
showing the most important concepts
occurrence frequency) and their most
significant neighbors
associations).

The following exposes

B Use
,

/

Practice

doctrine,

these practices which

A pproac h

Doctrine as Data was designed

(i.e.,

to

and the case opinions through which

it

nodes with high

co-occurrence

make

to Conreptiial

augment

(i.e.,

collection

that profile possible.

rnntpnr

the study of judicial product by heating

operates, as a central part of legal

discourse (White, 1990; Smith, 1994;
Davies, 1996; Smith, 1995) where conceptual
contosLs (Connolly, 1974) and affirmations
of law's coherency take place. Scholars

(Gordon, 1984; Kennedy, 1979; Kerruesh,
1991;

Fit/.patrick, 1992;

1987) lollowmg the realist tradition see doctrine
as indeterminate,

on case opinions by judges and commentators
seeking

them

in established traditions

made
still

(c.g.

is

dressing placed

to rationalize decisions

and

situate

which constitutes

the production

in

and interpretation of ca,se

contrived, or worse, obfuscating the real reasons decisions
arc

behavioral, political, or otherwise sociological). That said
however, doctrine

structures

meaning

for case opinions, doctrine is

scholarship, and ultimately doctrine

Compelling

is

still

part of legal education

part ol practices for

making sense of case

state interest doctrine in free exercise of religion

structure expectations

domains

window

of interpretation. Coherency said conferring from
doctrine

legal discourse, especially that

opinions and decisions,

Smith, 1995; Barkan,

and

may

be said

and
opinions.
to

relations framing disputes, as a parameter or logic enabling

lor winners and losers in contests of individual faith and police power.^

At

the

very least doctrine partially structures discussion and commentaiy swirling around those
contests.

As testimony

to

compelling interest doctrine and

its

enduring role

in politics,

occurring concepts to the information content of a document collection.

tliat law generally, and legal knowledge structures like doctrine
shape in a wide range of social iuid politiciil contexts. For more di.scussion See Brigham

constitutive assertion
specilically, take

(19%)

Cong.e,s,s

,,s

dcbaung ano.hcr a„cn>p,

reinvigonue ,hc cn.pelHng
nuces, .slandard.

hy ,hc Suprcn,c C„u,-,

njj. Compelling

ol

)

Religious
iiueiosls in the

domain

consuiuled, cxcmplilying ihe
rellcxive nainre

and law’s social

ol'

ol'

labmy

l>,,nec,,on

religious I'recdom

Ihc relalionship

Ac,

is still

,1

k.llccl

1.K,

being

belwcon law’s aulhoriiy

reality.

Karl Llywcllcn and the realists
established a critique of lormalism
and doctrine (See

Chapter 2

),

and opened up an analytical door

into the

meaninglul use of words therein. Karl
Llywellen’s
skeptical

view of doctrine

Icgahsm and disputes.
doctrine

is

in a

It is

examination of cases and the

oft cited

Bramble Rn.h lakes

a

discussion of judicial Hcxibility within
a Iramework ol

within disputes, subject to legalism’s
structuring power, where

most pronounced. Uewellyn and other

realists (e.g.,

Frank 1935; 1949) used

doctrine” to reler to practices like
“precedent” and “stare decisis,” overarching
concepts

which describe, and are

said to shape, judicial behavior in Ibrmalist
or traditional models.

Rules were used by Llewellyn and others

such as those

this project calls doctrinal,

and sense-making around cases

somewhat by suggesting
I

hese lules

may

to describe

specilic

knowledge

narrower abstractions applied

in particular areas

to the

structures,

processing

of law. This distinction can be llattened

that doctrine exists as a subset of a general
class

ol'

legal rules.

include signilicant abstractions or practices like
precedent or specific

constiucLs like the

strict

scrutiny balancing test or

iLs

scholais, lather than discounting the signilicance ol
absti actions

more

compelling interest component, d’hese
all

such

rules,

suggested these

provided screens, that lormal constructs and practices were structures
through

which

politics

which

that legitimation occurs,

and ideology were made legitimate and

active.

Llewellyn turned his energies

The case system
to

is

the data in

making sense of those

objects.

1 For a

Congress

more

delailed history of compelling inieresls in Free Exercise, and

to contravene die tSmidi decision, see Chapter 3.

1
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iJie

subsequeni elTorts of

Llewellyn’s discussion of the
case system (Llewellyn.
1930:25-69, focuses on Ute
pracuces of maktng sense
of the language of
appellate optnions.

and how

assessment of

the tesulhug law.

m order to grasp the meaning of a case

knowledgeably (Llewellyn. 1930:
41). and

to

do

that the reader

the words, not s.mply
adhere to an emp.rically
pos.tive

Contextual knowledge for
Llewellyn,
interrelationships, “the life of

words

is

to

make

you must read

must contextually know

knowledge of

their

mean.ng

an understand.ug based on
word use and

is in the

using of them,

in the wide network
of their
long a.ssoc,ations” (Llewellyn.
1930: 41). Certainly some
associations are positivist, .sign

Signifier relationsh.ps,
established through traditions
of use.

It is

some of these.

assocattons, across a body of free
exercise case law. that are
explored with InQuery,

probe

their actual use,

beyond those already

and perhaps tease out some
meaningful relationships

attributed to

-

for that

to

body

it .9

Socio-legal study of law and language
(Conley and O'Barr, 1990; White,
1990;
Fish, 1980; Constable,
1998) has largely focused on the

structures particular understandings
and contexts,

how

It is

applied and

made meaningful

grammars, and concepts

is

manner

how law

is

in

which

interpreted,

legal language

and ultimately

through social action. The role of words.

important in that work, with concepts being
central to InQuery’s

use here. Concepts are generally described
as ideas and notions meaningfully
associated
with particular authoritative acts and
proclamations of actors like judges, referred

words or

with

strings thereof (White, 1990: Ch.
2; Brigham, 1978: 9; Pitkin, 1972: 60-65).

JB White's work (White, 1990: 25-31)
term

to

concepts

critically

examines the

traditional use of the

and puts forth a more use or practice oriented view. White
takes on

the

notion that concepts are fixed packages of meaning for
universal, or even domain specific.

8 The use of Uie term “contextual knowledge” is variable,
Uiat is, it has several proffered meanings
depending uprm one’s definition and scope of context. For the particular
discussion of Llewellyn’s tiie
context was not only a textual one, but also a larger socio-institutional
one.

^Such

would largely be tlie product of knowledge experts
and appellate court behavior / pnxluct.

attribution

constitutional law
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in specific areas of

arc no. words;

.cy

are ,he inccrna, or
.„.oncc.ua, phcnonrcna
,ha,

words arc hough, ,o
labC. as markers, or rewards
wh.ch words arc .hough.
.0 poin,’’ (WhUc.
,9d0; 29) This
returns us .0 old pos.tivis.
„o.,„ns of language he
argues, suggesting ,hat
wtnds arc signs
,

Platonte .deals which ex.s,
only .0 he articulated
through the lall.hle eomexfs
of .eali.y
and human expression. White
posi.s instead that words
are all we have, and that
the
ttr

mcantng
contexts.

for tho,sc

No.

that

words

ts the

meantng

product of interprettve acfs by
tndivtduals situated

,s utterly

open

rather that eontexf, and
trad.tlon shape

,0 pol.ttcal

doma.ns of

argument, or force of rhetonc.
hut

sen,se

and

non.sen.se tn language,

concepts arc meanings associated
with those words and phricses

John Brigham’s Con stitutional

I

Bngham

and

in context.

.mg iKi g e (Brigham, 1978) was an

rclocusing scholarly attention
on the institutional language
practices which

meaningful.

,n social

early clTori at

make law

studied concepts which were
the product of a specific
language for

constitutional discourse in the

Supreme Court. That language

is

defined by the grammars

and subsequent word use practices
which shape notions of reasonable and
unreasonable

in

constitutional utterances. Perhaps
relationships between concepts, or
words in context or
practice, within a doctrinal space
or legal discourse could be explored
for their role in

providing domains of the sensible for the
texts of appellate decisions.

Hanah

Pitkin, in her writing

appropriated the work of Paul Ziff

on Wittgenstein and Justice

importantly, words

(Ziff,

become meaningful

I960) to explore the

in law,

shape. Like White, Zitl argued that words

some
Use

positivist or empiricist notion that
is

a broad notion,

it

and ultimately

(Pitkin, 1972),

way

how law

become meaningful by

words

language, and more
itself

then takes

their use, rather than

arc fixed signifiers for static meanings.

could be the use of words

in dialog, in

commentary,

in

Vcuiable social contexts, in the petitions and claims ot
interest groups existing in those

contexts, or lor this project, in the production and presentation
of case opinions of the

highest federal appellate courts.
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n,ean,„g

i

wou, nse
..s

r.ncicr ihc

.Icicrnnnec,

w„,Us or phrases

o,

depends on -,he

,i>,,hin

se, o,

on

ZilT, ,972:

,n

I

Pi,hn, a,gnes ihai Ihe

oiher words lha, can
also no,rnany occur

InQucry presen, s

).

,ools

,s,

-nreaning

language, .he hngu.shc
environ, neni

i

exp,essions.” and -ihe se, o,
exp,essions

H

r,po„ ,heir posi.ion
in a pai.ern

consiiiniive unrhrcila o,
language and granrn.ars,
iha,

hy ihe word’s disinhniion

Winch u .x,cn,s”

hepenhc,

is

winch

,n

,,

meaning

,n ,,s

posnion

nonnaliy occurs"

and pracices w,,h winch

,o

o, a

n,

wo.d

in du-sr-

(l>,,hn,

iOVZ-

explore wo,d use. and ,he

P, .Herns and associahons wi,h
„,her expicssions. While
allrihuiions ol meaning a,e
no,
,c,,lly

sough,

P..H ol Ihe

wi,li

InQueiy, lecognizing

,lia,

word use

relahonsliips aie only a small

derivahon and suslaining oh
meaning lor cases,

associahons uncovered

w„h

i,

may

,son,e ol ihe

pahems and

he u.selul lo underslanding
ea.ses and docl,ine's

assigned meaning.

L^OcCHrrciKT

l^•r.<n^cncv

Mos, compu,er inlormahon
ami .elrieval

and

liguies.

dchnnied

ol

documems,

lex, dociimcnis, wilh each

#IX)C. HOI

)

dislingiiished

Ihc sysicm has a I'obusl

perloi-med.

syslems a,e designed

ohjeCs consis.ing of

lo

manage

Ihe

The key

is

mechanism

lisi

immediaie ncighhors

lo idenliry dial

documems when

Ihc indexing .scheme which provides
acec.ss lo
Icxi

Lexis

/

alphanumeric shings

lo

in

docnmcnl

of ohiecls, a slack, a pile even, so long as
useriiueries aie

documems.

Ncxis or prohahilislic inrcrcnce InOnery

heal Ihc dociimcnis as iclalivcly iinslmcliircd colleclions
.seen as

iis

ol

#IX)CI!HGIN, #IX)CKND). Slorage

lor localing relcvanl

liili

slomge

Idr-ms of alpha numeric lex,

by a lew conirol characlers

he ralher simple, a

hiloimalion rehieval .syslems like

simply be

all

documeni concalenaled wiih

lor indexing and .scparalion (o.g.

documems can

ol Ihe ,-aw

.elrieval

Ihe dala

r» -Ocf„rreno..

nri

P,'edominanlly d.ese syslems Irea,
ilocumen, colleclions as sheams

no special oider, only
(e.g,

ji

ol lexi objccls.

he indexed univcrsaliy, as

|hcsc ohiecls may

in Ixjxis /

Nexis, or

they

may

be parsed for parts of
speech (e.g„ noun, verb,
nounphrase, term,

wtil help structure the
tndexing

and search

/ retrieval
proce,sses in

InQuery employs a sophi.sucated
tndexing .scheme wh.ch

systems

distills

etc.)

which

like InQuery.

information

rcpre,senu,t.ons

from documenus based on
the conceptual content
of each document. The,se
sysutms tdenttfy parks of speech
in a document to

make

cmtent of that document.
less

Tlrere are

some

parts of speech tn textual
di.scour.se

important to the tnformation
content of the documenus

eour.se

on the domain of

speech

known

document

as nounphra,ses are

collection,

in

most

in

domain

significant to

Scholarship

in

specific collections that
parts of

conveying the information content
of

and as a precondition, of each
document

Nounphra,ses are con.sidorcd coneepUsH

wh.ch are

a eolleciton, depending of

that duscourse (e.g.. law.
business, medicine).

inlormalion retrieval suggests
however that

a

asse.ssmenus about the tnlormatton

in this .scholarship,

in that collection.i.

and are constituted by either

single nouns or a string of
nouns, often connected by other
parts of speech. InQueiy
identifies

document

and

utilizes nounphra,ses to index

dtxument

collections,

and support enhanced

retrieval.

Collections of related documents
inevitably will have phrases which
occur more
Ircqucntly than others, in fact most
phrases appear only once. While those
appearing once
are certainly meaningful to the
information content of the

significant than tho,se

document

collection, they arc less

most frequently occurring. Highly occurring
phrases emphasize

concepts repeatedly, their use signifies importance,
weighted for readers and future writers
alike.

The conceptual content

h) See (Croft

the

ol the collection is a function of both the
use

and patterns of

tuid Turtle, 1991).

II Nounphrases are
considered Uic key concepts in a dtxunient collection, indieaUng or
conveying
informauon content of tiiat collection Uirougli tiie most highly occurring

empiricist notion ol

nounphrases. This rests on an

meaning to a degree, but is also linked to a use oriented derivation of
metuiing. Yes,
nounphrases, or concepts, have meaning unto tliemselves, for widiout
such meaningful ataibutes ifiey
would be unintelligible out ol some interpretive context. Simply, words
have to have some base elemeiiLs
ol meaning on tlieir own, tfiey may chtmge radically
depending uixm tlie context of use and interpreuuion,
but there must be some positive or empirical clement of meaning
to each word. That said, Uie relationships
between words is tlic key context for line tuning and shaping meaning.

these phrases, as well
as an empirically posh.ve

elemem

trad,..ons of char phrase’s
use ,n a vaneiy of contexts.

so

common

of meaning which

Some

derived Iron,

of these phrases however
are

as to essentially undercut
thetr contrihuuon to
collection meaning. For
instance

the nounphrases “court,”
and “law” in this project’s
collection
to render

,s

would so

t.-e,uently iKctir as

them somewhat meaningless.
Comparisons of concept ix-currence
frequences

between the subdivisions of die
document collection
state’s interest prevailed,

(i.e.,

compelling interest cases where

and those where individual
claims triumphed)

the correlation of doctrine
to distinctions

Occurrence frequencies
collections, that picture can be

pre.sent

may

.shed light

between them.

one picture of the conceptual
content of document

expanded with

the production of co-occurrence
statistics.

Co-occurrences, or collocation,s.ir are
relationships amongst terms and
phrases

document collection. The
and/or phrases

in

relationships are defined by the
occurrence of

close proximity

(i.e.

on

within

same paragraph

happens the greater the co-occurrence
frequency

in a

two or more lemis

typically), the

more often

it

value. Socio-linguists began
paying

attention to co-occurrences or pragmatic
associations (Bowers, 1989: 50; Firth,
1957: 194 5) because they suspected that
their associations
the, “habitual,

This

is

meaning of words and phrases was

partially a function of

through use. Associational meaning of
terms and phrases

is

derived from

and therefore expected, contiguity with other
objects” (Bowers, 1989:

from meaning which

distinct

situates the object in a socio-cultural

50).

domain of

contextual and interpretive variables, as well as empiricist
or positive meanings.

Associational meaning represents a narrow
actual combination of

slice,

words over quite short

it is

“a measure of expectation in the

stretches

-

phrases, sentences, and contiguous

sentences” (Bowers, 1989: 75). Co-occurrences show the lexical environment
of a
the patterns in

12 See

which terms and phrases occur

(FirtJi,

in

proximity to each other. Co-occurrence

1957: chapter 15) discussion about "modes of meaning" for
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text,

texts.

stat.sl.cs represent
syntactical relations, the
intermingling

“chains" of significalion
(Lacan
1977; de Saussure.1966),
deployed and recas, for
assigning and proffering
meaning.

Information Retrieval

a nd

Information retneval systems
take on a simple

supply a query language and
interface for users

to

those queries as effectively
as possible. That task
variability in data objects,
different

repre,sentations for data objects
retrieval

task, store data obiecfs

make

may

alike,

meaningfully

requests of Uie system, and
satisfy

be straightforward, but due

means of access, and

and quenes

InOnpry

distinct

to

knowledge

implementing an effective infonnation

system can be challenging.

InQuery

is

an information retrieval system
based on the probabilistic inference

network (Turtle, 1995). That

is,

InQuery

satisfies queries

by returning documents which

arc inferred to be probably
relevant to a user's query. InQuery
implements a probability

ranking system in order to weight
documents relative to queries.

estimates the probability

of relevance of a text to the query,
on the basis
0 the smtistical distnbution of terms
in relevant and non-relevant
text given an
uncertainty associated with the
representation of both the source text tmd
the
relationship between them. (Zelezn.kow
and Hunter,

SrIsT"

“

Relationships are inferred between documents
in a database and user quenes by
comparing
the inlomiation representations of

the

more

the inference,

i.e.

similar the information representations, the
higher the relevancy ranking for a

document, and the more

Relevancy

is

likely

“profile” or

it is

to be

on point

for that particular query.

based on textual characteristics of the query and document. The
terms

and phrases of the query, and

IS

documents and queries. The stronger

their

most highly associated phrases,

knowledge representation of a

compared with those of documents

are used to create a

user’s information request. That representation

in the collection.

A query can only be satisfied

documents possessing evidence or data which produce an information
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representation

by

similar u> the query’s
inlormalion rcprescmalion.
Evidence
slalislical represenlations

of occurrences and associations

ntrease the relevancy ol
dtK'umenUs retrieved

typically based

is

tif

on the

phrases within documents.
a query on a text collection

I'roni

achieve greater consonance
between query information
representation and document
information representation) InQtieiy
u.ses the InFinder
a,ssociational thesaurus
(i.c.

to

utility to

expand
user’s

the information representation
of the user’s query. Phrases and
terms front the

query are directly

documenLs

that also

utilized to find

documents having high occurrences of
them, hut

have high occurrences of phrases which
have been found

to

co-occur

signilicantly with those in the query
are often relevant to the user’s
informaUon need.

Since

IS

It

the product of the thesaurus
building which provides access to the
occurrence

and co-occurrence frequency
InQucry’s retrieval

ol'

statistics the

following will focus on InFinder, rather than

documents.

InFinder constructs a thesaurus by going
through every document sentence by
sentence, recognizing phrases
taggcrs.i3

InFinder then inserts the phrases and terms

term idcntilicrs
sentences

concepts) and terms using parts of speech
recognition

(i.c.,

is

in a table

in

a dictionary, storing phrase and

with their occurrence frequencies

processed, or generally

when

until a certain

a paragraph limit

InFindei produces pairwise associations between

all

is

number of

encountered. At this

phrases and terms within that text

window, determining co-occurrence frequencies by multiplying
frequencies
combination
then

ol phrase

summed

limit,

for each

and term. The co-occurrence frequencies for each combination

is

over the entire collection (Jing and Croft, 1994). The highest association

Ircquencics arc icprcscntcd in the thesaurus as the relationships between
given terms and

phrases and phrases which have high co-occurrences with them.

The thesaurus
each entry has a

1

patterns ol

list

is

a

list

ol all terms

use.

in the

document

collection,

ol associated phrases, in order of decreasing co-occuiTcncc frequency.

3 Taggers are applications

word

and phrases occurring

PtirLs

of speech

which use templates which model
(i.e.

nounphrases, verbs,

tools.
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tlie

structure of sentences and the

etc.) are effectively identif ied using tliese

InQuery

utilizes the thesaurus
to

expaud a querys tnlomtation

profile by look.ng up, and
including in that profile,
phrases which are highly
associated with terms and
phrases in lliat
query. Documents returned
will match to greater
or lesser degree an infonnation
profile

devised from terms and phrases
from the original queiy and
their as,sociaied phrases Iron,
ihe thesaurus.

E.

1.

While InQuery poses
this project

was not so much

The Prorpcc

Designs for InQuery Analysis

great potential as a database and
search engine for law’s texts,
interested in the

document management and

retrieval

properties InQuery presented. Rather,
the process used to build InQuery's
thesaurus and
the statistics
text IS 01

which represent the actual term

immediate

interest.

/

phrase occurrences and as.sociations

in the

Occurrence frequency data shows those concepts
which arc

arguably most significant to a collection’s
information content

Some

of these highly

occurring concepts can be treated as nodes for
co-occurrence examination, as conceptual
centers around which other concepts orbit,
thus producing a picture of the lexical

environment with the greatest informational weight
(Hockey, 1980: 89-91). Cooccurrence

statistics for doctrinal

terms and phrases

(e.g.,

compelling, state interests,

overriding state interests, overriding government
interests) provide a representation of the

environment around key phrases, exposing the doctrinal markers most
conceptual neighbors, and the text which

and future writers

By

may have

significant

the greatest doctrinal impact on readers

alike.

dividing the collection into cases where compelling interests were sustained, and

those where state interests were found lacking in the face of individual claims, and then

developing occurrence and co-occurrence frequency
hypothesized that those

statistics

statistics for

each group,

could help expose doctrine’s coherency,

it

was

i.e., its

correlation to those two groups. If doctrine really matters to the structure of cases in each
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collection there should
he

some disunctions

,n the

occun-ences and associattonul

relationshtps of key
concepts across the two
groups ol cases

compelltng

interests

was

where the doctnne of

said to exh.hit determ,
nafve inlluence.

Coherency was onginally

suggested as an .ndicator lor
the presence of textual
consistences, and distinctions,
wh.ch
m.ght lend weight to the notion
that compelling .nterests
were .denUliahle, or that there

was

a

domain of referents which indicated

The Center

made InQuery

moueoi and

the presence or ahsenee
of such interests.

for Intelligent Information
Retrieval at the University of
Mas,sachusetis

available for this project, and
supplied technical

ttsed lor the creation

and provide

of several data

/

Ncxis and West. The tagging of each
case was

files (see

below). CllR then built association
the,saun

acce.ss to occurrence frequency

CllR provided occurrence frequency

-statistics.

staff to help tailor

InFinder to satisfy the projeefs
needs. CllR was supplied with
the original

data Hies, the ca.ses collected via
Lexis

lor each

suppon

via an Internet interface,

tables for each data

and could be imported

To

to interactively a-sk

in

to

provide a

list,

a-ssociated phrases for a given term or
phra.se.

file,

they were acccs.scd

into a database or spreadsheet or

processing environment on a local platform.

InQuety

and co-occurrence asscKiation

word

explore co-occurrence frequencies one had

order of decreasing frequency, of

For instance, InQuery could be asked

to

provide the most highly associated phra-ses
to “compelling,” or “state interest”
or any

combinalion thereof.

The complete
the

two primary

CIIR

stall:

was

data set

was comprised of 186 case

sets investigated here.!-*

it

large

enough

to

Data

opinions, 108 of which constitute

set size presented

an immediate question

to

produce meaningful results? would the frequencies and

associations be telling in a sample this size? CIIR staff
raised concerns that there simply

would be too few documents
documents

14

to

wash out over

The dilfercnce of 78

for statistical significance, for the idiosyncrasies of individual

the expanse of a collection.

is

Uie total of

tlie

interests to legitimate peneological rationale (see

The

prison cases after

Chapter 3
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tlic

di.scussion).

larger the collection, the less

doctrinal shift,

from compelling

.mpaa any

,s.„g,e

.nord.nately
neces,sarily

how

d„cun,e„, would have, chus

u would have

skew

rclalivcly less

tt

number of words, and Judges

Ihe

lew

large

would

il-

is

not

you had a docun.m

lha,

in a large collection,

and would not

seemed

,so

much

cro,s,sed

the

any

extsted.

however when CIIR

are typically r,uite wordy.
This

text tor the collection
consisted
Di.s.senLs raised

large

in

one grttup of ca.ses.

concepLs and concept

a.s.sociattons that

e.g. those

where

that ntatters as

OK.

.scented

and

the di.sscnttng

i.ssues, ntost signtficantly

the pre.sence ol di.s.senting
opinions pollute the analysis
since

were placed

realised

not to say that only a

documenus

.some further data object

u aditionally considered
part of the “law" produced
by case.s?
that

is

the majttrtty opinion

ol'

.coaled a phnuso

number of docuntents

documents would work, but over
one hundred

Each case
opinion

weight

the results. This hurdle

large case opinions can
be.

,l

di.s.sents arc

Would

not

dissents ,n opinions

the state’s tnterest prevailed,
inject

ought not be tncluded with

that

of the majortty

opinion? InQuery does not distinguish
between pans of the data object, only
where data
objccLs begin and end, and the
textual contents therein. Thus,
di.s,seniing opinion text
treated the

same

as majority opinion language

occurrence frequency

statistics.

which was not simple given
11

ca.sy to cut this portion ol

was

production of occurrence and co-

decision had to be

made whether

that the intermediaiy daiaba.se

each

ca.se,

show cases where

likely that dissents

(i.e.

to edit

out

all di.s.seiiLs,

Folio Views) did not

and there were nearly 2 tX) cases. While each

selected on the basis of compelling
interests being

not purport to

was

A

in the

pan of

make
ca.se

the decisional mix, they did

those interests were the ratio exclusively.
Therefore

would address

is

a range ofissues in the majority opinion,

it

sometimes

tackling issues not explicitly presented in the
majority opinion, arguing instead for a

diamatically dillerent path ol reasoning and opinion.
In other instances, dissenting judges
will

only choose one piece

ol the majority

opinion to address, perhaps not even the

ratio.

Certainly, dissents were not always going to take on
application of the compelling interest
doctrine, thus

it

was decided

themselves out with

that dissents could be lelt alone, they

their variability.

would

effectively

wash

2.

To

InQuery Analysis

construct subsets for further
processing, and allow for
examination of

conceptual patterns and relationships
within logically distinct
groups of opinions, some

meta distinctions were applied

to the opinions via
tagging wiUt

some two

.state

condition

During scanning and verification
cases were tagged as either
a "win" or

fields.

corresponding
respectively.

to

cases where state interests
prevailed or were

Cases were also tagged

further divided

by a

distinction

if

tmmped by

individual claims

they were a prison case,
and those cases were

between those occurring before and

alter

1987 and the

doctrinal .sea change in free
exercise jurisprudence in prison
ca.ses (see Chapter

discussion of this change in free
exercise jurisprudence).

of interest, several were combined
to create 10 data
lo

CIIR

"lose."
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The tagging produced

files (see

Appendix C)

to

for

six suKsels

be provided

for InFinder association thesaurus
building.
In the onginal formulation of
Doctrine as

doctnnal coherency

in

and between several of these

based on InQuery's processing of

were present prevailing, and
over otlicial

interests.

Data the objective was

file 8,

file 9, all

That analysis

subsets.

representing

to see if there

The following

analysis

was

is

cases where compelling interests

all

those where free exercise claims were
successful

is

based on observation of patterns,

similarities,

and

distinctions in concept occurrence frequencies
and associations in each corpus. If there

was something

to the doctrine’s influence

knowledge and

interpretive traditions,

and

a.

their patterns

and

in

might show up

each

file,

at the level

beyond expert
of words and phrases

relationships.

Occurrence Frequencies

Appendix E displays
the

it

on the cases

a comparison ol the relative occurrence frequencies of

most highly occurring concepts

Irequency reports lor each

file,

in files 8

and

9.

some of

InQuery produced occurrence

they have been sorted in order of decreasing occurrence
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irccuency. and a reladve
frequency nreasure for
each concept was computed
hy d.viding
the concept occurrence
frequency for each hy the
occurrence frequency of the
ntos,

common

nounphrase. See Appendix

D for a representation of the two

baste occurrence
irequency reporfs, note that
the reports are cut off
well before the end, there
are far too
many concepts that occur infrequently
(i.e. predominantly
only once) and are less
significiint in this

torm of cincilysis.

After tdenltlytng stop words,
n„unphra,,es that are standard
identifiers hke
•s.ct„” or “fed,” highly
occurring concepts were
identified from each report
and
lor relative occurrence
frequency distinctions.

Those concepf, whose

Appendix

E.

Roughly

the first

I

(X)

concepts^

in the report for file

identified in the report for file
9, differences in relative occurrence
frequency

some of whtch were
was repeated

interesting

and are commented upon

in the reverse, findings are
also de,scribed in

Htghly occumng concepts

government

interests

(i.e. file

9)

in ca.ses

seem

cases where compelling interests exist

was much

larger,

rclahvtty measure
arc so

many more

mitigating

and there were nearly
is

2(I(X)

This

8 were

were noted,

Appendix E.

have a greater

(i.e. file 8).

files are

That comparative process

here.

where individual claims trumped

to generally

compared

relative occurrence

frequency values differed by more
than a few percentage points
across the two
Identified in

“u.s.,”

relative

ts partially

due

.state

or

weight than

in

to the fact that file 8

more concepts encountered,

therefore a

going to be watered down more significantly.
Conversely, since there

cases there should be more occurrences per concept
on average, thus

somewhat

the increased

number of overall

As

concepts.

a result, relative

occurrence Irequency distinctions of a few percentage
points should be treated as
interesting, but with less import that distinctions
of

There

is

5%

remarkable overlap between the two

concepts, there arc exceptions to be sure

15 Choosing hie

first

drops of considerably because

100 concepts
tlie

is

(e.g. the

or more.

files,

especially the highly occurring

concept “life”

probably overkill, alter Uie

far

first

relative occurrence frequency distinctions
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is

more common

50 or so

become

tlie

in

significance

negligible.

cusc,s

where smie

collcclion's

intereste

mast

were Irunrped), bur generally
Urere

sign.ficanl coneepis.

occuntng concepts
mcluded. Phra,sas

may

still

In the set

ts

some cohereney

rigged, ihal

be ot

m

their

.some highly

and detent, ine whether the

ca.se

tKCunence frequences and
co-occumence

of ca.ses where compelling
inleresLs did not
.set

s.xe
-

and

exi.st

patte. ns across

relat.v.ty issue d.,scus.sed

child,” “education.”

there are .some

above notw.thstandmg.

and “ordinances” indicate

municipal, and stale policy are
less likely to represent a
compelling

intere.st,

that hKal,

especially

the tree exerci.se “rights” of
parents to educate children are
concerned. Since

the successlul tree exercise
challenges were in the
ol “bencfiLs”

ought

interest.

phra.ses, ”city,” “children

when

is.

,o Ihe

lihe -free exerci.se” or
“religton” or -.merest” are
expected to h.ghly

tnterestmg results, the data

The

of that

are -search terms”
used to scan

occur, though distincttons
the tiles

Some

i,s

.seemed interesting. Might

it

unemployment

be expected

many of

benefits area, Ihe notion

that "benelifs"

occur differently

across the files? However, "benefits"
had essentially the same occurrence
frequency in

each hie. There were certainly cases
imeresLs prevailed, thus
di.scursively.

The

it is

in the area

likely that the

two

other interesting distinction

of unemployment benefits where the

states’

sets essentially canceled each other
out

is

perhaps more representative of an

ideological quality to the writings of judges
in those cases where individual
rights

triumphed over

more prominent

state interests.

The phrases

“beliefs,” “rights,” “freedom,”

in those cases, indicating that opinion
writers

and

“life”

were employing a

were

rhetorical

arsenal designed to influence interpretation by
readers. Judges relied on ideologically

powerlul concepts, providing strong rationales for defeating
sending signals to future challengers about

how

state interests,

to constitute their

own

and likely

fights.

Finally, the

occurrence ot “god” was quite humorous, again arguably serving a rhetorical
purpose,

god

is

more present

in the cases

where individuals

that

are victorious over the secular state.

Since the data set where state or government interests were compelling and thus
prevailed

was considerably

larger than

its

counterpart, and since compelling interest have
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been lound
there

file

to exist in all aaeas

seemed

of relevant pol.cy, save of
eourse for expl.c.t d.scnntination,

to be less of note in file
8. Subjeet area
distinctions

9 were not so

in its counterpart,

seemed dominant. The

“united states,” “congress,” “statute,”
and “purposes”

more

likely to be

in

save for one noticeable pattern.
The language of

authority, ot federal authority
espeeially,

authoritative policy prevailed there

which seemed evident

was

all

seem

“government,”

to indicate that

where

a predisposition to federal law,
that interests were

found compelling when emanating
from

relatively high occutrence frequency
of

phra.ses

the.se sources.

“exemption” may indicate

that

In addition, the

judges are being

rhetortcally active, attempting to
paint claims for free exerci.se as
exceptions, as contrary to

the default, as seeking special
treatment

Co-Occurrence

b.

Associafinnv;

The production of co-occurrence
two

from the norm, as deviant.

associations to explore the influence of doctnne
on

sets of related cases is experimental,
representing a

appellate case opinions.

preeminent

in assigning

It is

new way

clear that interpretive traditions of

to

view

texts of federal

knowledge experts

are

and ascertaining the meaning of case opinions, however
the

still

texts

themselves, the words of decisions, the patterns of
phrase use and associations have
significance to those traditions. Without the texts, their

communities can

toil.

Case readers are faced with

text

nothing upon which those

made meaningful

ways. As they encounter highly occurring phrases and
associated, or incorporated, with expert supplied

is

in a variety

of

their neighbors, patterns are

knowledge about those

cases, and

perhaps structure the production of future opinions.

i.

Co-Occurrence Nodes

-

Highly Occurring Concepts

The highly occurring concepts

identified

by InFinder for the two primary

be treated as nodes, as conceptual points around which other nounphrases orbit
degrees.

From

files

to

varying

the top twenty most frequently occurring concepts returned for each
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can

file

several phrases were selected
for eontpanson:
-reltgion, .nterest,"
..xerctse," and
behef.
Each was h.ghly occumng
,n both files and
ts

significant to the doctnnal
profile,
or intoiraation representation,
originally protTered.
These phrases are significant
components of contpelltng interest
discussions, they are
tnd.cators. thus it seemed
useltd to
evaluate the lex.cal environments
tor each tn the two
files.

Distinct, ons and similant.es
,n
co-occurrences between the two
^luups
srouns of
easps tested here
Ua
ot cases
are noted and examined for
thctr possible roles is
sustaining, or

Co-,x;currence
Phra,ses

there are

more

It

doctnnal or discursive coherency

more co-(«currence

interesting.

-search phrase,
ol

produced for the given concepts
from each

which commonly co-tKcur with
a given phrase across

may show

they

statistics are

undercultmg, dtKtrinal coherency.

in a

two

general sense.

distinctions than s.m.lanties

tiles,

files are identified as

As expected however

between the

Co-occurrence distinctions between
the two

may

the

file.

files,

and these arc

relaUve to a single

signify a correlation to doctrine
and thus potential coherency, or a form

nevertheless. This

is

speculative however, at best trends

may

be identified which

approximate rough correlations between
phrase co-occurrence distinctions
and doctrine’s
argued presence. In addition, there are
bound to be

which are idiosyncratic,
a phrase

which

is

that

is,

the product of

only really relevant

counting and associating

is

distinct phrase associations for

wordy judges

panicular cases,

in

to that particular case, but that

performed.

Some

each

who

set

repeat

weighs heavily when

of those idiosyncrasies will likely also be

indicators of the substantive areas dealt with
in each set of cases, the line between
those

which are

really only central to

one or a couple cases and those which are more general

dillicult to ascertain without referring

back

to the original cases.

is

Other phrases which are

highly co-occurring are simply fortuitous stowaways,
and are obviously not meaningful to
the contextual

meaning of

the textual environment

(i.e.

like the

word “while” co-occurring

with “exercise”).

Each subject phrase

is treated

as a conceptual node with a

number of related

(co-

occurring) phrases, they are listed below sorted by decreasing co-occurrence
frequency.
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Co-occumng
will

appear

phrases, wh.ch are unique
to that particular

file

lue underlined.

Commcnls

to the

nght ol each associated
phrase as appropriate. The
tollowing presents
the top phrase
co-occurrences for "religion,"
"interest," "exercise," and
"beliel" IVom those
cases where state interest
was compelling and prevailed,
and Utose where individual
claims
trumped those interests:

ii.

Co-Occurrence Nodes

In addition to those

-

User Defined

concepts supplied by InFinder
as highly occuning, and Ihus

significant to the content of ihe
collection, the key textual

components of the doctnne were

posed as co-occurrence nodes.
InFinder was queried to provide
highly co-occurring
phrases tor

compelling,” and “state interest”
from

The important
overlap, that

The

textual

is,

seems

is

that for

mcoherency

if

Or

and

9.

each supplied query there

is

remarkable

to be little distinction in
co-occurrences across the

environment for doctrinal phrases

interests existed

doctrine?

there

finding here

files 8

and those where they did

is

not.

two

files.

nearly identical in cases where compelling

Does

this then

imply an inherent

there are no real distinctions across
the files subject to compelling interest

rather, is the doctrine coherent,

occurs elsewhere

(i.e.

and the determinative element of the cases

away from compelling

interest talk) in the decision?

The answer

lies

between, the findings cannot sustain either
conclusion, especially since the whole notion of
coherency, and doctrine's essential identity, has
been problematized
project.

Nevertheless, there

is

some coherency

to

at

each step of

this

be sure, readers of compelling interest

and tree exercise cases will encounter certain highly occurring,
and otherwise important,
phrases and their most

common

neighbors repeatedly,

this is likely to

orderliness in the data being interpreted and consumed.

Some

produce a sense of

of that orderliness will likely

then accrue to the relationship between doctrine and those cases. The
goal however
largely to expose the co-occurrences for further discussion and
research. Appendix

contains a

list

ol the

most highly co-occurring phrases with the core
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is

G

doctrinal terms and

phrases
lile

(i.e.

compelling and

sia.e .merest).

Note

that co-oecurring
phrases unic,t,e to

m Appendix G, there are not many of them

are underlined

at

automated Lexis

.

Concliisinn

F.

The attempt

howevei

each

/

Nexis searches, and then ,he
painstaking ease by

case examination using West’s
products, showed that the
unstructured nature of case
opinion texts and the complexity
of legal language and reasoning,
make it d, ITict.lt

to

categonze some cases as repre,sentative
of a particular doctrine. The
meaning of cases and
their language are contextually
constituted by individual readers,
there are
of counse

domains, or communities, of interpretation
structured by things

grammars (Brigham, 1978) and

other expert or authoritative driven
traditions of

understanding and discourse (White,
1990;

Case opinions arc complex data
partially constitutive of the

like constitutional

S. Fish, 1980).

objects, thus

meaning of those objects

knowledge

structures

which

arc

are likely tied to both the symbolic

elements ol those objects as well as interpretive
communities around them, sustaining
them.

A

document

collection of doctor’s notes on asthma
(See Chapter 1)

is

not so

mtcrprctively wedded, the data objects are
far simpler, thus knowledge derived
from textual
relationships across

InQuery described
they

felt

would

them

is likely less

m Chapter

correlate to

1,

tenuous. Recalling the asthma study and the use
of

doctors were asked to provide key search terms which

asthma attacks and exacerbations. Given

doctor’s notes, as compared to case opinions,

it is

documenks containing those search terms and

the

the simplicity of

relatively straightforward to capture the

documents which are

related to those

terms through high co-occurrence frequencies. Case opinions are
far different, the

occurrence ol key terms which
occurrences which arc
that

may

in dicta, or in a dissent.

InQuery provided the chance

but that

is

signily a doctrinal discussion can be easily

to

examine

mixed with

We tried to look beyond this by suggesting

the text of a discourse, a doctrinal discourse,

a knowledgeable attribution by a researcher, and
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is

not necessarily represented

in

.he

documents e.fecuvely. Simply,
doctors’ notes are one

thing, case op.n.ons are
tiu.te

clearly another.
Is there

the text of

coherency

to

compell.ng

tnterest doctrine? If so.

an opinton, or collection of
them wtth tools

Ihis project, in

undercut the

like

can

,t

be ascertained

iron,

InQucry? The experiences of

conjunction with existing views
on doctrine and appellate cases,
seem to

while the prior

latter,

is

shown

to

communities as with cases themselves.
While
collected in such a
certain phrases),

way

was

be as

beyond

amount of coherency

that,

Aside from search terms and stop
words there

a eonditton of tntcrpretive

the data set of cases for this
project

as to front load a certain

there anything

much

is

(i.e„ the

was

presence of

or which correlated to their presence?

a remarkable amount of overlap

in

occurrence frequencies of the most
significant phrases between the
primary two sets of
cases examined.

Some

there are likely other

Repeated

of

this is

common

undoubtedly related

which cause

features

to

compelling interests doctrine, hut

certain concepLs to appear readily.

fact paliems, especially with
respect to the types of issues being
coniestcd, or the

policies being challenged

may

also be concept magnets, causing the
overlap witnessed.

Separating these parts of cases, or attributes
represented therein,
since case

meaning

is

a lunction of

all

is

probably not useful,

of those things and the interpretive community

giving them ultimate social (and specialized)
meaning. The relationship between

compelling interests

in free exercise

law

is

going

to

be connected to certain kinds of cases,

dealing with most likely a relatively fixed, or incrementally
changing, domain of subject
areas.

There were also distinctions

in

occurrence frequencies, and some co-occurrence

frequencies, for particular significant doctrinal phrases in each of the
examined

files.

Distinctions also correlate to doctrine’s presence. Doctrine's causality cannot
be sustained

on

this alone, but

it

represents yet

more

correlation and thus arguments about causation and

coherency can be furthered. InQuery unfortunately did not

what was already known about compelling

interests, there

really

uncover much beyond

were some

interesting

occuTence frequency distrncons

that

seemed

to soltdify understandings,
bu, unlike the

doctors and the asthma study
there seems to be only
mcrcmenuti knowledge derivation,

conlined for instance to
occurrence frequency distinctions
for phrases ‘•freedom”
or

“exemptions” which

What
do InQuery’s

may

give insight into the rhetorical
directions of opinion writers.

then can be gleaned from the
InQuery examination of these
case texts?

of cases and doctnne and the
ways they become meaningful?

been preceded by Uie experiences
and findings from

and Lexis

/

What

practices for organization and
accessing data objects lend to
understandings

Nexis

to define

utilizing

If the u,se

of InQueo^ hud no,

West’s digest and reporters

and collect a doctrinal case collection,
then InQuery would have

uncovered similar concerns via

its

treatment and organization of the
data objects. Case

opinions are complicated data
objects, with contested meanings
produced through complex
inlerpretive functions performed
interested parties. Since
I

by

legal

knowledge

InQuery does not incorporate the more

unction, and only really deals with
the text as

knowledge expens are

experts, as well as a raft of other

appears,

it

to understandings of cases.

it

interpretive aspecus of that

shows just how

InQuery shows

01 a lot of text that could be dicta or
ratio, but the only

way

to

know

significant

that cases are

is

made up

through knowledge

experts. Doctrinal search terms might
just have likely occurred in dicta as not.
InQuery

cannot distinguish between.

shows

that phrases

What of doctrine

which believed

in

which

pan of those understandings? InQuery

to be central to a particular doctrine are
associated with a

range of other concepts, some of which

domain

as

may

help shape understandings of the basic

that doctrine works, but just as

many,

if

not

more of them, show

the

idiosyncratic nature of case opinion writers.

And what

of access to cases? Essentially InQuery was cut off before

used tor document

retrieval, as this investigation

was

it

could be

largely interested in the tools InQuery

uses to help retrieve documents most effectively. Indexing

is

predicated on the creation of

occurrence and co-occurrence frequency data, those practices only reaffirmed notions
doctrine, while textually present to varying degrees,
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is

as yet indeterminate in

its

that

influence

those ohjcus. In short,

if

coherency lor such a knowledge
structure as dwtrine

sought, Ure lens applied
must he wider Uran

must

fiK-us

ba,ses,

how

case.s,

i,

must include cases for sure,
bu,

on the manner they are
incorporated and proffered
their

is

in particular

i,

knowledge
meanings are arranged, and
whether those meanings become
real in (he

realm ot judges and other
social actors.

CHAPTER

VIII

doctrine, data, discourse
A. IntrodllPfinn

Docmne

has been treated throughout

this project as

both a clump, or a coliccuon of

data objects, as well as a logic,
where parameters of practice and
intetprcmtion arc

estahhshed. This chapter concludes
that treatment by situating
the use of doctrine as data,
both as clump and logic, wiihm
traditions of scholarship around
courts and law, and then
in

an examination of several of
law’s information machines.
Realist and formalist public law
and .socio-legal scholarship have
divergent notions

of doctrine,

this project

attempted to strike a middle ground.

that doctrine structures basic
case

A formalist framework posits

management and commentary

techniques, and that

important to

how judges

reason, decide, and write case opinions
(Carter, 1994;

Levi, 1949).

Doctnne

Data shied from such determinism,
acknowledging

reahstsi

as

were convincing when they suggested doctrine
could be

outcomes, and

that other factors in case disposition

identiliable within lormal constructs like
precedent

The lollowmg explores

fitted to

it

is

that the

a variety of

and rationalization which arc not readily
and doctrine are

scholars' use of doctrine as a

likely significant.

knowledge

structure

which

helps provide sense to Judicial decision making
and opinion crafting,2as well as one
subject to the constitutive influences of practices
of legal information

manipulation.3 Doctrine

^

is traditionally

management and

expressed relative to judicial opinions, thus opening

See K.N. Llewellyn (Llewellyn, 1960) for prototypical

realist

statement

9

Doctrine, viewed discursively, helps shape a range of institutional
actions, standards, legitimate
motions and phrases which constitute a domain of possible outcomes. This is
basically Smitli’s discursive
tlieory

of doctrine, see Smitli (1994).

Conceptualizations of legal forms have socially constitutive inlluences, shaping beliefs,
and ultimately behavior pursuant to all tliose tilings (Brigham, 1996). Brigham
also suggests tliat texts, e.g. opinions sustaining tilings like constitutional doctrine?,
can be examined
relation.ships, expectations,

constitutively by studying

tlie

practices which

make

tliose texts

meaningful

to scholars, judges, otliers.

a space for irealing federal
appellate case texts as data
manifesting doctnne.4 Legttl
scholarship, as well as dcKlrinal
and behavioral public law
pohtical science, use ihat data,
and doctrine, tn dtst.net ways.
This project lakes from all of
them, and ulttmately relies on

work of sociolegal scholars who

are renewing attention to
law's inslt.uitonal product

(i.c.

opinions) and practices making
them meaningful in a variety of
social contexts.
Professional and intellectual traditions
as well as information machines
and practices

represent several such contexts and
have been the subject of this
project's analytical
attention.

^
1.

Doctrine in the Primary Tradition, of AnaiycSc

Understandings of Doctrine and Texts

Scholars with formal and skepticaP
understandings of doctrine exalt and dismiss

it

respectively. Doctrinal political science
and legal scholarship attribute a logical
consistency
to doctrinal tormulations, as part
of the regular practices of applying rule
to fact,

determinative of case outcome, as well as
shaping the

way

and as

scholars understand and

organize cases. Realist inspired criticisms of
the fluid reasoning used to

fit

cases to pre-

existing categories, as well as the lack of
attention to contradictions or weaknesses in
doctrinal readings of case opinions, cuts
against such detemiinism.
is

To

the critics doctrine

considered largely indeterminate, viewed as rhetorical,
legitimating, or

at worst,

obfuscating of the real influences in case disposition.

The

realists and more recent discourse theorists share a
skepticism about the textual
determinism urged by formalists, but the realists' reductionist tendency to
discount
almost entirely the role of ideas, logic, and language in shaping law blunted the
cntical edge of their work. The realist attempt to simply replace textual
determinism

^

For an elaboration see (Berring, 1987: 36), "tlie doctrines of tlie law arc built from findable
pieces of hard data that traditionally have been expressed in tlie form of published judicial decisions.
The
point of tlie search is to locate tlie nugget of autliority tliat is out tliere and use it in constructing
one's

argument" Berring

(

1994; 45).

^ This formulation of different views of doctrine in scholar.ship

is tliat

of Smitli (Smitli, 1994).

Jc.crm,nisn, allced

,l,e

,„
From formalism comes
ntanagemen, and commenta^

deede, and write opinions.

this

sense lhat docirinc structures
very basic case

techniejues,

and

that

imporlan, to

,t is

Reali.sis sugge.sted doctrine

could he

outcomes (Llewellyn, 1931) as
a construct which, while
organizational and pedagogical
purpo.scs,

is

clearly

how

judges reason,

fitled to a variety

of

employed post hoc

also in part a delimiting force

for

on what judges

do

in the first place.

iLs

application, or attribution, to
tho.se opinions by practitioners,
information managers and

Doctrine unfolds through the
articulation of opinion writers,
as well as

scholars.

2.

Doctrinal Scholarship

-

A Shared

Tradition

Doctrinal study in political science
follows the model of formalist legal
scholarship

and

Its

attention to precedent, reasoning,
and structures like dicta, ratio decidendi,
and

docirinc:

understanding doctrine involves extracting a cimccl
slalcmcnt or lormula Irom the cases and then
working out the logical
consequences ol that lormula lor concrete controversies.
II' docirinc is understood
in icims ol Its logical consequences,
moreover, it presumably should be evaluated in
similai terms This approach to docirinc roughly
describes the bulk ol' conventional
constitutional scholarship. (Smith, 1994: 527)
,n,lalin.“i'
Urinal

In this

view docirinc

lacililalcs resolution ol particular controversies in
a logical, if

abstracted, way. Clearly this tradition considers judicial
opinions rcricclivc of the act
judicial decision

making and representing

ol'

legal authority, opinions arc data for

investigations ol both. Political science has been interested in reasoning
expressed in

opinions because that

is

where judicial

politics lay

exposed (Carter, 1994:

3).

Doctrinal

scholarship focuses on particular phrases which signify a decision making formula, or
least

shape opinion cralting or categorization

practices.

at

Doctrinal scholarship adopts an

analytical

framework relying on dividing

categories.

areas

m

the

The most

dre corpus of appellate
cases into meaningful

likely candidates for
analysis in public

domain of constitutional

law. For

works

law polihcal science are those

exam.ne a

that

particular case, or

sequence of cases, which
demonstrate doctrinal development
or devolution

see: Shapiro,

1985; Levinson, 1985; Schuck
and Smith. 1985; Alfange,
1983; Bmion, 1983; Downs,
1985. This scholarship strives
to unlock those processes,
examining how reasoning and

precedent are managed and presented,
and often what the appropnate
doctrinal path ought
to

have been.^
Doclnnal analysis

treats constitutional doctrine
as

inieirelaled judicial practices

which provide

doctrinal phrases are explicitly
used

an abstraction for a collection of

structure to the

by judges

meaning of cases. Sometimes

in opinions, especially

raised articulating a particular
doctrine. In this style of analysis
greatest inlluence in the aulhoriialive
indexing of cases and the

when a claim

is

however doctrine has

its

commentary propagating

notions like doctrinal traditions,
depanures, and coherence. "Clear and Present
Danger,"

"Separate but Equal," "Intra Military Immunity,"
"Sovereign Immunity," "Plain View,"
Collateral Consequences" are

all

doctrines created by judges and commentators,
caught in

an interpretive relationship that defines both
analytically.

since

its

While

still

how

cases are treated judicially and

practiced, doctrinal analysis and scholarship has

waned

steadily

nadir in the 1950s, this sort of examination
originates from strong doctrinal

fomiulations and notions of reasoning and argument.
Philip Bobbit, in his

work on

different forms of

expressed in opinions, posits that "doctrinal argument

.

Supreme Court argument
.

.

asserts principles derived

precedent or from judicial or academic commentary on precedent" (Bobbit,
1982;

Bobbit divides Supreme Court argument into five essential types corresponding
activities

under the umbrella ot the so-called legal model. ^

6 See Martin Shapiro's assessment of doeuinal publie law

First, historical

from

7).

to formal

arguments

(Finifter ,1993).

n

The

legal

model

is

a label referring

to

an explanatory scheme used

to describe

law by such

(e.g.

ongmal

.ntent" ) are expressed
Urrough mterpreUrUons
of daur

and aenvtties. Second, textual
arguments, or
trrelutable
structural

power of words

argument

in the

plain

meaning of

dte words, star, from
the

Constitution and the.r posit,
vis, meantngs. Thi,d.
’

based on the expressed or
agreed upon

is

from the Founding period

state structures

and

relattonshtps derived from the
Const.tution, Fourth, prudential
argument, appears as a
catch-all category, where
decisions, or portions thereof,
are made on grounds other
than
the previous three, and are
likely interpreted as
tnstitutionally self preservationist
or

expansionisfS Doctrinal argument

is

rationalisation utilizing a precedenttal
structures,

and practices

the final categoty, describing
rhetoric or
trail,

like standards of review

Case opinions are obviously data

mapped onto
activity,

and

Mapping
It

IS

and balancing

it

shapes

how

in doctrinal analysis, but

it

is

opinions as Otcy are

scholars and practitioners understand
and utilize

acts of interpretation

some of those

acts, like that

and commentary

knowledge

tests.

the categorized terrain of
constitutional law. That categonzation

done by

IS just that

replete with constitutive
abstractions,

is

a formalist

ca,scs.

relative to established categories,

of leading legal scholars. West
publishing editors,

and judges themselves weigh more
heavily on assigning a cases doctrinal
place, thus
Structuring the

meaning of both doctrine and

For Bobbit’s tormulation

to

work

cases.

doctrine needs to be understood as a fairly

narrow abstraction, as a word or phrase which
represents some

set of practices

and

standards to police case domains and affect their
expressed outcomes. However, practices
ot interpreting

and applying plain meanings and

doctrinally. It doctrine

is

original intentions

might also be described

simply considered an abstracted element of judicial practice and

expression, then whether inspired by words in the constitution
or a long history of
practices as reasoning from precedent, stare decisis, and
doctrinal argument. The attitudinal scholars of
public law political science deride tlie legal model and die formalisms
undergirding it as non-explanatory of
judicial behavior, it provides tliem tlieir foil.
O

Bobbit speaks of
as being prudent arguments.

tiie
.

decisions manifesting die so-called

.diat is, die

"sift in

dme" of

argument of the decision supports die

mid maybe die polity generally.
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die Roosevelt era court

stability of die institution,

mlcrpreting those words should
not matter. Bobhit
suggests as much, saying tha,
doctrinal
iirgument wss susUiincd in,
"nrcccdent
^
picctuem, in'^iitiitir-moi
institutional doctnne, and
doctrines of
construction" (Bobbit, 1982:
•

1

,

47).

Bobhit shows that there
correspond
ca,ses

to doctrine.

a set of knowledge structures
and practices that

accepted history

exi.sts

under the tree exercise banner,
and doctrine

existence of
to

An

is

many

is

body of

important therein. This despite the

types of argumenLs and fact
patterns in that collection, and skepticism
as

whether opinions

3.

tying together or defining a

really matter in understanding

why judges do what

they do.

Attitudes, Behaviors, and Databases

Doctrinal analysis and perspectives
reign supreme in legal education and

scholarship generally. Political science
though has developed different lenses through

which

to

view judges and

attitudinal charactenstics

their case votes,

Behaviorist

courts.

Behavioral studies of judicial decisions suggest
that

and ideological orientations of Judges are largely
determinative of

and that opinions are nothing more than a
rationalization of those votes.^

work has

at its root a realist

view of judges as ideological

actors, driven

by

policy preterences rather than archaic notions^^Mike
fidelity to practices such as legal

reasoning, lormal rule application, and doctrines such
as stare decisis.^ Realism and

its

See Harold SpaeUi's piece in die Spring 1996 Law and Courts Newsletter of die
American
Science Association responding to Mardn Shapiro's survey of Public Law and
Judicial Politics in
(Finilter, 1993). Spaedi vehemendy oppo.ses Shapiro’s suggestion
diat public law pay more attention to die
words of judges, to die language of courts. Spaedi poses:
Political

And why, we are indignantly asked, have we not returned to uakiiig constitudonal language seriously? The
answer seems patendy obvious to anyone even remotely connected to reality: because die justices
diemselves do not, anymore diari dieir brediren on lower courts, (pp. 12)
This

may be

called legal formalism or die legal

^ ^

model (Segal and Spaedi,

1993).

See work (Brenner and Spaedi, 1995), which attempts to probe die innuence of die legjil
model's stalwart, precedent in die ultimate decisions by justices of die Court. The tide of dieir work, Suire
Indecisis is a very good indicator of dieir contended findings, diat precedent matters litde to decisions, its
atdtudes and values diat matter.

progeny

atlnbuteU

is

component

,n the post

Based
scientifically.

other

more

wim

a skeptical

view of docnine, one which
largely sees diKhrinc as a

hoc rationalization of dec.sions

l.kely

made on

in realist theories,
behavioralists claim to study
judges

Rather than studying judictal
poliUcs

interpretivist lenses, polittcal
scientists

aiutudinal grounds.

and couas

d, rough a traditional legal
formalist or

began coding cases and counting votes.

Doctrine as a knowledge structure
was not jettisoned completely however
with the
repudiation of legal formalism.
Instead doctrine was reduced
to
behavioral political science continued
to use

it

behavioral

".stare decisis,"

did not have a place in their models
for stare decisis or

stare decisis is incorporated only
through

the

is

more

However,

cousins, in fact

its

coded variables for "precedent altered" or the

Neither formulation though typically
includes nounphrases'^such as “compelling

like.

state interests”

The

The other formulation

represenLs long standing judicial
practices like

work

basic fomis,

occasionally to code cases according to
"legal

provision," "authority for decision."
and "issue area."i2

common, and

some

which represent narrow practices within domains

like free exercise law.

exploration, or incorporation as codable data,
of these specific nounphrases would

require a deeper level ol textual analysis than
the behavioral effort attempts.

Common

aceounts ot the history ol behavioral studies of judges
and their deeisions

begin with C.H. Pritchett's The Roosevelt

Conn

(Pritchett, 1948).

This work

is

credited

with devising an essential perspective of behavioralism,
one which tracks and interprets
votes of justices, albeit in blocs, against a scale of liberal and
conservative positions
particular areas ot law.

ideology

1

41-58.

^

to a

While

Pritchett declined to

See Spaeth's Supreme Court Database Documentation,
tlie

Fourtli

ICPSR

Release,

May

who

took

1993, pp.

database which can be searched on

O
-

Nounphrases are

just

tliat,

a collection of terms which are comprised largely of nouns iuid
how such plirases have been suggested as being most significant

adjectives, subsequent chapters will discuss
in tlie

votes and

theory of decisions, he provided impetus to a generation of scholars

Specifically Uiese represent fields in records of
1

move beyond mapping

in

determination of meaning in a text collection.
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lhal step.

In a sense behav.oral.sm
suggests that the

detailed ones,

is

the territory

Suhsequently

many

ofexplanaUon for

facets of legal

map, and a plethora of new
more

judicitU actions,

phenomena and

practices slip through then
collective fingers, relegating
detailed study of opinions
to those too slow or
stubborn to
accept the sense of the attitudinal
model.ia Doctrine as
a specific knowledge structure

which

signifies a legal practice
or test in the disposition
of cases,

Pritchett's

work, however the categorizations
of

the dtvision of areas of
law

would continue

to

liberal

was

largely left out of

and conservative, not

depend on abstractions

to

mention

that arguably

have

doctrinal dimensions.

Incorporating scholarship by
psychologist Clyde
scientist

Glendon Schubert

articulated a

model where

Coombs (Coombs,

1964) political

Pritchett stopped (Schubert,
1965).

Using a scaled continuum of ideologies

(i.e.

from

contended that cases could be placed
on

this

continuum based on a codingis of their

Ideological content. Judges are then
placed on

it

liberal to conservative)

depending on

Schubert

their perceived or accepted

Ideology; the catch was that these
attitudes were being derived from
judicial behavior while
at the

same time being suggested

as an explanation for that behavior. 16
ideally though,

once you constructed your continuum, and
mapped the judges' so called

new

cases could also be

forward.

No

mapped onto

it

by assigning

i-points onto

their "J-points," analysis could

move

longer would this work provide just a highly
coded picture of events but

could have predictive potential. Doctrine has
a less than central place
14 Altitudinal model

is

in this

it.

it

work.

die pre-eminent conceptualization of behavioral

work in public law /
and Spaeth m the Attitudinal Model were very adamant about die
lack of utility of die so called legal model for making
sense of judicial decisions, claiming die auUioriuiUve
high ground for dieir model to die exclusion of die
legal model. In a sub.sequent work, (

judicial politics.

Interestingly, Segal

i.e.

Brenner./Spaedi, (1995)) Spaedi appears to have backed off
diat dichotomous view, suggesting diat die
attitudinal model, while good at representing die
decision making process is not, and cannot be, completely
explanatory. This caveat however neglects to speculate on die
proportion of explanation die atdtudinal
model possess, and conversely how much die legal model might contain.

Coding refers to die interpretations ol case profiles against Uiis ideological scale,
ca.ses are
scaled reladve to odier cases which are coded into a defined subject
space or legal issue domain.
'

16 Schubert recognizes diis in
a later work (Schubert, 1974:

xii).

occasionally providing coders
with knowledge structures lor
the categori/alion

ol'

legal

subject areas and keys to
assigning liberal and conservative
positions vis-a-vis those areas.
Specilic judicial practices
like balancing ol interests
(e.g. strict scrutiny
analysis and

compelling Interest standards) arc
conspicuously

ab.sent

from these codtng schemes,

slipping through an analytical
niter unconcerned with
things like doctrine.

Behavioral scholarship

and

ca.scs to a

more nuanced approach

Rohde and Spaeth (Rohde and
decisions,

moved heyond
at

modeling

Spaeth. 1976)

namely of the Supreme Court,

the straight ideological

is

judicial decision

mapping

ol'

judges

making. The work

ol

predicated on the theoiy that political

are largely a function of the
policy preferences of

decision makers, institutional rule
structures, and the situations in
which tho.se decisions
are

made. The rule structures can he both
formal and informal, though Rohde
and SpacUi

.seem to locus on the formal rules of
Court constitution and procedure which
support the

theory that policy preferences arc
most determinative in the discretion laden
cnvironmcni of
the Court. 7
1

It is

also plausible to suggest that informal
rule structures in

Rohde and

Spaeth's conceptualization facilitate
dcKtrincs like compelling state intcresLs,
and they too

have a dclcrminalivc ellcct on

Ol

central concern

constructs

bcliel,

altitudinal factors being opcrationali/cd.

however

altitude,"

arc the Justices' preferences manifested through
the

"and value." Rohde and Spaeth suggest that these

construcLs arc independent variables in the determination
of the dependent variable

They consider

decision.

attitudes the

key unit of operationalization

contend attitudes arc relatively enduring collections
situation. 18

77).

Values

in turn arc

ol beliefs

in their

about an object and

an "interrelated set of attitudes" (Rohde and Spaeth, 1976:

These construcLs arc determinative of behavior when combined with

1

model, and

particular social

7

For example Uie Coirslitulion's provisions which provide for life tenure, no electoral
and a relatively narrow jurisdiction which has been essentitilly reduced to wholly
discretiomuy writs of certiorju-i (for a discussion of tliis see Perry (1991).
accountability,

in

An

object in

context witliin which

tlie

tliis

model

is

genertdly a person, institution, place, or thing; a situation

decision nuikcr eonfronts

tlie

object.

is

the

and inslitudonal objecLs and

siluations. Altitudinal
objecLs arc described as tndtviduals,

groups, or corporations before the
Court, tdenttfied by their
social roles and those assigned

cm

in judicial proceedings.
Clearly there arc

lormal and informal institutional
rules which

provide for determining the domains
of objects which can

come

before the court.

Some

those rules or practices might
be considered doctrinal, but
for purptxscs of this study
the .so-called atiiiudinal .situation
that

Rohde and Spaeth
ca.se"

seems

of

it is

mo.sl likely to be doctrinally
.significant.

identify altitudinal situations
as the "dominant legal issue in the

(Rohde and Spaeth, 1976:

77).

Siluations include, but are not exclusive

to:

abortion

legislauon, search and seizure and
electronic eavesdropping, voluntariness
of confession,

comity, harmlul beliefs or ideas, privacy,
mootness, religious freedom,

sit-in

demonstrations, and the right to vote. They
range from situations defined by clauses
Constitution to very context specific situations

events

when

this

book was written

(e.g. sit in

in the 1960's).

in the

demonstrations as an indicator of

Attitudmal situations represent a high

level of abstraction, that is they are
attributed to cases wholesale, allegedly
capturing the

essence

ol the case belore

Irom things

like doctrines

them. In

some

and

but they

tests,

cases then attitudinal situations could be derived

become subsumed,

finding

little

overt

expression in the proffered situations.

Contemporary behavioral work continues

Supreme Court and

the Attitudinal

the basic

Rohde and Spaeth

project, with

Model (Segal and Spaeth, 1993) and Brenner and

Mecisis (Brenner and Spaeth, 1995)

the

most notable

efforts.

Stare

However, incorporating

concerns lor the circularity critique ol early ellorLs (discussed above with respect

to

Schubert) these works attempt to be predictive, with Stare Indecisis attempting to find
attitudinal indicators

holds "that justices

from sources other than the judicial votes

make

to

be explained. This work

decisions by considering the facts of the case in light of their

ideological attitudes and values" (Segal and Spaeth, 1993; 73).

an exercise in representing cases by their constituent

19 Facts can
be inlcrpreted

(e.g. legal provision) or

facts,

Thus

their project

becomes

determining ideological

can be claimed more objective

(i.e.

names).

positions vis-a-vis the decision
space for those cases, and analyzing
judges decisions

against those positions and relative
to different fact patterns.
Like legal formalism this

model views

facts as

independent variables

to the decision, hut unlike

formalism which

then goes on to suggest that
things like precedent, plain
meaning, intent, and balancing of
interests are also determinative,
the attitudinal perspective
turns to the Justices' values for

decision explanation.

To

facilitate this

Harold Spaeth constructed the Supreme
Court Database, a

searchable collection of computer records
containing the coded representations of
cases

Irom the 1950s

to the

near present.

The database

is

composed of records, each of which

corresponds to a Supreme Court case opinion.
Records
ol variables (fields)

which are coded

in turn are constructed of a
series

to represent so-called

case

six essential characteristics of a
case: 1) identification variables

numbers; 2) background variables

-

e.g.

how

source ot case, the reason the Court granted

-

correspond to

e.g. citations

and docket

the Court took jurisdiction, origin and

cert; 3)

chronological variables

decision, term of Court, natural court;
4) substantive variables
issues, direction of decision; 5)

facts, these

outcome variables -e.g.

-

-

e.g. date

of

e.g. legal provisions,

disposition of case, winning

party, formal alteration of precedent, declaration
of unconstitutionality; 6) voting and

opinion variables

-

e.g.

how

individual justices votes, their opinions and interagreements,

the direction of their votes.

These variables are constructed by coders,
individuals evaluating the case before them.

most researchers would agree

However, some of them

Some

that

is,

of that evaluation

to that variables existence

are less objective,

variables are filled in by

and value

is

objective in that

(e.g.

docket number).

and require interpretation by the coder. For

example, coding a case for substantive variables such as

"legal provision," "issues," or

"decision direction" require a coder to definitively establish a discrete value for something
that

may have

several contenders for leading role.

The database allows

for the examination of
votes

by querying on specific

tndependent vanable patterns. For
tnstance. one can analyze
decisions
overturned or upheld) coded for
a variety of characteristics

where

the search

was tncident

to

in

(e.g.

percentage

search and .seizure ca.ses

(e.g.

a valid arrest and lacking a
warrant or pursuant to a valid

watrant). Scholars are then able
to dev.se nuanced
queries of the databa.se to tty and

tea.se

out decision and vote patterns
based on a variety of coded
independent variables.

However, never

are scholars able to

move beyond

the coding .schema that has
been

consu-ucted as a representat.on of a
large collecuon of opinions, the
text of Ute opinions

remain beyond the reach of the database
and
tailh that the distance is ct^vered
effectively

Doctrine

however

is relatively

its

by

analytical power,

that

and

.scholars

must have

schema.

ignored in the database and the work
that goes on around

it,

the construction of several variables
in the database imply the
existence of

structures and/or practices

which have

doctrinal connections.

Specifically, the "substantive

variables" of "legal provisions considered
by the Court," "authonty for decision," "issue,"

and issue area" arc

all

potential sites for the influence of that thing
called doctrine.

should be noted that never does the attitudinal
work come down

to a

Again

it

lower level of

abstraction and deal with specific judicial
practices which are manifested in opinions, such
as balancing tests or doctrines, but this

on ordering knowledge

To

structures,

some of

summary of cases

basically a duplication of the Reports

were known as constitutional clauses,
constructs, all of

included

those

may be

a level of operation dependent

considered doctrinal.

identify the legal provision at issue the coders sought
authority, determining the

provision by consulting the

was

work does maintain

in the

in the

U.S. Reports. At this level coding

summary, and

for the

most

part the values

coded

statutory provisions. Court rules, or practices and

which conceivably could be considered

doctrinal. Doctrines explicitly

1993 version of the database were the "Abstention doctrine," "retroactive

application of a constitutional right," the "exclusionary rule," "harmless error,"

"res judicata,"

and "estoppel." Largely however
doctrine, as

in

compelling

interests, is not

expressly incorporated in the
database.

Behavioral Public law political
science makes docinne a largely
underulili/cd

independent variable. This scholarship
pays attention
categorization, but this

may

to judges written

and

fluidity,

behavioralism

signilicance to judicial decisions.
Given this one

few naive

d.scu,ssions of doctnnal legal scholars.

and pracmtoners,
leach and

wnte

who

are privy to scholarship

,n its terms.

lor

be accomplished without a
complete accounting ot an opinion,

behavioral coding also uses the
most abstract notions of doclrine.
doctrine's indeterminacy

words

As

is

Due

to criticisms of

generally .skeptical ofdocuine's

would expect doctrine

The paradox however

which denies

to be relegated to a
is

that .scholars

doctrine's importance,

still

skeptics decry doctrine's use for
understanding judicial

decision making, and the formalists
neglect to always critically examine
the words of

opinions to

make

sure a doctrinal label can stick, there

is

a sense that doctrine

C.

The Sens e and Shape of Doctrine

1.

Discursive Constituting

A constitutive analysis ot

doctrine and case opinions examines

become meaningful, some of those ways

are manifested in information

.still

ways those

matters.

objects

machines and

their

practices of organization, categorization, access, and
ultimately information retrieval.

Constitutive socio-legal study (Brigham, 1996; Brigham,
1987; White, 1990) examines

how law and

its

forms become meaningful through social practices which give them

palpable substance. Resulting social contexts, and individuals' beliefs, attitudes,
and
actions thus constitute law's forms and structures. Brigham suggests that constitutional

concepts and provisions are constituted, made meaningful, through social and
interests as they organize

and act

and provisions. Law's meaning

political

relative to authoritative understandings of those concepts

is

manifested

in action

and

belief, in discourses

where

individuals or groups are attempting to contest or reaffirm authoritative understandings for

social, institutional, or
political ends.

A significant part oflcgal

understanding, are knowledge
structures like doctrine
helping

discourse, data for

make

sense of objects like

cases.

Treating law as a discourse,
as "a system of linguistic
and nonlinguistic modes of
categorization, evaluation, and
transmission of meanings,
implies a significant role for case

opinions and doctnne" (Davies,
1996: 43). These modes
span contexts, operating within
appellate

more

couns and

generally.20

the legal profession, and
finding expression in socieiy
and poliiics

Law signifies practices

rules in case disposition

and opinion

such as the application of codes,

crafting.

It

also mlluences interests,

statutes,

and

community

groups, perceptions and behaviors
which socially mediate institutionalized
law.

It is

important to note that legal discourse

is

not just the formal rules of the

eame of

ursSrs

!^Syr

Discourses are constrained, or enabled?, by
practices for manipulating knowledge
structures around particular events or
contexts (e.g. cases) (Brigham, 1978).
Margaret

Davies suggests that discourse norms

(e.g.

principles, doctrines, or rules) are the law's

currency, that norms categorize and construct
"facts" and "actions," making them

meaningful, creating official stories (Davies, 1996:
52). Doctrine as norm enables
descriptions of legal events through categorizing and
ordering.
as those categorizations shape

how

Norms

are also prescnptive

actions are socially and legally interpreted and reacted

to.

In this

work compelling

state interests is

an analytical subject for probing the

practices

which make knowledge

structures like doctrine meaningful.

approach

to doctrine posits that

is

it

A discursive

a structure which can be argued over, pushed and

See for example how Uie compelling interest doctrine, or standard, or test, found its way to die
arena of Congress after Smitli and tlien how various .social interests lined up for and against die
re-articulation of compelling interests as proposed by Congress.
political

.

pulled,

and re-arUcula.ed

u, man.l'est judicial

change or discrecion. Doclrinc
may take
several form,s within op.nions,
each fom, .stmctunng
understandings and expectations
about what practtces and standards
are sensible

tn reaching,

or at least rat.onaliWng

decisions.

2.

Doctrinal Opinions as Part
of Law’s

Judges arc the most significant
individuals

Forms

in the practices

around knowing and

using the compelling state
interest doctrine. Scholarship
(Brisbin, 1993; Kessler, 1993;
O’Niell, 1981:631)

which explores the relationship
between the

and Supreme Court opinions
suggests

phenomena of nghts

social

that doctrine not only inllucnccs

decisions and opinions, but also
inlluences

how

Judges

individuals and groups

m

their

know and

approach law ouUsidc of specific cases
or courts (Brigham, 1987).
Doctrine gives

rise to

particular understandings of legal
situations and creates opportunities
for actions.2l

li is

mtcrsubjcctivc, yet imbued with a sense
of objectivity through the mediation
of written

words22and

legal institutions.

primary sources of law used

The

authoritative texts of appellate courts contain
the

to delineate social

OB.uT, 1990;

and

political contcxts.23

1983) which argues Uial law and legal
that laws doing tlie
consutuling and regulating are mulufaceted, wiUi
a variety of sources luid histories, luid different normative
Junctures applications, actors, prescriptions (See Law and Society scholarship on
LegiU
& Pluralism ( e Kg
Merry 1990; de Sousa Santos, 1987)).

nnu
.re.
u
idcrstandings

/

practices can,

and do, contribute

Gcerty.,

to particular social realities,

AND

•

'

,

22 See
Walter Ong's discussion of how writing transformed cognitive
ulumately altered the tiling being written about (Ong, 1986)

luid

epistemic faculties luid

23 These
contexts may be viewed as social texts, A text is constituted by any
meaningful action,
which writing is only one example.
interpretive social scientists have long believed tliat imy bounded
activity tliat raises questions of meaning can be considered
a text. What is tlieoretically interesting about
texts is tliat tlicy raise tlie question of multiple meanings, and it
is in how one chooses among these
multiple meanings tliat hermeneutic tlieories of different sorts reveal tlieir
tlieoretical edge. (Scheppele
1988:87)
.

.

’

Also, In essence, tlie social construction model places emphasis on tlie primacy of language
and
of Uie social processes by which Uuiguage develops luid is used. Those tilings we call knowledge,
reality, or facts, are viewed as community-generated linguistic entities tliat
lae constitutive of the
all

communities

tliat

generate tliem (Barrett 1989: xiv).

Op.n.ons are employed by
shape the spaces of American

state

political

and private actors, omc.alty
and intormally,

and social acuon (Sche.ngold,
1974:

to

McCann.

xi;

1994: 6). Atienrion to docinne,
a sign.fieanl stmcture in the
"mandarin" materials of law
udy, IS an assertion that judicial
politics is conceptually
expressed there (Gordon, 1984)

Gordon argues

that legal

forms and practices are the

results of political processes,

from the struggles ot conflicting
social groups" (Gordon,
1984:

arise

101),

Stopping short of claiming law's
forms as purely instrumental results
of those

Gordon suggests
changes of

that

forms often provide for brakes or
resistance

politics.24 Theories of law's
relative

conflicts,

to the instrumental

autonomy pick up

moving beyond both Marxist and
behavioral claims of laws

and as

this line

of thought,

instrumentality, positing that

law's forms have an institutional
quality that at least partially transcend
the politics out of

which they emerge. (Brigham, 1990:
introduction; Thompson, 1975; Hay,
1975).

Law

furnishes American politics with
important symbols of legitimacy like cases

and doctrine, these

m turn reflect values which may be the building blocks of

political

Ideology (Scheingold, 1974: 13). Symbols
and the practices of access and understanding

which connect them
interests, groups,

are "the products of long evolving
historical struggles in which

norms have tended

to prevail"

(McCann, 1994:

9).

some

By examining

practices of organizing, indexing, and accessing
case opinions around doctrine in a narrow

domain we can

also perhaps explore

how

those symbols evolve and shape legal

conceptualizations.

D.

Concltisinn

Ellorts to define a doctrinal profile, execute searches in computer and
hard bound

digest

/

reporter environments, and collect target case opinion texts

showed

that

compelling

See discussion of die tensions between formal rationality of law (and its attendant legitimacy)
desire of political elites to maintain order and tlie status quo (Balbus, 1937). His work was an early
socio-legal assertion of laws relative autonomy (see also (Hay, 1975) ) in tlie movement away from

and

tlie

structuralist

Marxism

(at its

most

radical)

and

social scientific beliavioralism (at a
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more mcxlerate

level).

.meres, doctrine
less sure wrU.

was no. fixed or eas.ly

quantifiable in Utosc n.ach.nes,

of what was being asked ol
each machine, and the manner

indexed and accessed. Asking
information systems

made

it

necessary to examine doctrine

and access

to,

Doc.nne became

each step of definition and
discovery, and ultimalely
forced a re-exam, nation

the cases

itself,

to

and how

which arguably manifest

in

which data objects arc

produce the desired docurnal data
tho.se

doctrine.

systems structure

With each step

.storage of.

(i.e.

definition,

discovery, acquisition, and ultimately
InQuery analysis) the Uting doctrine
and the case

opinions themselves acquired, and

Compelling
lawyers

which

is

extremely difficult to sustain

bound

doctrinally related cases
filters,

is difficult.

Compelling

the target doctrine,

capture as

many

in

is

an

to

case outcome in the area of free

was not sustained

it

through the editorial

in those

systems as a categorizing

was subsumed under some other indexing

structure of the data object, and the different
textual representations of

made

it

ditticult to create a sufficiently robust
search profile so as to

of the relevant cases as possible.

1.

Lexis

Nexis

/

False positives, those data objects hit appropriately

not

it

and

an information machine. That to ask

interest doctrine slips

while proffered as significant

attribute of the data objects, but rather

The

level rule or principle for
judges

digest and reporter system to
present a collection of

exercise law, as the ratio decidendi,

characteristics.

low

that manipulation.

of constitutional law, despite
that relative "low level"

either a lull text or hard

and indexing

meaningful attributes from

interest doctfine is a relatively

in the contests

abstraction

lost,

on point concerning compelling

when executing

a search, but

interests in tree exercise, highlighted the

importance

of dicta and authoritative understandings of free exercise case law. Full text
searches of

documents

like case opinions are

going

machines cannot distinguish between

to treat all

dicta

terms and phrases similarly. Full text

and the determinative

text of the decision.

Doctrinal terms and phrases are just as likely to occur in dicta as not. The textual presence
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Ot

compelling interests

is

easily ascertainable (taking into
account synonyms), but

determining which doctrine

is

most

signifieant because of

depends on more interpretation than a

full text

Standing back and reflecting on
doctrine

was well

this

its

presence

in the ratio

decidendi

machine can provide.

shows

that the notion of

compelling interest

established prior to defining a search
profile, that a doctrinal profile

was

already established by exposure to second
hand knowledge proffered by knowledge
experts in law and education.

From

that

it

was known what

sorts of cases

ought

to

be

outside the set of cases manifesting the
compelling state interests doctrine in free exercise

law even before executing searches based on
textual

characteristics.

And even

in

some

cases where the search profile was satisfied, the
"hit" document was not “on point” because
it

did not indicate that the compelling interests
doctrine

constitute determinative text, whether a doctrine

concept ot

knowledge

on point are sustained

in the

experts. Full text systems

do

is

was determinative. Notions of what

active in that determination, and the

knowledge bases and
not, cannot, index

interpretive practices of

on such notions

if

they are not

correlated in textual occurrences or patterns. Scholars and
practitioners can relatively easily
ascertain

when

a case meets that sort of criteria, a machine

Doctrinal
a significant

dilemma

wide open Lexis
1

963 and

synonyms

/

as well.

it

complex expression

By randomly sampling

Nexis search

the present)

interests implied

for a

became

by compelling

(e.g. all

(i.e.

is

challenged.

compelling

state interests)

posed

free exercise cases returned with a

cases with the phrase free exercise and between

clear that there

were other ways

interest doctrine (e.g.

to

express the balancing of

compelling government

interests,

overriding government interests, overriding state interests, interests of highest order,

compelling justification for imposing
with which

human

easily determine
in a

readers and editors

when

a data object

is

this burden).

make

Full text is devoid of the fuzzy logic

sense of data collections, people can relatively

related to a expressed information

case-based fashion.
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need when trained

While
cases

11

dissaiisfied with Lexis

/

Nexis as a tool

to identify

a doctrinal collection of

proves excellent for acquiring cases
already identified as useful, as well
as for

searching for a specific case or a group
of cases tied together by things like
opinion writer,
date range, participants, or even the
presence of certain terms and phrases (c.g.
religion).

2

Like lull-text Lexis

/

.

West

Nexis the West hardbound digest and reporter
system did not

support a straightlorward detinition and
identification of the relevant cases. West Digests
are indexed

by subject

Compelling

interests in Free Exercise

thcretore

more

ol

must

areas, with ever decreasing levels of abstraction
in each subject area.

either exist within

them depending upon the

law

is

not manifested in one of those levels,

one subject area

keynumber

/

characteristics of the cases

or

is

it

spread across two or

and how they

intersect

West’s

categorization scheme.

By

utilizing expert

interests in tree exercise^^

knowledge which defined paradigmatic cases of compelling
it

was possible

to locate

one basic area

in the digests

where

the

desired cases reside. West's inclusion of headnotes and keynumbers
act as identifiers and
pointers, theretore the paradigmatic cases pointed back to the digest
categories

similar cases could be found. Following those pointers a region in the

where

West Digest was

located in which to search for the target cases. At that point however the researcher had
to

manually process the digest

entries, screening for Free Exercise first, then looking for

signs of a balancing ol interests which

would

either explicitly

mention compelling

interests

or imply their incorporation in the ratio of the case. This act injected significant inlluences

Irom second hand knowledge,

i.e.

possible cases for the data

Cases identified

set.

expert knowledge derived bias in the selecting of
still

had

to

be examined however

to

determine whether the compelling interests doctrine was actually present and was part of
the decisional mix.

25 See discussion

in

Chapter 6 which discusses

tliese.

Notions of compelling interest
doctrine were largely unalTecled
by West.
possible that the doctrine

was undercut by

and thus being subsumed

in

not being included in the subject
area categories,

another category. However, one
could also

compelling interest cases resided within
one category

m fact help re-affimi that doctrine's meaning.
did

show up considerably

importance. Like Lexis

manage case

in the digest

(i.e.

the

Religious Liberty) that West did

Also, the language of compelling
interests

case blurbs, thus further affirming the
dwtrine's

opinions, and the existence of that
doctrine

organizational

po.sit that .since

Nexis however doctrine's meaning pre-dated
the systems

/

is

It

scheme of them. Neither West

or Lexis

/

was not

to

specifically part of the

Nexis were able

to capture the

cases manifesting the doctrine without
significant expert knowledge, thus doctrine's

meaning

as a significant delimiter of judicial
decision

making

in a particular area

of law

may

be shaken.

As

a basic finding,

it

became

clear that doctrine such as compelling interests
reside,

or are largely constructed, through inteipretive
communities in and around federal appellate
courts,

working with judicial opinions.

and scholars of law; the

full text

Doctrine exists more in the minds of practitioners

machines performed poorly

at

capturing data that could

reasonably be said to represent the target doctrinal space.
West performed better but
required significant
users

it

is difficult

human

investment. Without heavy editing and tweaking by system

for full-text or hard

3.

Experience with Lexis
structure,

it

and

that use ol those

was challenged without

represented a

most

new

/

to provide a satisfactory set.

InQuery

Nexis and West showed doctrine

machines

to define, discover,

to be a fluid

knowledge

and acquire cases manifesting

significant input from expert knowledge. Nevertheless, InQuery

set of practices with

tied to doctrine.

bound systems

which

to

manipulate case opinions, the data objects

InQucry was

used

slill

t„

expose die concepiual eontcnl

delimited by compelling interest
docuine. That delimiting
as editorial structuring of

West and

markers of the cases tuc limited
exercise" and

and superior and

InOtieiy

was

Itirned loose

.Some basic

di.stinctions in the

ca.ses

where the claims of

tho.se

in textual

content as well

"compelling stale interests" and "rrec

been divided into two groups,
corresponding to
prc,sent

based

the knowledgeable searching
of a researcher. Textual

to the phrase

synonyms thereoT

is

ol a colicclion ol cases

on the collection, which had

where the compelling

interests

were

free exerci.se violation triumphed.

conceptual patterns .seemed to appear, with
the

ba.sic

dillcrcncc being that ca.ses where
compelling interests prevailed tended to locus
aiotind the

supremacy of concepts representing
thc.se ca.scs in

pai lictilar

terms

meaning,

ol'

i.c.

"exemptions"

Icdcral law

I'roiii

and policy. Opinion writers also phra.scd

iho.se policies,

that the policy is the

making

norm or dcl'ault, and

a rhetorical play lor
the claims vis-a-vis that

policy are .seeking exceptional ireatnicni
Irom that norm. Ca.ses where the interests

were

less than

law was

compelling tended

at issues.

liccdom

more

to I'octis

on "children" and "education", and where

Rhetorically, opinion writers u.sed the language

readily than the other

.set,

ol' .state

ol' "beliel's"

establi.shing another range

ol'

liKal

and

cxpcctalions and

understandings.

These

sorts ol lindings lend to re-atlirni existing

interest doctrine,

and

likely could

analysis. Since the corpus

is

knowledge about eompelling

have been determined with a

relatively small

it

less robust

would have been possible

machine

to

make

lor

similar

observations by reading each and keeping track. But InQucry shows other concepts
and
distinctions

new

between them

significant in the

stand

(i.c.

own

New

might not be so obvious, and more importantly

possibilities lor case text analysis

more

not

that

wake of

the

it

opens up

and manipulation lor larger databases. This

Supreme Court's decision

in the

Spring of '99

is all

the

to let

declined to hear the case) a lower court decision which established that West did

the content of case opinions, aside from their editorial value added of course.

markets arc opening, systems like InQuciy arc likely candidates for organizing and

making sense of
With

the

growing mass of case opinions.

the real prospects for a dramatically
changing legal information market

InQuery, or similar products,

and structure access

may

to law’s data.

offer practitioners
It is

and scholars new tools

to categorize

very likely that these tools will sustain

new

understandings ot that data, as well as
undercut existing knowledge bases. Existing

knowledge bases and

their

systems are brought on
have.

It IS

line,

impossible tor

relation to the

human

facilitators

though will also influence the way new

and ultimately will structure the influence these
new tools

new

tools to simply exist, in a context free

manner with no

world they enter, they come into being as part of
a tradition of information

manipulation and knowledge traditions. Whether
seen, the primary players are

still

new

tools supplant the old remains to be

extremely well positioned and powerful, yet there

dissent and dissatisfaction, and those forces
often
directions.
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move markets and

is

their entrants in

new

APPENDIX A
LEXIS / NEXIS QUERIES

Query

(compell! w/2 interest) w/3 (state or government)

1:

many thousands of hits, and rightly so, as it is going to null all
doctrine. Many false positives ( i.e. returned
cases that did not

renSsl^Iif a
i case where a free exercise
represent
balancing tests

was

applied, that were "on point").

subsequent action: Narrowed this query by adding "and (free
exercise) and (first
amendment) and (religion)," but still had over 600 hits, again the
query will pull cases
which just mention free exercise. First Amendment, Religion,
compelling

Query 2

:

and a combination of

state or

government

interests in close proximity.

free exercise and date

> 1962 -> over 4000

and (compelling w/2

interest)

hits

-> 936 hits

results: These pulled too many, considerable false positives. These
attempted to
use date as a floor, since the Supreme Court did not start using compelling
state interest
in religious free exercise until then, but again it will hit
on cases where compelling state
interest is mentioned but not acted on, or in merely a discussion
context (i.e. dicta), not
working with it (i.e. ratio decidendi). For example, it will pull Establishment cases
that
merely talk about tree exercise as another area of First Amendment doctrine.

subsequent action: Narrow

further by requiring state or

government

interesLs to

be present.

Query

3:

(free exercise

government)) -> 708
results:

and date > 1962) and ((compelling w/2

interest)

w/3

(state or

hits

Many

false positives result.

subsequent action: Took new

path, forget date for

the doctrinal phrase.
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now,

just try to

narrow around

compelling governmenc

raSe anSgfdn)"®

mSTot

and

(free

*is makes sense because so many
«’">*‘ilcli™al areas, and the mere

discussinns“Irf
‘

mention ot the

interest)

sHmen®!
1st
Amendment application of
I

it

will trigger a hit.

action: Try to peel off specific groups
of false positives trv to

rdmte'daL1ac“ ofZgfr''''*™*

Query

(compelling government interest or compelling
state interest w/40 free
(compelling government interest or compelling slate
interest
w/lO establishment) -> 307 hits, note: 14 of these
were Supreme Court cases while 97
5:

were federal

circuit cases

results: Added the "and not" to skim off hits
which CSI or CGI occurred, but that
was concerned with Establishment rather than free exercise.
The use of not is
problematic because now some false positives are eliminated,
but also very likely those
true positives which as a matter of dicta discuss
Establishment and compelling state

M
0982), and case

missed "overriding government interest" in U.S. v. Lee 455 U.S.
252
opinions with "compelling state interest or compelling government
(e.g. Lyng V. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Assn
.

1

U8

o.

Ct 1319 (1988)).

subsequent action: Turn

to

West

editors and the agents of legal information

authority.
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appendix b

DATA SET
Cases where individual claims
supercede state interests (LOSE)
Callahan
Callahan

v.

v.

of Education, Escambia CouiiE'
Woods.
658 F. 2d 679 ( 1981)
Woods.
736 F. 2d 1269 (1984)

Ch^choftheLukiimiBalmluAyev.Cit^ud^
Edwards v. Maryland State Fairs. 628 F.
2d 282
airfax Covenant Church v. Fairfaz
City School.

Ferguson

^ozee

V.

Hohhie

v.

v.

IRS.

921

F.

Ala..

880 F 2d SOS (1989^
(

H3S
'

(

1980).
17 F. 3d

•

Cl
Lt.

2217
22 7
1

M
S^
( 99
993).
1

703 (1994)

2d 588 (1991).

Dept of Employ erne nt & Securin’.
Unemployement Appeals Commission.

Illinois

nternational Socien for Krishna
Consciousness

^

v.

101 S. Ct

1514 (1989)
107 S. 01 1046 1987)
Barger. 650 F. 2d 430 (1981)
!

Consciousness v. Bowen. 600 F. 2d 667 (1979)'
Center of Mississippi v. Starkville, Mississippi.
840 F 2d 293 ^(1988)
McCurry v. Tesch.
738 F. 2d 271(1984)
McDaniel y. Pan.
98 S. Ct. 1322 (1978).
Mozert y. Hawkins County Public Schools.
765 F. 2d 75 (1985).
^ozert V. Hawkins Coimn Board of Education.
827 F 2d (1987)
Northwest Indian Cemetary Protection Associatioin
v. Peterson. 795 F. 2d
688 (1985)
^
Peyote Way Church of God y. Smith. 742 F
2d 193 (1984)
Quaring V. Peterson
728 F. 2d 1 121(1984).
Salvation Army v. Department of Communin
Affairs, N.J 919 F 2d 183 (1990)
Society of Separationists y. Herman. 939 F.
'2d 1207 (1991)
Spence v. Bailey.
465 F. 2d 797 (1972).
Thomas V. Review Board of Indiana Employment Division.
101 S Ct 1425 ^(1981)
Wisconsin y. Yoder. 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972).
Yonkers Raceway y. Cin of Yonkers.
858 F. 2d 855 (1988)
Yott y. Rockwell.
501 F. 2d398 (1974).
Islnmi
/i/rtw/6

.

'

Prison
Barnett

Brown

1

v.

(PIL)
Rodgers

Peyton.
Jihaadv. O’brien.
Neal V. Georgia.
Walker v. Mintzes.

Yevgen

v.

y.

Scully.

410
437
645
469
771
817

F.
F.

F.
F.
F.
F.

2d
2d
2d
2d
2d
2d

995 (1969).
1228 (1971)

556
446
227
227

(1981).
(1972).

(1985).
(1987).
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’

Cases where state interests
prevailed over individual claims
(WIN)
Alexander V. Boston University.
766 F. 2d 630 (1985)
American Friends Service Commission
v. Thornburgh
941 F 2d 80R iQon
American Fnend.^ Serv,ce Commission v.
Thornb rfh: ^ ^ r.
F zu
2d M05 u^i).
1
2)
Austin V. Berryman. 878 F. 2d
786 (1989).
Badoni v. Higginson. 638 F. 2d 172
(1980)
Ballinger v. IRS
728 F. 2d 1287 (1984).
Baz V. Walters. 782 F. 2d 701(1986).
Bethel Baptist Church v. U.S
822 F. 2d 1334 (1987)
Bob Jones University v. U.S. 103 S. Ct
2017 (1983)
Borgeson v. U.S. 757 F. 2d 1071 (1985).
Bowen v. Roy. 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
Brandon v Bd. of Education, Guilderland
Central School District 635 F. 2d 971
(1980).
Drown V. Hot, Sexy, Safe Productions.
68 F. 3d 525 (1995)
Brown v. Polk County, Iowa.
37 F. 3d 404 (1994).
Christian Echoes National Ministry v. U.S.
470 F. 2d 849 (1972)
Christian Gospel Church v. City
of San Fransisco. 896 F. 2d 1221 (1990)
Cra//7 V. Board of Police Commissioners,
St. Louis. 920 F. 2d 1402
(1990).
V. Shenandoah Baptist Church.
899 F 2d 1389 (1990)
EEOC V. Freemont Christian School. 781 F. 2d 1362 (1986)
EEOC V. Pacific Press Publishing
676 F. 2d 1272
EEOC V. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary (1982).651 F. 2d
277 (1981)
Enipl Division, Dept, of Human Resources, Oregon
v. Smith.
108 S. Ct. 1444 (1988).
Division, Dept, of Human Resources, Oregon v.
Smith. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990)'
Eellowship Baptist Church v. Iowa Department Public
Instruction. 815 F. 2d 485 (1987)
Fleischfresser v. Directors of School District 200. 15 F.
3d 680 (1994).
First Assembly of God, Naples Fla. v. Collier
County. 20 F. 3d 419 (1994)
Forest Hills Early Learning Center v. Lukhard.
728 F. 2d 230 (1984).
Golden Eagle v. Johnson.
493 F. 2d 1179 (1974).
Goldman v. Weinberger.
106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986)'
Graham v. IRS. 822 F. 2d 844 (1987).
Gray v. Gulf Mobile, and Ohio Railroad Co. 429 F. 2d 1064 (1970)
Grosz V. City of Miami Beach, 721 F. 2d 729 (1983).
Grove v. Mead School District. 753 F. 2d 1528 (1985).
Hernandez v. IRS.
819 F. 2d 1212 (1987).
Hernandez v. IRS. 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989).
Hynes v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville. 667 F. 2d 549 (1982).
Intercommunity Center for Justice and Peace v. INS 910 F. 2d 42 (1990).
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Houston 689 F. 2d541(1982).
Lakewood Congregation ofJehovas Witnesses v. Lakewood. 699 F. 2d 303 (1983).
Linscott V. Millers Falls Co.
440 F. 2d 14 (1971).
Lyng V. Northwest Indian Cemetary Association. 108 S. Ct 1319 (1988).
Menora v. Illinois High School Association. 683 F. 2d 1030 (1982).
Messiah Baptist hurch v. County of Jefferson, Colorado. 859 F. 2d 820 (1988).
Miller v. IRS.
829 F. 2d 500 (1987).
Murray v. City of Austin. 947 F. 2d 147 (1991).
Murphy v. ARkansas. 852 F. 2d 1039 (1988).
Nelson v. U.S. 796 F. 2d 164 (1986).
New Life Baptist Church v. East Longmeadow 885 F. 2d 940 (1989).
Ogden V. U.S. 758 F. 2d 1168 (1985).
Olsen V. DEA. 878 F. 2d 1458 (1989).
f

%

W

.

.

.

.

.

.

Olsen V. IRS. 109 F. 2d 278
(1983).
Palmer V Chicago Board of Education.
603 F 2d 27 U 91^)\
Peyote Way Church of God v.
Thornburgh. 922 F 2d 1210
n
12 10 Ago
(IFJl).
Portv. Heard
764 F. 2d 423 (1985).
Potter V. Murray City. 760 F.
2d 1065 (1985)
Rushton V. Nebraska Public Power
District 844 F 2d 562
Ryan V. U.S. 950 F. 2d 458 (I991)
Scott V. Rosenberg. 702 F. 2d
1263 (1983).
Sherwood v. Brown
619 F. 2d 47 (1980)
Smith K Board of Education North
Bahvon Union Free School Disi 844 F 2d 4()( 1488^
CommL^sion of Oh o 9
24 1202 ' 990)
sTboI
St.
Bariholomew s Church v. NYC. 914 F.
2d 348 (199(1)
V. bdizahelh Community Hospital
v. NLRB
708 F. 2d 1436 1983)
«4() F. 2d 1087 (1988).
1

'

.

(

.

>

T

.

^C.sTmh“"
U.S.

V.

U.S.

V.

U.S.

V.

U.S.

V.

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

U.S.

U.S.

California.

All F. 2d 1329 (1973)
Bigman.
470 F. 2d 13 (1970).
Campbell.
439 F. 2d 1087 (1971).
Del Socorro. 883 F. 2d 662 (1989).
Dickens.
695 F. 2d 765 (1982)
Gering.
716 F. 2d 615 (1983).
Greene.
892 F. 2d 453 (1989).
Grayson.
656 F. 2d 1070 (1981).
Holmes.
614 F. 2d 985 (1980).

U.S.

Lee.

102

Middleton.

690
582
794
738
815

F.

861

F.

Mow at.

U.S.

Merkt

V.

U.S.

Rush.

U.S.

Schrnucker.

U.S.

Scopo.
Slabaugh.

U.S.

10 S. Ct. 688 (199(1).

Bertram.

U.S.
U.S.

1

1051 (1982).

S. Ct.

F.
F.

F.
F.

2d
2d
2d
2d
2d
2d
2d
2d

820 (1982).
1194 (1978).
950(1986).
497 (1984).
413 (1987).
339 (1988).

852 F.
1081 (1988).
U.S.
Turnbull.
888 F.
636 (1989).
Vandiver y. Hardin County Board of Education
925 F. 2d 927 ( 99 1
Vernon v. Los Angeles.
27 F. 3d 1385 (1994).
Walsh V. Louisiana High School Athletic Association. 616 F. 2d 152 (1980)
Wilson V. Block.
708 F. 2d 735 (1983).
Wilson V. NLRB.
920 F. 2d 1282 (1990).
Windsor Park Baptist Church v. Arkansas Activity Association. 658 F. 2d 618 (1981).
1

Prison

(PIW)

1

Abdullah v. Kinnison.
Brooks V. Wainwright.
Brown v. Wainwright.
Childs

Cole

V.

Duckworth

.

Fulcomer.
v. Marks.

V.

Dreibelbis
Hill

V.

Blackwell.

Jaworski

Kahane

v.

v.

Schmidt

Carlson.

.

769
428
419
705
758
742
774
684
527

F.
F.
F.

F.
F.
F.
F.
F.

F.

2d
2d
2d
2d
2d
2d
2d
2d
2d

345 (1985).
652 (1970).
1376 (1970).
915 (1983).
124 (1985).

792
338
498
492

(1984).
(1985).

(1982).
(1975).
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LaReau

v.

Little

Norris.

V.

Madyim

MacDougall.

Smith
St.

Clair

Walker

v’.

Brierly.

Coughlin.

V.

Teterud

Franzen.

v.

O’Malley

v.
v.

v.

Cuyler.

Burns.
Blackwell

.

The following were

Note:

luture reference

Prison 2 (P2L)
Ali

-

McKinney
v.

Phelps

V.

v. Maynard.
Maynard.
Dunn.

Reed v. Faulkner.
Salaam v. Lockhart

Ward

Walsh.
Coughlin.
V. Lane.

V.

Young
Young

(P2W)

Ahdur-Rahman

-

F.

F.
F.
F.
F.

F.
F.

2d 974 (1972).
2d 1241 (1986).
2d 954 (1983)
2d785 (1973)
2d 783 (1984).
2d 109 (1980).
2d 357 (1975).
2d 23 (1969).

colleeted but not part ot analysis at this
phase of project

2d 86 (1990).
2d 119 (1987).
F. 2d 1117 (1991).
16 F. 3d 330 (1994).
827 F. 2d 634 (1987).
952 F. 2d 350 (1991).
937 F. 2d 1521 (1991).
965 F. 2d 93 (1992).
842 F. 2d 960 (1988).
856 F. 2d 1120 (1988).
F. 3d 873 (1993).
866 F. 2d 567 (1989).
922 F. 2d 370 (1991).
F.
F.

1

V.

Prison 2

411

912
816
936

Higgins V. Burroughs.
LaFevers v. Saffle.
Malik V. Brown.
McCabe v. Arave.

Mosier

F.

Prisoner’s claims victorious

Cousins.

V.

473
787
704
477
748
634
522

State interests prevailed

Michigan. 65 F. 3d 489 (1995).
827 F. 2d 563 (1987).
Aziz. V.
8 F. 3d 13 (1993).
Bear v. Nix.
977 F. 2d 1291 (1992)
Bettis V. Delo
14 F. 3d 22 (1994).
Blair-Bey v. Nix.
963 F. 2d 162 (1992).
Brown v. Harris.
26 F. 3d 68 (1994).
Campbell v. Purkett
957 F. 2d 535 (1992).
Cooper, et. al. v. Yard.
856 F. 2d 125 (1988).
Dunavant v. Moore.
907 F. 2d 77 (1990).
Eason v. Thaler.
73 F. 3d 1322 (1996).
Farid v. Smith.
850 F. 2d 917 (1988).
Felix V. Rolan.
833 F. 2d 517 (1987).
Friedman
Arizona.
912 F. 2d 328 (1990).
Friend v. Kolodziencz.ak.
923 F. 2d 126 (1991).
Hadi V. Horn.
830 F. 2d 779 (1987).
Hall V. Bellnion.
935 F. 2d 1106 (1991),
Iron Eyes v. Henry.
907 F. 2d 810 (1990).
Jordan v. Gardner.
953 F. 2d 1137 (1992).
Mark v. Nix.
983 F. 2d 138 (1993)
Matiyn v. Henderson.
841 F. 2d 31 (1988).
Matthews v. Morales.
23 F. 3d 118 (1994).
McCorkle v. Johnson.
881 F. 2d 993 (1989).
Allen

v.

Toombs.
Moore.

V.

.

.
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O’ Lone v. Shabaz.
Powell V. Estelle.
Sapanajin v. Gunter.

107

S. Ct.

959
857

F.

Scott V. Mississippi.
Skelton v. Pri-Cor. Inc.

961

F.

963

F.

Standing Deer

831

F.

Tisdale

v.

Turner

v.

v.

Carlson.

F.

Dobbs.

807

F.

Safley.

107

S.

805
851

F.

Udey V. Kastner.
Williams v. Lane.

F.

2d
2d
2d
2d
2d
2d
Ct
2d
2d

2400 (1987)
22 (1992).
463 (1988)
77 (1992).
100 (1991).
1525 (1987)
734 (1986).
2254 (1987).
1218 (1986).
867 (1988).

APPENDIX C

DATA FILES
File

name

Description

to all non-prison cases between 1963
and present' where
.ho proffered
the
claim of a policy’s violation of an individual’s
right to religious free
exercise was superseded by the state’s
interests or needs.

2)

Lose

-

^

prevailed

All those non-prison cases between 1963
and present where the
^ policy’s violation of an individual’s right to religious free
exercise

PIW

- All those
3)
prison cases prior to the 1987 doctrinal shift where
the prison
administration or state policy prevailed over an
inmate’s claim of violation of their free
exercise rights

4) PIL - All those prison cases prior to 1987 where the prison
administration or
s ate policy was superseded by an inmate’s
claim of violation of their free exercise rights

P2W

- All those prison
5)
cases subsequent to 1987’s doctrinal sea change
regarding standards ol evaluation of free exercise claims by
prisoners, and where the
prison administration or state policy prevailed

6) P2L - All those prison cases subsequent to 1987’s doctrinal sea change
regarding standards of evaluation ol free exercise claims by prisoners,
and where the
prison administration or state policy was superseded by a prisoner’s
rights.

7)

Win

-t-

8)

Win

-I-

Lose

-

All

PIW

-

All cases

non prison cases
where

state policy or action

upheld and compelling

interest applied.

9)
applied.

Lose

10)

(Win

-I-

-I-

PIL

-

PIW)

All cases where individual rights upheld and compelling interest

-t-

(Lose + PIL)

-

All cases compelling interest applied.
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APPENDIX D

OCCURRENCE FREQUENCY
Occurrence Frequencies for the most highly
occuring phrases

Cases where state interests prevailed

1.

(file

8)

Qcc., Phrase, Re lative Occurrence freouencv (% highesis (M'c
3009

u.s.

1875
1867
1846
1833
1187
1180
1106
1061
1059
1057
941
931

court
f.2d

^

100 00 %
62.31%
62.05%
61.35%
60.92%
39.45%
39.22%
36.76%
35.26%
35.19%
35.13%
31.27%
30.94%
25.56%* combined 33%
22.80%
21.40%
20.90%
20.87% * combined 31%
20.51%
19.31%
18.54%
17.68%
17.35%
16.98%
.

1.

ed

s.

ct

religion

government
district

court

united states
state

case

church
cir

interest(s) *

769
686
644
629
628
617

id.

581

plaintiffs

558
532
522

use

5

1 1

499
496
479
46
459
440
434
433
417
412
412
410
385
378
377
370
370
1

exercise
section

law
belief(s)

939

*

burden
evidence

exemption
right(s) 868 *
congress
defendant
appellants
part

order
u.s.c.

issue

defendants
purpose(s) 717 *
conduct
statute

action
cert.
first

amendment

fact

claim(s)614*

16.58%
16.48%
15.92%
15.32%
15.25%
14.62%
14.42%
14.39%
13.86%
13.69%
13.69%
13.63%
12.79%
12.56%
12.53%
12.30%
12.30%

*

combined 28%

*

combined 24%

*

combined 20%

369
369
363
362
350
339
335
334
333
327
325
325
324
314
314
313

rights
act

supreme

members
practice(s) 6

time

question
s.

ct.

city

appeal
counsel

record

1

1

1

1.27%

*

amendment

310
310
309
309
309
305
302
298
294
292
285
282
279
275
274
272
268
267
263
260
259
250
244
244

221
221

4

regulation(s) 631 *

elTect

239
237
234
233
230
228
228
225
224

1

opinion
decision

311
311

241

court

cases

12.26%
12.26%
12.06%
12.03%
.63%

beliel'

application

person
education
activities

purposes
violation

regulations

11.1
1

1

1.10%
1.07%

practices

I'reedom

9.1

board

9.04%
8.91%
8.87%
8.74%
8.64%
8.61%
8.31%

plaintilT

courts

b
school (s) 539 *

services
trial

judgment
schools
history
children (child) 359 *
sherbert

claims
information

argument
matter

persons
irs

peyote
rule

authority

establishment clause
interests

secretary

employees

combined 20%

*

combined 21%

10.87%
10.80%
10.80%
10.77%
10.44%
10.44%
10.40%
10.34%
10.34%
10.30%
10.30%
10.27%
10.27%
10.27%
10.14%
10.04%

9.90%
9.77%
9.70%
9.47%
9.37%
9.27%
9.14%

basis

*

3%

8.1

8.1

*

combined 18%

*

combined 12%

1%

1%
1%

8.01%
7.94%
7.88%
7.78%
7.74%
7.64%
7.58%
7.58%
7.48%
7.44%
7.34%
7.34%

1

86

221
221

benefits

220
220
220
220
217
216
214
212

yoder

appeals

means
faith

f.supp
free exercise clause
organization
facts

individual

21

laws

208
205
204

summary

201

respect

protection
inc.

200

motion

198
197
195
194
194
193

inmates

191

nature

189
186
183
183
182
182
179
178
177
174
173
172
172
172
170
168
168
167
167
167
166
163
163
162

relief

161

161

160
160
160
159
157

denial

smith
n
benefit

reason

way
policy

payments
testimony
property
j-

status
aliens

parents
activity

reasons
organizations

commissioner
process
review

employee
view
tax

students

defense
investigation
constitution

thomas
years
circumstances
test

Jury

course

power
institution

judgment

7.34%
7.34%
7.31%
7.31%
7.31%
7.31%
7.21%
7.18%
7.11%
7.05%
7.01%
6.91%
6.81%
6.78%
6.68%
6.65%
6.58%
6.55%
6.48%
6.45%
6.45%
6.41%
6.35%
6.28%
6.18%
6.08%
6.08%
6.05%
6.05%
5.95%
5.92%
5.88%
5.78%
5.75%
5.72%
5.72%
5.72%
5.65%
5.58%
5.58%
5.55%
5.55%
5.55%
5.52%
5.42%
5.42%
5.38%
5.35%
5.35%
5.32%
5.32%
5.32%
5.28%
5.22%

1

87

156
156
156
155
155
154
154
153
152
152
152
152

lee

example
district

grounds
emphasis
requirement
holding
discrimination
parties

ordinance(s) 195 *
institutions

brief

151

standard

151

area

150
148

payment

147
147
147
146
146
146
146
144
144
143
143
142
142
141

society

141

138
138
137
136
136
136
135
135
134
134
133
132

marijuana
light

discretion

support
id

exception
analysis

people

number
instruction

churches
requirements
determination
context
actions
result

place

terms
statement
judges
issues
extent

complaint
doctrine

conclusion
funds
exercise

131

hearing

130
130
129
129
129

intent

128
128
128
127
127

individuals

new

york
need
employer

vemer
request
religions

questions
others

clause

5.18%
5.18%
5.18%
5.15%
5.15%
5.12%
5.12%
5.08%
5.05%
5.05% * combined 6%
5.05%
5.05%
5.02%
5.02%
4.99%
4.92%
4.89%
4.89%
4.89%
4.85%
4.85%
4.85%
4.85%
4.79%
4.79%
4.75%
4.75%
4.72%
4.72%
4.69%
4.69%
4.59%
4.59%
4.55%
4.52%
4.52%
4.52%
4.49%
4.49%
4.45%
4.45%
4.42%
4.39%
4.35%
4.32%
4.32%
4.29%
4.29%
4.29%
4.25%
4.25%
4.25%
4.22%
4.22%

188

126
126
126
126
125
125
125
125
124
124
124
124
123
123
122
122
121

120

states

public

provision
service

possession

manner
enforcement
system
state

%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
12 %
12 %
09 %
09 %
05 %
05 %
02 %
3 99 %
3 95 %
3 92 %
3 92 %
3 89 %
3 86 %
3 86 %
3 86 %
3 86 %
3 86 %
3 82 %
3 82 %
3 82 %
3 79 %
3 79 %
3 76 %
3 72 %
3 72 %
3 72 %
3 72 %
3 69 %
3 69 %
3 69 %
3 66 %
3 62 %
3 62 %
3 62 %
3 62 %
3 59 %
3 59 %
3 59 %
3 56 %
3 56 %
3 56 %
3 56 %
3 52 %
3 52 %
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

speech

interest

form
county
provisions
cause

worship
inquiry

impact
Wisconsin

.

19
19
19
19
15
15
15
15
12

.

1

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

19

1

addition

.

118
118

god

.

association

.

1

17

circuit

judge

1

16

title

vii

1

16

indictment

.

.

.

1

16

failure

.

116
116
1

15

1

15

exercise

accommodation
group

1

15

decisions
areas

1

14

respondents

114
1

13

112
1

12

legislation

inteip rotation

refusal

prohibition
land

conviction

111

prosecution

111

principle

1

1

opinionby

1

10

employment
states

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

112
112

109
109
109
109
108
108
108
107
107
107
107
106
106

rights

court

showing
petitioners

child
hair

finding
entry
d.c.
California

ante

amount
treatment

response

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

1

89

106
106
106
106
105
105
105
105
104

prison

^

language
february

^ S2

3 52
:

%
%

appellees

^

work

349 %

program
opportunity

3*49%
3^49%

hemandez

349%

trial

court

3.46%

Cases where individual claims prevailed
over proffered state interests

2.

Phrase, Rclaavc Ocnirrcncc In-

I'/,
1

/J

1

684
674
572
556
489
408
389
323
316
111
275

court
s.

ct

1.

cd

state
district

court

f.2d

case
exercise
beliefs(s)

248
240

intcrest(s)
cir

231

id.

457

*

law

369

*

government
children or child 31

*
1

opinion
plaintiffs

order

church

191

plaintiff

188
186
180
178
174
172
164
162

education
rights

defendants
practice(s)

273 *

burden
free

exercise clause

cases
claim

161

use

161

conduct

158
158
153
150
149
147
143
142
140
139
138
135

tsa

134

*

city

right(s)

194
192

593

belief

271
261

228
207
204
202

68.52%
62.41%
61.50%
52.19%
50.73%
44.62%
37.23%
35.49%
29.47%
28.83%
25.27%
25.09%
24.73%
23.81%
22.63%
21.90%
21.08%
20.80%

religion

action

decision
part

united

states

freedom
issue

sherbert

supreme
judgment
s

.

first

court

ct.

amendment

131

record
smith

130
130

question
evidence

hivhi'si.; o,-,-

'

()().()()%

*

combined 54%

*

combined

*

combined 33%

42%

18.89% * combined 28%
18.61%
18.43%
17.70%
17.52%
17.43%
17.15%
16.97%
16.42%
16.24% combined 23%
15.88%
15.69%
14.96%
14.78%
14.69%
14.69%
14.42%
14.42%
13.96%
13.69%
13.59%
13.41%
13.05%
12.96%
12.77%
12.68%
12.59%
12.32%
12.23%
11.95%
11.86%
11.86%

191

128
125

rcgulation(s) 212 *

members

121

purpose(s) 192*

121

interests

1.68%
1.41%
1.04%

1

1

1

16
14
111
1

1

105
104

violation

ordinance(s) 210 *
basis
rule

thomas
appeal
courts
fact

104

child

101

school (s) 185 *

101

protection

100

complaint
inmates

99
99
99
97
95
95
95
95
94
94
94
94
93
92
91
91
91
91

90
89
89
89
88
87
87
87
87

faith

act

work
way
u.s.c.

practices

affirmation
statute

society

reasons
parents
effect

provisions
ordinances
life

exemption
claims
n

requirement
benefits

appellants

nature

laws
j-

course

amendment

86
86
86
86
84
84
84
84
82
82

establishment clause
students
hearing

81

holding

yoder
verner
section

board
schools
regulations

immunity

combined 19%

*

combined 17%

*

combined 19%

.04%
10.95%
1

120
119
119

*

1

10.86%
10.86%
10.58%
10.40%
10.13%

9.58%
9.49%
9.49%
9.22%
9.22%
9.

1

*

2%

9.03%
9.03%
9.03%
8.85%
8.67%
8.67%
8.67%
8.67%
8.58%
8.58%
8.58%
8.58%
8.49%
8.39%
8.30%
8.30%
8.30%
8.30%
8.21%
8.12%
8.12%
8.12%
8.03%
7.94%
7.94%
7.94%
7.94%
7.85%
7.85%
7.85%
7.85%
7.66%
7.66%
7.66%
7.66%
7.48%
7.48%
7.39%

1

92

combined 17%

81

animals

80
80
80
79
78
78
78
77
77
77
77
76
75
75
74
74
72
72

view
time
actions

proceedings
Wisconsin
state

interest

application

school board
person
history
cert.

persons
relief

activity

means
matter
respect

number

71

purposes

71
71

Callahan

70
70
70
69
68
68
68
68
67
67
67
66
66
66
66
66
66
65
65
65
65
64
63
63
63
63
63
63
62
62

injunction

oath

god
f.

supp

years
test

refusal
florida

emphasis
program
counsel

amish

summary Judgment
people
hialeah

circumstances
cause

army
neutrality
facts
article

argument
sankirtan
states

others
office

individual
constitution

b
prisoners
activities

61

day

60

result

7.39%
7.30%
7.30%
7.30%
7.21%
7.12%
7.12%
7.12%
7.03%
7.03%
7.03%
7.03%
6.93%
6.84%
6.84%
6.75%
6.75%
6.57%
6.57%
6.48%
6.48%
6.48%
6.39%
6.39%
6.39%
6.30%
6.20%
6.20%
6.20%
6.20%
6.11%
6.11%
6.11%
6.02%
6.02%
6.02%
6.02%
6.02%
6.02%
5.93%
5.93%
5.93%
5.93%
5.84%
5.75%
5.75%
5.75%
5.75%
5.75%
5.75%
5.66%
5.66%
5.57%
5.47%
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60
60
60
59
59
59
59
59
58
57
57
57
57
56
56
56
55
55
55
55
55

quaring
provision
property
terms
state

court

5
5
5
5

seminary

5
5

district

5

concern
support
tennessee
issues
country
appeals

power

5
5

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

5

.

5

.

5

.

5

.

.

appellee

5

.

reason
peyote

5

.

parties

5

.

5

.

5

.

new
judge

5

york

%
%
11 %
02 %
02 %
02 %
02 %
02 %

5 11
5 11
.

department

47 %
47 %
47 %
38 %
38 %
38 %
38 %
38 %
29 %
20 %
20 %
20 %
20 %

.

1
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APPENDIX E

RELATIVE OCCURRENCE FREQUENCIES

superseS'Se oah”sta7(i.t file 9)!'’°''^
noun phrase

(rei occ.fr eq. in file 9 to rel
occ.freq. in file 8)

religion

(52%

to

39%)

state

(51%

to

35%)

district court

(45%

to

37%)

exercise

(29%

to

23%)

belief(s)

(54%

to

31%)

city

(25%

to

10%)

right(s)

(42%

to

28%)

children-child

(28%

to

12%)

education

(17%

to

10%)

practice(s)

(25%

to

20%)

freedom

(13%

to

9%)

sherbert

(13%

to

8%)

smith

(12%

to

6%)

ordinance(s)

(19%

to

6%)

society

(9%

free exercise clause

(16%

life

(8%

to

.5%)

god

(6%

to

3%)
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to

5%)

to

7%)

and

^-‘’mpelling

preSiM

model:

nounphrase

(rel.

occ. freq. in file

8

to rel occ. freq. in file 9)

government

(39%

to

21%)

church

(31%

to

17%)

united states

(35%

to

13%)

congress

(16%

to

4%)

statute

(14%

to

9%)

exemption

(17%

to

8%)

purpose(s)

(24%

to

17%)
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APPENDIX F

CO-OCCURRENCE ASSOCIATIONS
File 8

Cases where

-

slate interests prevailed

InFinder found 928 terms related
‘

p.lamtiffs’ religion

—

-

respo ndents' religion

to:

religion

religion posed problems for state
policy?
not significant
interesting but not clear on its meaning

-not significant

religion
religion rcqnirpmpnf

Devote places
Icmale soldiers

-

free exercise
nationalism
nonreligion

- reference
to Smith .?
idiosyncratic likely,

b.

state

faith

cntanglemem
mandates

-

as rationale for compelling interests?

-

Establishment language? patterns in Dicta?
- Balancing
test language

calculus

burden results
advances
government entanglement
property protection statute
religion clauses

File 9

-

Cases where

state interests

superseded

InFinder tound 536 terms related
nonreligion
Irec exercise clause.
precepts

conception
discrimination because
disputes

^te

gove rnments

imposition

to:

religion

-Interestingly, the clause is discussed
-

-

more here

Procreative? not likely, a religious “conception” perhaps
Sensible association,

Language of disputes rather than “exemptions”
Slate - local laws more likely to be superseded
See “disputes” above

religion clauses
religion

photograph requirement burdens

-

Idiosyncratic, several cases dealt with photo id’s

heritage

government entanglement
ience

-

Interesting, but not sure

slate religion

adherents

toward

197

how

it fits,

likely idiosyncratic

science
process clansp

File 8

-

Cases where

Due Process?

Interesting that

it

would crop up here

state interests prevailed

InFinder found 710 terms related
tax benefits places
petitioners' exercise

-

interest

Exemptions from tax policy sought

burden denial
interest claiming protection
~

to:

-

Claims of

free exercise

Peculiar, referent to statute,

burden

wordy

fail

iudge'^

interest

government

interest

state interest

ax collection
say
n6 because
t

-

See “tax benefits places” above

stake

welfare traud
- Another area
where
compelling
un employment compensation statutes

state interests are

-

See “welfare fraud” above

thus

id.

workplace
solvency

amendment

* Doctrinal

coherency? economic issues heavy?

interest

overriding

-

Doctrinal

synonyms used more heavily

interest test

File 9

-

Cases where

state interests

superseded

InFinder found 337 terms related

to:

interest

student groups
state university

-

Idiosyncratic

-

Idiosyncratic

liberty interest

*Doctrinal coherency? ideological element to judicial rhetoric

-

though several cases were of education variety

interest
state interest

motorists

-

Idiosyncratic

-

Idiosyncratic

-

photographic requirement

/

license cases

state interest test

proximity
licensees
transactions

government

interest

applications
identification

photograph requirement

-

See licensees, motorists, identification above

exclusion

magnitude

-

Balancing

-

Idiosyncratic

test

language?

interest test

crowd control

198

conccssionairps:
a nimal carcasses

File 8

-

Cases where

-

Ditto

-

Likely idiosyncratic

slate interests prevailed

InFinder tound 1001 terms related

to!

exercise

exercise litigation
s chool attendance statute
exercise protections

religion

problem

Idiosyncratic? or a reference to

-

Yoder

* Doctrinal coherency‘s

process right

accommodation

sta te

value judgment
exercise clause
exercise riphis

*

Exemptions policy as the default

* Doctrinal coherency's

free exercise
exercise claim
exercise challenge
s fate

compulsion

-

State

is

compelled, balancing

test

language

ridicule
restraint

religion

argument
Shenandoah

-

^

Idiosyncratic

peyote places
interest claiming protection

-

Smith references?

a-e

exercise

File 9

-

Cases where

state interests

superseded

InFinder found 607 terms related

to:

exercise

animal-sacrifice laws

smith rule

-

Heavy

use, esp. since

most cases

in this set

come

before

Smith
protections
regulates
issue discriminates

* Doctrinal

coherency? Discrimination by

designs
rule smith
quotation marks
free exercise clause
exercise claim
historical understanding

* Doctrinal

coherency? Judges referring to traditions of
and knowledge of religious beliefs / actions

interpretation

case law
exercise
neutrality

* Doctrinal

coherency?

state actions

199

state policy

score
inleresi

claiming proieciic^n

Doctrinal coherency? Rather than seeking
exemption or
exceptions as in the other set of cavSes,
judges articulate
claims in terms of protection

free exercise claim
exercise clause

while

File 8

-

Cases where

-

Bizarre

state interests prevailed

InFinder found 558 terms related
mishler

-

to:

beliefs

-Delinitely idiosyncratic'

beliefs

david smith

-

Another idiosyncrasy

plaintiffs' beliefs

graduation exercises

diploma
government

-

Ditto

benefii*;

prison officials' beliefs
burdens incident
state conditions
receipt controls

government
plaintiffs'

program.^;

claims

centrality

prospect
perjury clause
sincerity

tendency
beings
security considerations

File 9

-

Cases where

state interests

superseded

InFinder found 291 terms related

to: beliefs

plaintiffs' beliefs

beliefs

diploma
amish beliefs

* Doctrinal coherency? either a reference to

inordinate

unemployment

* Doctrinal

amount of repeats

predicament
pressure
plaintiff parents
-

Idiosyncratic

juror

200

Yoder or an

case itself

coherency? Expert knowledge

reaffirmation though.

holt readers

in the

tells

us this already

second c ommandment
observances

-

Idiosyncratic?

objector
holt
t

books

hemes

grant

employers
centuries
revelation
evolution

201

Odd

for sure.

APPENDIX G

CO-OCCURRENCE NODES USER DEFINED
-

File 8

-

Cases where

stale interests prevailed

InFinder found 314 terms related

to:

compelling

interest test

-

Same

welfare fraud

-

Ditto

state interest

-

Ditto

-

In both files, consistency of discourse

-

In both files, consistency of discourse

-

Remarkably

significance as in File 9

exercise inquiry
pienta
fields

2()0()bb-l

projects
2()()()bb

workers' compensation program
government interests

precedents
interest

border control laws

government

interest

slabaugh

in both,

would seem

idiosyncratic

state interests

centrality

* Doctrinal coherency?

stake

bowen

name

-

Idiosyncratic

overriding

-

drug laws

-

Doctrinal synonym
Not surprisingly correlated to compelling interests

-

case

magnitude

fulfillment

approach

means
drugs
claimant
exercise rights
fourth circuit
File 9

-

Cases where

state interests

superseded

InFinder found 452 terms related

to:

compelling

interest lest

-

Almost same significance

welfare fraud

-

Ditto

-

Ditto

as in file 8

state interest test
state interest

student groups

* Originally suspected of idiosyncrasy, but perhaps

doctrinal coherency indicator.

202

.

it is

.education and children

a

may

beat

state interests
riel (is

state university

licensees

pienta
exercise inquiry
ssn requiremoni
motorisi.s

ensuring

anomaly
2()()()bb-l
2()()()bb

interest

workers' compensation program
state interests

precedents
nebraska oiTici;(l.s
border control laws

photograph re()uircmenl
projects

slabaugh

government

interests

iustirication

exercise right

magnitude

means
File 8

-

Cases where

state interests prevailed

InFinder found 1340 terms related
* Note:

to:

state interest

remarkable overlap of highly co-occurring concepts

interest claiming protection
state interest

solvency

unemployment compensation

statutes

respondents smith
pienta

drug laws
users

Imra
plaintiff principals

overriding
interest

liberty interest

stake

magnitude
drugs
principals

women

guards

-

Idiosyncratic likely, but interesting

state court

sex education policy

-

Idiosyncratic as well, again interesting that sex ed. would
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"

»rpX.:aWr "I

‘-'“y P'--ns -ppon

state

part

ii

state interests

claimant
union shop
exercise protection

Oregon

Smith! Idiosyncratic.

interest test

relationship standard
exercise rights

File

9

-

Cases where

state interests

superseded

InFinder found 1563 terms related

to;

state interest

interest claiming protection
church group
- The next
three phrases are all indicators of subject
areas
where compelling interests of the state are trumped

motorists
student groups
state interest

state university

solvency

This is odd, would be expected to correlate more highly
with other set of cases, used as a rationale lor
state interest
.

in certain policies (i.e. tax or

unemployment)

being compelling.

unemployment compensation

statutes

-

See above

respondents smith
pienta

drug laws
Imra
photograph requirement
licensees
liberty interest
interest
state interest test

plaintiff principals

ensuring

magnitude
respondents' claim

nebraska otticials

-

Trouble with Nebraska! Prison case idiosyncrasy

overriding
users
licensee
state interests

ssn requirement

stake
principals

drugs
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